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My doctoral dissertation, an in-depth case study of the Phulbari Coal Project in Bangladesh, 
accentuates the interests and engagements of Indigenous peoples (Adibasi people) in the decision-
making process in resource extractive industries through an environmental justice framework. My 
primary aim is to observe how and to what extent Indigenous peoples’ interests are reflected in 
official environmental decision-making processes versus how they frame their own claims in a 
mining conflict situation. I employ extensive qualitative research in the project area to demonstrate 
how Adibasi communities articulate and implement their claims through raising their voices and 
ultimately stimulating a movement that stopped the development of a ‘perilous’ open-pit mining 
project. The resistance movement began more than a decade ago in 2006, but Adibasis, other 
farming communities and activists are still bearing the spirit of the movement, which they shared 
in the interviews I conducted. This research analyzes their motivations for fighting a multinational 
corporation and identifies how their movement articulates with national and transnational activists’ 
conceptions of environmental justice in the global South. I explore how these ideals play out in 
practice on the ground, in a context where the development is highly contested, and disparities of 
power are prevalent. I anticipate that this empirical research will attract other ethnographic 
research on the environment, Indigenous peoples, resource extractive industries and sustainable 
economic development in the global South. 
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justice groups; resource extractive industries; EIA; mining conflict; resistance movement; 
Indigenous environmental justice movement; global South; open-pit coal mine; environmental 
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The dissertation is about resistance to coal mining in Bangladesh. The proposed ‘Phulbari Coal 
Project’ in Dinajpur district would establish one of the largest open-pit or surface coal mines in 
the world. If established, this large-scale development project would present several environmental 
degradation risks, including economic and social problems like any other extractive resource 
project. Tension first rose in the local communities when the minerals were discovered in 1998, 
and it was declared that the project proponent would extract coal through the open-pit mining 
process. Local people, including a large number of Adibasi communities,1 protested the decision 
beginning a resistance movement called Phulbari Koyla Kkoni Anodolon in Bangla language and 
Phulbari Coal Mine Movement in English language that would spur violence by 2006. ‘Khoni’ is 
a Bangla word means ‘mine’ and ‘andolon’ means ‘movement’. The movement is popularly called 
as Phulbari Khoni Andolon by local people which I use throughout the dissertation.  
I take Adibasi communities or Indigenous peoples of the mining region as the ‘subject’ of my 
research and examine whether they have experienced a lack of recognition, limited or insignificant 
consultation, and participation in the decision-making process of the project proposal. The study 
explores and documents how Adibasi communities mobilize arguments based on human rights, 
compensation, recognition, distributive justice, and procedural justice in the course of their 
 
1 Adibasi communities are self declared Indigenous peoples in Bangladesh. As the term ‘Indigenous peoples’ is not 
commonly used in the local context, throughout the dissertation, I use ‘Adibasi’ in the Bangladesh context to mean 
Indigenous peoples. Although ‘Adivasi’ term is popularly used in India, I use ‘Adibasi’ to keep consistent how 
Bangladeshi people pronounce the term.  
2 
 
resistance. This research aims to explore the rationale of meaningful integration of the rights of 
Adibasi communities into development decisions: how affected peoples understand and how they 
react to a development process conducted by a multinational company. I examine the resistance of 
Adibasi communities to the Phulbari Coal Project with an environmental justice lens. I ask: what 
lessons about environmental justice can we draw from observing the resistance of Adibasi 
communities to halt the Phulbari Coal Project in Bangladesh? Do the protesters’ actions reflect 
concerns primarily about the distribution of risks and benefits, or instead, do they focus primarily 
on ideas about recognition and procedural justice, or both? Is there something distinctive about 
environmental justice movements as they emerge in the global South?  
I begin by investigating the interests of Adibasi communities, as they would be affected by the 
open-pit coal project, emphasizing the socio-economic and environmental impacts. I consider 
whether they are ‘Indigenous peoples’ under international law and if their claims form a new 
dimension of the environmental justice movement from the global South. I found much research 
conducted on the Phulbari Khoni Andolon, but an environmental justice lens and Adibasi accounts 
were not taken into consideration in those researches. My research fills this gap by intensifying 
the Adibasi voices as they struggle for recognition as ‘Indigenous peoples.’ Since self-identified 
Adibasi communities around the Bangladeshi open-pit coal mine and throughout Bangladesh are 
not recognized as ‘Indigenous peoples’ or ‘Adibasi’ by the government, I examine how the 
surrounding Adibasi communities attempt to establish their identity as Indigenous peoples 
according to international law through qualitative research conducted in the mining region. The 
purpose of this effort is to demonstrate the recognizable legal and political character of Adibasi 
communities so that their voices are adequately heard in every stage of development decision in 
their traditional territories and lands. 
3 
 
Moreover, threats to rights, lands, and cultures of Indigenous peoples have triggered resistance 
against multinational and transnational corporations (MNCs and TNCs), governments, and 
international financial institutes (IFIs) in the process of protecting land rights, sacred sites, food 
security, climate change, and traditional ecological knowledge around the globe.2 Through their 
struggles against powerful actors who continuously threaten to displace them from their traditional 
lands and drive them away towards assimilation into mainstream majority communities, 
Indigenous groups have embraced diverse notions of environmental justice.3 The resistance of 
Indigenous peoples and other marginalized communities who traditionally lived and worked 
closest to the land is a central strand of the environmental justice movement.    
Adibasi communities and other local people of the Phulbari coalmine area threatened with 
dislocation, vastly depend upon agriculture since the land is fertile enough for three seasons’ crops. 
The air, soil, and water of the surrounding area of the project are likely to be contaminated by the 
mining. Critics argue that the contaminated water, air, and soil would significantly affect the 
fertility of agricultural lands, the health of workers and local people near the project area and that 
the local bio-diversity and ecosystem would be destroyed permanently.4 Furthermore, extracted 
coal would be transported by vessels for export to the Mongla Seaport through the Sundarbans, 
the largest mangrove forest in the world, which is the habitat of many wild animals, including the 
Royal Bengal Tigers and a UNESCO World Heritage Site.5  
A mine development project can minimize the impact of its activities on the neighboring 
communities and the surrounding environment by careful pre-planning, and policy 
 
2 David Schlosberg and David Carruthers, “Indigenous Struggles, Environmental Justice, and Community 
Capabilities” (2010) 10:4 Glob Environmental Politics. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Manaranajan Pegu, “The Phulbari Movement: Resisting Neo-liberalism in Bangladesh.” In Sustainability and 
Ownership in People Centred Advocacy in South Asia (Dhaka: National Centre for Advocacy Studies, 2011).   
5 Mangrove Action Project, “Save the Sundarbans- Stop The Phulbari Coal Mine: Mangrove Action Plan” (2012), 
Online: http://mangroveactionproject.org/save-the-sundarbans-stop-the-phulbari-coal-mine/  
4 
 
implementation, through environmental impact assessment (EIA), social impact assessment (SIA), 
and pollution control measures, and by monitoring the effects of mining and rehabilitating the 
mined areas.6 In line with these expectations, the Department of Environment (DoE) of Bangladesh 
granted an Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECA) in September 2005 and approved the 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) prepared and published by Asia Energy7 in 
2006 for the Phulbari Coal Project.8  
The people of Phulbari and the surrounding areas, however, formed movements to protest the 
company and the open-pit coal project for the sake of the affected people and the country’s 
economic and environmental interests. Protesters were not convinced that coal extracted from the 
open-pit mine would create a benefit surpassing the overall human losses and environmental 
impacts. They disagreed with the company’s claims about the damage and the number of people 
to be displaced. For that reason, local opposition against the project was strong. A group of local 
politicians took the initiative by forming a committee to protest Asia Energy that later became 
weaker due to political influences. However, a national interest protection group consisting civil 
society and left-wing politicians called the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral 
Resources, Power and Ports of Bangladesh (also known as the National Committee of Bangladesh 
or NCBD) emerged and organized a mass protest on August 26th, 2006. The protest was locally 
called the Asia Energy Office Gherao Kormosuchi9 (Occupy the Asia Energy Office). The popular 
Phulbari Khoni Andolon has multiple layers. The movement was the result of eighteen months of 
 
6 Irene Sosa and Karyn Keenan, Impact Benefit Agreements Between Aboriginal Communities and Mining 
Companies: Their Use in Canada, (Ottawa: Canadian Environmental Law Association, 2001). 
7 Asia Energy PLC is a British owned multinational company. Although the company changed their name from Asia 
Energy to GCM Resources Plc, I use the former term because the name is familiar to local and national protesters. 
8 Asia Energy PLC, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment for Phulbari Coal Project: Executive Summary, 
(NSW: Asia Energy Corporation (Bangladesh) Pty Ltd, 2006). 
9 Bangla words ‘Gherao Kormosuchi’ are used more often in political movement in Bangladesh to mean encircling 
or surrounding of politicians or office buildings until the protestors’ demands are met. 
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campaigns, networks, meetings, assemblies, and discussions among local and national activists 
and Adibasi leaders. Their goal was to increase awareness of the potential negative impacts of 
mining and to help local farming and low-income communities to organize protests against the 
company and the open-pit mining method.10 
On the 26th of August 2006, thousands of people from surrounding sub-districts started 
gathering in Phulbari town to express their grievances. Adibasi and local Bangalee farming 
communities, teachers, students, small entrepreneurs, women, children, public interest groups, 
civil society members, and solidarity groups from Dhaka and other parts of Bangladesh gathered 
at the outskirts of Phulbari to send a message to the government, the company, and international 
financial institutions (IFSs) that they did not want the open-pit mine. As the demonstration 
concluded, security forces opened fire on the rally. Three young men were killed, and as many as 
three hundred people were injured. This incident heightened public sentiment against Asia Energy. 
Another reason for the mass protest was the contract between the Government of Bangladesh 
and the foreign company, which was perceived as going against the interests of the country, though 
the government looked forward to economic gain from the project. The low royalty percentage on 
the project, which is only 6% for Bangladesh, angered local people and motivated them to raise 
voice against the foreign company.11 The protesters assumed that the government would not 
benefit from the project since the company would export most of the extracted coal. They asserted 
that the government did not consider national and local interests during signing the contract 
because the project would destroy local dwellers, economy, biodiversity, sacred and religious sites, 
and environment. The protesters’ frustrations could be ‘justified’ in the sense that if the project 
 
10 Sadid A. Nuremowla, Resistance, rootedness and mining protest in Phulbari, DPhil Thesis. University of Sussex, 
(2012) at 170. 
11 Asia Energy Plc., “The Phulbari Coal Project” (2004). Online: http://www.gcmplc.com/sites/default/files/2017-
09/Asia_Energy_19th_MineSite.pdf   
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proceeded, their households and livelihoods would be destroyed, and local people in the project 
area would be displaced, which would ultimately make them environmental refugees.  
Soon more people, especially women and children, joined the mass protest. They gathered in 
Phulbari town and blocked all major roads during four days of protests. The protestors 
disconnected communication among major cities. During this period, activists faced several 
obstacles. The company employed powerful people as their agents (locally called Dalal)12 to 
threaten movement activists. Security forces raided and arrested some activists after the company 
filed criminal charges. Government representatives finally sat with the protest leaders to negotiate. 
They agreed to meet all the demands of Phulbari demonstrators and signed a social contract. The 
contract stated clearly, among other things, that the government agreed to the expulsion of Asia 
Energy from Bangladesh and to dropping the open-pit mining method everywhere in the country.  
The Phulbari Khoni Andolon was one of the most widely publicized local resistances against 
the extractive industry in Asia in the last decade. The movement became the focus of national and 
international media, public interest groups, civil society members, non-government organizations 
(NGOs), national and transnational environmental justice organizations (TEJOs), and many 
studies were conducted throughout the period. It has been 13 years since the project was 
suspended. Although the company had wound up their activities in Phulbari and shut down their 
offices in Bangladesh, they have been continuing their business on the London Stock Exchange in 
the name of the Phulbari Coal Project. The resistance is still going on. Local people observe 
‘Phulbari Day’ on 26th August every year and vow to fight until the project is ultimately canceled.  
 
12 The word ‘Dalal’ is popularly used in Phulbari to mean agents who were appointed by Asia Energy to manipulate 
local people and protesters to work in favor of the company. They take repressive measures to force local people to 
transfer their lands for the project and are supported by local administration. 
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Although the ESIA of the Phulbari Coal Project provides special provisions for ‘Indigenous 
peoples’13 as has become the norm in these procedures, the document identifies only three Adibasi 
communities (Santal, Munda, and Mahili) as ‘Indigenous peoples.’14 But Jatiyo Adibasi Parishad 
(JAP), a national Indigenous NGO,15 claims that some other ethnic communities who are not 
included in the document should also be regarded as Indigenous peoples.16 According to different 
environmental and Indigenous organizations in Bangladesh, the ESIA of the Phulbari Coal Project 
does not accurately describe Adibasi or Indigenous peoples’ participation in the decision-making 
process.17 They claim that the documentation of the company consultations with Adibasi 
communities is also grossly inadequate, and some Adibsis are excluded from the process.18 The 
company’s explanation for not holding satisfactory consultation was “our communication and 
consultation process in the project area was interrupted in 2006, due to political instability and 




13 Indigenous People’s Development Plan (IPDP) Volume 4.1, Section 4 of the ESIA. In this document, three 
Adibasi communities are as ‘Indigenous peoples,’ although they are not recognized by the government as 
‘Indigenous peoples.’  
14 Section 3.2 of the IPDP, “Indigenous Groups in the Project Area,” states that 7.3% of all households to be 
displaced are Indigenous. However, a footnote reveals that this estimate excludes households from groups that “are 
more appropriately classified as ‘small ethnic minority’ groups rather than ‘Indigenous,’ given their historic past, 
their social structure, religious practices and non-agricultural livelihoods.”  
Also see: Kate Hoshour, “The Indigenous Peoples Development Plan for the Phulbari Project, Bangladesh” (2012) 
International Accountability Project. 
15 Jatiyo Adibasi Parishad (National Indigenous Union in English) was formed in 1993 for helping Indigenous 
peoples/Adibasis of North Bengal. Furthermore, as the government was mis-recognizing the existence of Adibasis in 
the country, the land grabbers would get more chances to take possession of Adibasi properties illegally. The NGO 
had 9 demands when they had started the journey. The first demand was to get/achieve constitutional recognition as 
Adibasi/Indigenous peoples. They also stated that Adibasis must have a separate land commission which would deal 
land alienation and dispossession issue.  
16 Hoshour, supra note 14.  
17 Jennifer Kalafut, “Phulbari Coal Project: A Displacement Disaster in the Name of Development” in Jennifer 
Kalafut and Roger Moody. Phulbari Coal Project: Studies on Displacement, Resettlement, Environmental, and 
Social Impact. (Dhaka: Samhati Publications, 2008). 




1.2. Adibasi and the Politics of Recognition in Bangladesh 
 
 
Bangladeshi Indigenous leaders 
who are vocal for their rights prefer 
the term ‘Indigenous peoples’ in 
English and ‘Adibasi’ in Bangla,20 
arguing that there is no difference 
between the two terms. The Sanskrit 
word ‘Adibasi’ is comprised of the 
phrase ‘Adi’ and ‘Basi’; the former 
means ‘original or earliest times’ and 
later means ‘residents or 
inhabitants.’21 In this sense, Adibasis 
are original or earliest residents or 
inhabitants in a particular region. 
These groups are believed to be 
descendants of a ‘pre-Dravidian race’, 
who are considered as the oldest inhabitants of the Indian sub-continent.22 According to Joseph 
Dineker, the Dravidian race is mixed of both the Indonesian and Australian which is prevalent 
 
20 Bangladeshi Indigenous peoples, both from the CHT and the plains, have started to refer themselves as Indigenous 
in English and as Adibasi in Bangla when the International Year of the Indigenous Peoples was declared by the 
United Nations.  
See also: Raja Devasish Roy, The ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations, 1957 and the Laws of 
Bangladesh: A Comparative Review, Project to Promote the ILO Policy on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and the 
ILO Office, Dhaka, Bangladesh, July, 2009.  
21 Mesbah Kamal, “Introduction” eds Mesbah Kamal, Jahidul Islam and Sugata Chakma, Adibasi Communities 
Bangladesh Asiatic Society, Dhaka: 2007, at xiii. Also see: David Hardiman , The Coming of the Devi: Adivasi 
Assertion in Western India ( Delhi : Oxford University Press , 1987). 
22 Ibid. 




among the peoples of Southern India speaking the Dravidian tongues and some other people of 
India.23 He mentions that most of Indian race are mixed of the Afghans, the Rajputs, the Brahmins 
and crosses with Assyroid, Dravidian, Mongol, Turkish, Arab and other elements.24  
It is assumed that Tibeto-Burman language-speaking tribal groups belong to social groups who 
have been inhabiting the region before the coming of the dominant sections of the current Indian 
society, such as, the Aryans. The Bangalees, Gujaratis, Ariyas are said to the descendants of the 
Aryans.25 The tribal groups have generally been described as Adibasis or the original people by 
scholars, social workers, missionaries, and some administrators since the beginning of the present 
century.26 The term ‘Adibasis’ was being used to identify and differentiate a group of people 
different in physical features, language, religion, custom, and social organization.27 However, 
critics argue that the identity of Adibasis which was forced upon them from outside to differentiate 
them from the dominant community has now been internalized by Adibasis themselves.28 
Prathama Bannerjee also makes a similar argument to Xaxa about original inhabitants or earlier 
settlers. She argues that “the term Adivasi was an emphatically historicist, nationalist category—
literally meaning ‘original’, perhaps true inhabitant of the country.”29 According to her, the use of 
the term ‘Adibasi’ is a historical claim which is not easily established within Indian politics like 
Indian nationalism itself, rather the claim often turned into a culturalist approach where Indigenous 
identity was reduced to maintenance of the autonomy of tribal traditions.30 Given the situation in 
 
23 Joseph Dineker, The Races of Man: An Outline of Anthropology and Ethnography. (Charles Scribner's and Sons: 
London, 1900) at 498. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Virginius Xaxa, “Tribes as Indigenous People of India.” (1999) Economic and political weekly, at 3589 
26 Ibid. at 3591. 
27 Ibid. at 3590. 
28 Ibid. at 3589.  
29 Prathama Banerjee, “Culture/Politics: The irresoluble double-bind of the Indian Adivasi.” (2006) 33.1 Indian 
Historical Review, at 105. 
30 Ibid.  
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the Indian sub-continent, the name ‘Adivasi’ is a political statement of distinctiveness and 
autonomy originating from colonial anthropological categories such as ‘tribe’ and ‘aborigine’ that 
cast them forever as low and backward.31 
Virginius Xaxa has contributed to the scholarly debate about ‘original inhabitants’ in the Indian 
context. He explains that it is certainly difficult to say that all self-identified tribal people in Indian 
sub-continent are earlier settlers than Aryans, and therefore, they are Indigenous, and others are 
not.32 Some argue that the non-tribal groups like the Bangalees, Gujaratis, and Oriyas have a much 
longer history of settlement than these tribes.33 If ‘who came first’ is taken foremost consideration 
for being Indigenous, many Tibeto-Burman speaking tribal groups in India would not be 
considered as Indigenous peoples because Aryans settled earlier than them.34 According to Xaxa, 
then, for the purpose of identifying the existence of Indigenous peoples, there is no need to make 
a distinction between settlement in the country as a whole, and settlement within its parts or 
regions.35 The author explains that the settlement of the Mizos, who are one of the Adibasi groups 
live in the North-east India, may have been a later development than those of the Gujaratis or 
Bengalis, but the fact is that they are the original settlers of the place where they live now. The 
Mizo people are said to have settled in the territory where they live only in the 16th century.  
Similarly, the Santals may have settled in the territory where they live now later than the 
Bengalis, but it cannot be said that their settlement in India is prior to that of the groups commonly 
 
31 Ibid. at 113.  
32 Xaxa, supra note 25 at 3592.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid. at 3591.  
35 Ibid.  
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referred to as the Aryans.36 Therefore, to claim Indigenous status on this ground, a group can say 
they are the original settlers of the area they live now from the time immemorial. 
In the Indian sub-continent, especially in India and Bangladesh, self-defined Indigenous 
peoples call themselves and prefer to be called ‘Adibasi’, but they are neither recognized by the 
state Constitution nor other legal instruments exclusively. The Indian government classified ‘all 
ethnic communities who are calling themselves Indigenous peoples’ into three categories in its 
Constitution: ‘scheduled tribes’, ‘scheduled castes or forward castes’, and ‘other backward 
classes’.37 As Pooja Parmar points out in the Indian context, “the claims of Adivasis as original 
inhabitants were thus effectively written out of the Constitution, foreclosing any possibility of a 
future recognition in the country's law. Since there are no recognized Adivasis, there is no legal 
basis for any claim as an original inhabitant.”38  
Adibasis are also not recognized in Bangladesh, and there are no such categorizations. 
However, some ethnic groups are generally recognized as ‘tribes,’ ‘minor races,’ ‘ethnic sects’ and 
‘communities,’ ‘small ethnic groups,’ ‘upojati,’ etc., and some are not recognized at all. For 
example, the 1991 official census data identified and recognized only 27 ‘tribal’ communities in 
Bangladesh, as reflected in the Small Ethnic Groups Cultural Institution Act 2010 (SEGCI Act).  
There are around 1.6 million people amounting to 1.7% of the total population Bangladesh are 
Adibasis. . However, Adibasi leaders and researchers came up with almost double that number.39 
Surprisingly, the 2001 and 2011 official censuses did not categorize any Indigenous groups and 
 
36 Ibid. at 3592.  
37 The complete list of Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes was made through two subsequent Presidential 
Orders: The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. 
38 Pooja Parmar, “Undoing Historical Wrongs: Law and Indigeneity in India.” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
at 516. 
39 Philip Gain, Survival on the Fringe: Adibasis of Bangladesh, (Society for Environment and Human Development 
(SEHD), Dhaka: 2011). 
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their numbers, because both the censuses have considered the religious base of the population.40 
Although Chattogram41 Hill Tracts (CHT) (the Southern hill districts) have the largest 
concentration of Adibasis comprising of eleven Adibasi groups of which the Chakma people is the 
largest in number, the North-western region /North Bengal, North-central part, North-eastern 
region, and coastal regions have a large number of Adibasis. The Santal is the most populous 
Adibasi community in the North Bengal followed by the Oraon. The Garo, Hajong, Koch, 
Rajbangshi and Dalu are Adibasi communities live in the North-central part of Bangladesh, of 
which the Garo is the largest ethnic group. Many Garos live in North-eastern states of India. There 
are some Adibasi groups live in the North-eastern region of Bangladesh such as Khasi and 
Monipuri.42 Rakhine is the lone Adibasi community live in the coastal areas of Bangladesh. Most 
of the Bangladeshi Adibasi communities are concentrated in the borders of neighboring countries 
such as India and Myanmar. More demographic information about Bangladeshi Adibasi 
communities are set out in the table 1.  
Table 1 Adibasis of Bangladesh 
Adibasi Groups Regions Divisions and 
Districts 













These 11 Adibasi communities of the 
CHT are collectively called as ‘Jumma 
people’. The Chakma is the largest in 
number (239417 according to 1991 
census). Each community group has 
distinct features regarding language, 










According to Bangladesh Statistics 
Bureau in their Population Census 
estimates that Adibasis in this region 
 
40 Ibid.  
41 It was Chittagong before; the government recently changed the spelling officially into Chattogram to comply with 
Bengali pronunciation. Chattogram is one of the eight administrative Divisions (bivag) of Bangladesh. In 
Bangladesh, 64 district administrations are divided into different Divisions. Source: 
https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2018/04/02/english-spellings-chittagong-comilla-barisal-jessore-bogra-
changed/ 
42 Gain, supra note 39.  
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in all 16 
districts) 
constitute 1.5% of the total population and 
represent 26% of the entire Adibasi 
groups of Bangladesh. They are also 
regarded as Adibasis or Indigenous 
peoples of the plains.  
Santal is the largest Adibasi community in 
Bangladesh, and throughout their history, 
they are one of the most marginalized, 
persecuted, and disadvantaged 
communities in Bangladesh.  
 
Garo, Hajong, Koch, 
Rajbangshi and 
Dalu.  
North-central Dhaka and 
Mymensingh 
Garo is the largest in this region (64,280 
according to 1991 census). The Garos are 
popularly known for their matrilineal 
nature of society structure Their language 
is unique in Bangladesh which is called 
Tibeto-Burman. Most Garos are 
converted into Christianity. The second 
largest Adibasi group of this region is 
Koch (16, 567, according to 1991 census).   





According to 2001 census, 1.13% of total 
population of this region belong to the 
Manipuri and Khasi people. There is a 
considerable number of Garo live in this 
region too. 






2001 census indicates that Rakhines 
constitutes 5.58% of total Adibasi 
communities in Bangladesh. They are 
Mongoloid and follow Buddhism. They 
have their own scripts and language. 
Some Marmas are found in the region too. 
The Rakhine and Marma have similarities 
regarding their social matters. 
Source: Indigenous Peoples Framework, Ministry of Information of the Government of Bangladesh and 
Philip Gain, Survival on the Fringe: Adibasis of Bangladesh, (Society for Environment and Human Development 
(SEHD), Dhaka: 2011) 
 
As Pooja Parmar has demonstrated, considering the literal meaning, government authorities of 
the Indian sub-continent have tried to argue that ‘Scheduled tribes’, ‘Tribal’ or ‘Ethnic groups’ are 
not ‘Adibasi’ or ‘Indigenous peoples.’43 Some regard them as ethno-occupational groups.44 The 
 
43 Pooja Parmar, Indigeneity and Legal Pluralism in India: Claims, Histories, Meanings. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
44 Gain, supra note 39. 
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Bangladeshi government contends that the entire Bangalee community of Bangladesh had 
‘coexisted’ with other ethnic groups before the geographical divisions by British administrators, 
and therefore, “all Bangalee people are Indigenous or Adibasi.”45 In various diplomatic 
discussions, government officials have rejected the claim of the existence of Indigenous peoples 
in Bangladesh, though the United Nations (UN) acknowledges that the recognition of Indigenous 
peoples should not be dependent on whether national governments recognize them as Indigenous 
or not.46 Moreover, various international legal instruments and scholars emphasize ‘self-
identification’ as a significant criterion. However, instead of taking the self-identification principle 
as the basis of recognizing Indigenous peoples, the Bangladesh government took ‘historical 
continuity’ as the primary basis. During the discussion with foreign diplomats and UN agencies 
representatives in 2011, Bangladeshi former Foreign Minister Dipu Moni insisted, “‘tribal people’ 
of the CHT did not exist before the 16th century, and they were not regarded as ‘Indigenous 
peoples’ in historical reference books or legal documents; instead, they have been identified as a 
‘tribal’ population.”47 When the UN Special Rapporteur Lars Anders Baer presented a study titled 
“Status of implementation of the CHT Accord of 1997” in 2011, Iqbal Ahmed, the First Secretary 
of the Bangladesh Mission in New York, said, “Bangladesh does not have any Indigenous 
population.”48 He also added, “we urged upon the UN forum for not wasting time on politically 
fictitious issues in Bangladesh.”49 Furthermore, Bangladesh countered that ‘Indigenous peoples’ 
refers only to “those countries where racially distinct people coming from overseas established 
 
45 Ibid.  
46 FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), Free, Prior and Informed Consent: An Indigenous Peoples’ Right and 
a Good Practice for Local Communities, Manual for Project Practitioners (Paris, 2015) at 12. Online: 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6190e.pdf  
47 The Daily Star, “Ethnic Minority, not indigenous people,” July 27, 2011. Online: < 
http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-195963>  
48 The Daily Star, “No indigenous people in Bangladesh! Govt official tells UN” May 28, 2011. Online: 
http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=187527 
49 Ibid.  
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colonies and subjugated the Indigenous populations.”50 The government authority also contends 
that the CHT has more dominant Bangalee population than ‘tribal people,’ but they do not want to 
recognize the enormous population migration from various parts of Bangladesh who settled in 
Indigenous lands in the late 1970s, which is still continuing. Indigenous territorial lands were 
occupied by Bangalee settlers and legally registered for ownership.51 Against the backdrop of 
much debate over constitutional recognition of Adibasi communities in Bangladesh, the Law 
Minister Shafique Ahmed stated in 2011, “they are tribal people, not Indigenous.”52 He further 
explained the issue, “there are two criteria in the ILO Convention No. 169: the first criterion which 
defines ‘tribal people’ is applicable for Bangladesh, but the second criterion that defines 
‘Indigenous peoples’ is not applicable for Bangladesh.”53 Eventually, the executive body took a 
few initiatives to bolster their claims of the non-existence of Indigenous peoples in Bangladesh.54 
For example, on March 2012, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development issued 
and circulated a letter to all levels of administrative bodies of the government stating that “in 
Bangladesh, there are tribal people, not Indigenous peoples” and urged people to stop celebration 
of “International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples.”55 The Ministry of Information of the 
 
50 Ibid.  
51 In 1947 the Indigenous constituted more than 98% of the population of the CHT, the Bangalees less than 2%. In 
the period 1951 to 1974, the Indigenous numbers increased by 71.7% while the Bangalees increased by 125.1%. 
Bangalee population in the Hill Tracts rose to 9% in 1951, 12% in 1961, and 40% in 1981. Between 1980 and early 
1984, 4,00,000 Bangalees were settled in the CHT which accounted for almost 50% of the total population of the 
CHT. Since the government could not provide lands for Bangalee settlers it promised, settlers started to grab 
Indigenous lands with the help of military which is still continuing. See: Syed Aziz-al Ahsan and Bhumitra Chakma, 
“Problems of National Integration in Bangladesh: The Chittagong Hill Tracts.” (1989) 29.10 Asian Survey. Also 
see: Bhumitra Chakma, “Structural Roots of Violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.” (2010) Economic and Political 
Weekly. 
52 The Daily Star, “Indigenous Issues Draws Arguments,” published on August 8, 2011, Online: 
<http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/cache/cached-news-details-197739.html>  
53 Ibid.  
54 Binota Moy Dhamai and Pallab Chakma, “Bangladesh” in The Indigenous World-2015, (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 
2015) at 299.  
55 Farhat Jahan, “Indigenous Identity Disputes in Democratic Bangladesh” (2015), Southern Papers Series: Working 
Paper No. 26, at 11.  
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Government of Bangladesh on 18 October 2018 published and circulated a notice to the media to 
stop using the term ‘Adibasi’, and requested them to follow the terms used in the Constitution.56 
The government has disregarded demands for upholding Adibasi rights as well as inserting 
Adibasi/Indigenous peoples/Indigenous hill-men/Indigenous tribes as terms in the Constitution.57 
Instead, the 15th Amendment to Article 23(A) of the Constitution that took place in 2011 refers to 
Adibasi or Indigenous peoples of Bangladesh as ‘tribes,’ ‘minor races,’ ‘ethnic sects and 
communities,’58 which becomes challenging for people who are demanding to be recognized 
internationally as Indigenous peoples.59 Furthermore, only cultural aspects are mentioned in the 
amended provision, whereas issues related to ‘Indigenous peoples’’ economic and political rights, 
not just their land rights, remain ignored.60 Before the Constitutional amendment in 2011, these 
communities were only regarded as a ‘backward section of people’ in the Constitution under 
Article 28 that provides that “the state shall take necessary steps for the advancement of ‘any’ 
backward section of citizens.”61 The issues or questions raised in this discussion are taken up in 
detail in Chapter IV.  
 
1.3. The Conceptual and Theoretical Framework of the Dissertation 
 
 
The theoretical framework adopted in my dissertation allows me to explore aspects of 
recognizing Indigenous peoples, and their rights over traditional lands and development projects, 
in the context of the global environmental justice movement. The framework helps to explore the 
case study and answer some questions: How do the affected Adibasi communities articulate their 
 
56 Dhamai and Chakma, supra note 54. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Article 23A states “The State shall take steps to protect and develop the unique local culture and tradition of the 
tribes, minor races, ethnic sects and communities.” 
59 Binota Moy Dhamai and Sanib Drong, “Bangladesh” in The Indigenous World-2014, (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 
2015) at 322.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Article 28 of the Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh.  
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claims to environmental justice? Do they primarily claim a right to be heard? Or do they make a 
distributional claim? Why do they resist against the coal mine project? Do they want to get 
involved in the decision-making process or do they want to share in the benefits? Or do they want 
both? Why do national and transnational solidarity groups get involved in the process of 
resistance?   
The study observes how Indigenous peoples in the global South draw a connection between 
procedural justice and distributive justice, gleaned through field interviews. Moreover, since the 
ethnic groups around the project area and throughout Bangladesh are not recognized as 
‘Indigenous peoples’ by the government, I observe and document how they frame their claims in 
order to be heard. The company through the ESIA of the Phulbari Coal Project provides special 
provisions for Indigenous peoples like any other resource extraction industry does, which identifies 
a list of communities to be recognized as ‘Indigenous peoples’. Against this backdrop, I also 
examine whether the rights and interests of the surrounding ethnic communities should be 
established according to international law, and how their claims impact the struggle in the Phulbari 
project area. I also ask whether self-defined Indigenous communities who are widely known as 
‘Adibasi’ need to be recognized under the global term ‘Indigenous peoples’ in order to participate 
(be consulted and be entitled to free, prior, and informed consent) in the decision-making process 
and to achieve environmental justice. 
1.3.1. Extraction on Indigenous Territories 
Many Indigenous communities around the world delineate their identity as ‘people of forests, 
of the plains, of the buffalo, or of the seal,’62 because they have strong ties with lands and wildlife 
 
62 Brian Goehring, Indigenous Peoples of the World: An Introduction to Their Past, Present, and Future. Purich's 
Aboriginal Issues Series. (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 1993) at 21. 
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around them. National governments often rely on the exploration of their mineral resources for 
economic prosperity, and for this reason, they often expand the exploration and production into 
traditional Indigenous territories.63 The trend of increased mining activities by national states and 
transnational companies is escalated in the global South, i.e., Asia and the Pacific, Africa and Latin 
America, and the Indigenous areas of the USA and Canada.64 Approximately 1200 Canadian 
Aboriginal communities are situated within 200 km of active mines, 36% of which are located 
within 50 km of a mine development project.65 The Mineral Council of Australia estimates that 
60% of mining operations in that country are situated in Indigenous territories.66 The 
Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade (EJOLT) estimates that between 1970 
and 2004, the global extraction of major metals grew by over 75%, industrial minerals by 53%, 
and construction materials by 106%, while world population increased by about 72%.67 And while 
the experiences of Indigenous peoples with mining has been overwhelmingly negative, in some 
cases, Indigenous interests are now recognized and accommodated to various degrees by corporate 
policy and practice.68 
Extracting minerals is not a sustainable industry, though it brings economic benefits for a 
country. Several experiences show that the environmental hazards of mining continue for decades 
 
63 Macarena Gómez-Barris, The Extractive Zone: Social Ecologies and Decolonial perspectives. (Duke University 
Press, 2017). 
64 Gail Whiteman and Katy Mamen, Meaningful Consultation and Participation in the Mining Sector?: A Review of 
the Consultation and Participation of Indigenous Peoples Within the International Mining Sector (Ottawa: North-
South Institute, 2002). 
65 Arn Keeling & John Sandlos, “Environmental Justice Goes Underground? Historical Notes from Canada’s 
Northern Mining Frontier” (2009) 2:3 Environal Justice at 120. 
66 ICMM, Good Practice Guide: Indigenous Peoples and Mining. (London: International Council on Mining and 
Metals, 2010) at 9. 
67 Begüm Özkaynak, et. al. Mining Conflicts around the World: Common Grounds from Environmental Justice 
Perspective, (2012) EJOLT Report No. 7 at 7. 
68 Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh, “Aborigines, Mining Companies and The State in Contemporary Australia: A New 
Political Economy or ‘Business as Usual’?” (2006) 41.1 Australian Journal of Political Science at 3. 
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by undermining traditional land-use patterns.69 Besides, every stage of a resource extraction 
project leaves behind abandoned pits and mine shafts, ore and waste rock deposits, roads, railways, 
heavy equipment, storage facilities, oil spills, and hazardous wastes, the garbage that can have 
long-term adverse effects on the environment as well as significant risks for nearby communities.70 
Extractive industries located in Indigenous territories tend to have more negative outcomes than 
other industries regarding environmental impacts, displacement, resettlement, and violation of 
human rights by affecting the living conditions of Indigenous peoples.71 And while some argue 
that resource extractive industries near Indigenous communities are more incidental than 
intentional, because mining companies operate where they find significant deposits of natural 
resources, others find that environmental racism impacts how companies operate.72 
The negative impacts of extractive industries on Indigenous communities are often enhanced 
by their lack of access to traditional lands and practices. It is a common phenomenon that if a 
mining project is implemented, most of the people of that area would be displaced from their lands, 
and the situation gets even more severe in open-pit mining projects. Problems associated with the 
displaced people of resource extractive projects are increasingly becoming the focus of human 
rights organizations.73 Moreover, the communities in the areas where the resources are located 
tend to carry a disproportionate share of the negative impacts of development through reduced 
access to resources and direct exposure to pollution and environmental degradation.74 Forced or 
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involuntary displacement from the original habitations often means not only physical relocation 
but also the loss of livelihoods derived from the subsistence resources offered by the local 
environment.75 Indigenous peoples have traditional ways of managing resources around them, but 
most of the conventional resources would be missing in new places. Displacement from their 
traditional lands and resettlement in another location may lead to a breach of individual and 
collective human rights such as the right to life, liberty to security, the right to non-interference 
with privacy, family, and home, and the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.76 
1.3.2. Rights of Indigenous Peoples on Traditional Lands and Management of 
Natural Resources 
Various international instruments and organizations have collectively recognized Indigenous 
peoples’ right to cultural identity, traditional lands, and territories, right to self-determination, right 
to meaningfully participate in the decision-making process and respect their way of development 
and traditional knowledge.77 Article 14(1) of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention-1989 
(the ILO Convention No. 169) affirms: 
“The rights of ownership and possession of [Indigenous peoples] over the lands which they 
traditionally occupy shall be recognized. Also, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases 
to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by 




75 Dayna Nadine Scott and Adrian A Smith, “Sacrifice Zones in the Green Energy Economy: The New Climate 
Refugees” (2017) 26:2 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problem 371.  
Also see: Rodolfo Stavenhagen, “Report on the Impact of Megaprojects on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(2003).” Peasants, Culture and Indigenous Peoples, (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2013) 117. 
76 Ibid.  
Also see: Bogumil Terminski, Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement: Social Problem and Human Rights 
Issue. Working paper. (Vancouver: Simon Fraser University, 2012) at 4-5 
77 Whiteman and Mamen, supra note 64 at 13. 
21 
 
States and other international actors have legal duties and obligations to comply with those 
rights. Article 13 of the Convention emphasizes that states should respect the cultures and spiritual 
values of Indigenous peoples with distinctive importance as well as their relationship with the 
lands or territories. Also, Article 15 requires nation-states to safeguard Indigenous peoples’ access 
to natural resources in their regions, including the right to participate in managing, conserving and 
altering. However, Article 12.1 of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention- 1957 (the 
ILO Convention No. 107) states that Indigenous populations ‘shall not be removed without their 
free consent from their habitual territories’—unless the government wants to develop the said 
territory for their own purposes. I find this provision enables nation-states to continue their 
oppression on Indigenous peoples.  
It is relevant to note that if any government signs and ratifies a convention or an agreement, it 
will be legally binding or enforceable for that country. But it is observed that governments are 
often reluctant to implement those commitments within their national boundaries. It is evident that 
many governments have signed and ratified international conventions and declarations recognizing 
the rights of Indigenous peoples, and they have adopted national legislations accordingly. 
However, many states have favored multinational corporations (MNCs) and transnational 
corporations (TNCs) in dealing with extractive projects on Indigenous territories by overlooking 
international law obligations,78 as power relations are decisive of the extent to which participatory 
instruments can be used for transformative engagement.79 Nevertheless, Indigenous peoples see 
the recognition of their cultural and other rights as the only way for their survival and development. 
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1.3.3. Right to Self-determination of Indigenous Peoples 
 
It is well documented that environmental degradation commonly harms Indigenous peoples. It 
is a significant threat to their lives and culture.80 By complying to establish the rights of people in 
international law, Article 1(2) of the UN Charter incorporated the principle of equal rights and the 
right to self-determination of peoples. Similarly, Article 1 (1 and 2) of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) recognize:  
“1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.  
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources 
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, 
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people 
be deprived of its own means of subsistence.”81  
 
Again, Article 3 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) states that Indigenous peoples have right to exercise the right to self-determination. By 
that right, they can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development. Article 4 of the same Declaration states, “Indigenous peoples, in 
exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in 
matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their 
autonomous functions.” Therefore, Indigenous peoples should not be prevented from taking any 
decision (social, economic, political or cultural) of whether they want any development in their 
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territory or not.  
1.3.4. Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)  
 
James Anaya states that as part of their right to self-determination, Indigenous peoples have 
the right to decide whether they will allow a development project in their territory or not.82 
UNDRIP, the ILO Convention No. 169, and the International Convention on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD) articulate that if any state or any corporation wants to go forward 
with development in Indigenous territories, FPIC must be obtained before deciding on 
development projects. Indigenous peoples have the irrevocable right to offer and withhold their 
consent to those developments before any authorization of development activities.83 It empowers 
them to negotiate how the project will be designed, controlled, managed, implemented, monitored 
and evaluated.84 Regarding Articles 19 and 32(2) of UNDRIP, the government must confirm 
“consultation in good faith through Indigenous peoples’ representative institutions, in order to 
obtain their FPIC before adopting or implementing legislative or administrative measures that may 
affect them and prior to approval of projects that may affect their lands, territories or resources.”85 
Article 10 states that Indigenous peoples should not be forcibly removed from their lands or 
territories. No relocation shall take place without the FPIC of Indigenous peoples concerned. The 
governments should comply with the Declaration before the approval of projects that may affect 
lands, territories, or resources of Indigenous peoples.  
Article 7.1 of the ILO Convention No. 169 states:  
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“The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the 
process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual 
well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to 
the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development. In 
addition, they shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation 
of plans and programmes for national and regional development which may affect 
them directly.”86  
James Anaya argues that a nation-state must respect and protect the rights of Indigenous 
peoples, and it must ensure other safeguards are implemented before proceeding with an extractive 
project. A state must take specific steps to minimize the limitation on the rights they can obtain 
through impact assessments, measures of mitigation, compensation, and benefit-sharing.87 Any 
decision by the government to construct an extractive project without the consent of Indigenous 
peoples that impacts them negatively should be subject to review by an impartial judicial authority. 
The right to FPIC of Indigenous peoples has a secure connection to the right to self-
determination. Both rights empower the community to decide their political status freely and 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. FPIC requires that Indigenous peoples 
should have the right to access full information regarding the proposed development on their 
ancestral lands.88 As Papillon and Rodon state, “the principle of FPIC is rooted in the recognition 
that Indigenous peoples, as self-determining peoples, should be empowered to make decisions over 
their future and that of their traditional lands.”89 The consent they express must be free from any 
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pressure, and they must have all relevant information regarding the proposed activity and its 
potential impact.90 Papillon and Rodon argue that FPIC is a powerful political discourse by which 
Indigenous peoples can play an essential role in the natural resource economy where they freely 
express their identifiable priorities through an informed and collaborative process by fully engaged 
in decision-making.91 The authors contend that FPIC must be considered as one of the criteria for 
project authorization, and no project should be allowed without it. Project proponents or states 
should apply FPIC in every case, engaging not only Indigenous peoples but also all project-
affected communities unless it is exhibited that the impact of the proposed project would be 
minimal, and the project is in the public interest.92 
Although there is much debate as to whether Indigenous peoples’ participatory rights extend 
to veto power over the state action,93 James Anaya and Shin Imai argue that in cases where 
Indigenous peoples are utterly and willfully ignored in a process that would have a significant 
impact on their lands and livelihoods, a veto right is certainly applicable.94 Exercising or 
employing this right to FPIC does not mean that international and domestic regulations and donor 
policies for developing a resource extracting project are to be ignored.95 Given the situation and 
the position of the right to self-determination and right to FPIC of Indigenous peoples, national 
legislation and practice seem to be particularly weak concerning implementation. Although in 
many cases, Indigenous peoples accept such resource extraction initiatives, research shows that 
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Indigenous peoples are also resisting them in many more places around the world, especially in 
the global South.96  
 
1.3.5. Engaging Indigenous Peoples in Development Decisions 
 
The crucial role played by Indigenous peoples and their communities in environmental 
management and development has received generous recognition in international law.97 
Significantly, most extractive projects are increasingly taking place in the territories of Indigenous 
peoples. States and corporations mostly advance these projects without the meaningful 
involvement of Indigenous peoples in the decision-making process. In most cases, states and 
project proponents minimally recognize rights, cultures, and traditional knowledge of Indigenous 
peoples. In many countries, especially in the global South, instead of seeing the interests of ‘people 
of the land’ and negative social and environmental impacts on lands, ecological diversity, and 
human health, the governments favor companies’ interests for their economic benefits. Most of the 
resource extractive companies and their sub-contractors are not interested in taking appropriate 
measures to address environmental and social impacts on Indigenous peoples. Rather, they look 
for how effectively they can extract mineral resources for their financial gain.  
Generally, it has been observed that low-income and Indigenous communities affected by 
mineral development exert little influence on the decision-making processes of legislative and 
environmental agencies because such groups are not represented among the interest groups that 
lobby and litigate against environmental authorities.98 Moreover, they are hardly involved in a 
 
96 Ibid. 
97 Roda Mushkat, “Public Participation in Environmental Law Making: A Comment on the International Legal 




complex network of political, cultural and social relations within communities and with regional 
organizations. As a result, Indigenous interests persistently struggle to pursue negotiations on both 
fronts.99 The scenario is common across the global South due to weak environmental regulations, 
health and safety standards, although progressive mining companies conduct partial impact 
assessments with essential impacts left unmitigated or ignored.100 Moreover, community 
consultations are often restricted to discussions on immediate consequences and not on long-term 
effects.101 Furthermore, the recognition of the vulnerability of the collective rights of many 
Indigenous communities to environmental degradation is essential.102 
Indigenous organizations have signaled their concern about the negative impacts of major 
development projects on their environments, livelihoods, lifestyles, and survival. As mentioned, 
very often, these projects entail involuntary displacements and resettlement of Indigenous 
communities. As a result, Indigenous peoples resist major projects because of the violations of 
their civil and political, and economic, social, and cultural rights. The conflict between economic 
development, environmental protection, and recognition of human rights is seen in the livelihoods 
of Indigenous peoples.103 
1.3.6. Struggle/ Resistance by Indigenous Peoples 
 
As part of exercising their rights to self-determination, freedom of expression, and 
participation in decision-making processes under international law, Robert Bullard and Glen 
Johnson argue that Indigenous peoples and grassroots groups necessarily organize themselves, 
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educate themselves, empower themselves, and resist in their communities.104 These rights 
necessarily entail the ability of Indigenous peoples to pursue their own initiatives for resource 
extraction within their territories if they choose.  
It is widely documented that mining activities have fostered ecological distribution conflicts 
around the world. Communities opposed to mining projects have been facing human rights 
violations. The Latin American Observatory of Mining Conflicts (OCMAL) reported more than 
150 active mining conflicts in the region, most of which started in the 2000s.105 However, 
Indigenous communities across Latin America are also resisting mining operations in their 
territories. Canadian and other multinational mining interests have been successful since most 
Latin American resource-rich countries adopted mining policies that favor corporations over 
Indigenous peoples, other marginalized communities, the environment, and labor rights.  
Concerning struggles over the environmental and ecological impacts of mining activities on 
the lands of Indigenous peoples, Keeling and Sandlos illustrate that the efforts not only manifest 
themselves as local conflicts but also as global settings of capital accumulation, profit 
maximization, and neo-colonialism.106 Indigenous communities and their leaders observe that the 
operation on their lands is a direct assault against their people as well as their cultural practices 
and beliefs. Indigenous leaders thus articulate environmental injustice as a set of conditions that 
remove or restrict the ability of individuals and communities to function effectively.107 Brosius 
argues that Indigenous campaigners have frequently found support outside national borders, as the 
rights of Indigenous peoples have become a global concern. Such groups, legitimately concerned 
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about local issues, refer to global discourses and are increasingly brought into transnational 
advocacy networks.108 Moreover, the solidarity sectors of the global North support the self-
development of Indigenous peoples to gain the degree of self-determination to control over their 
lands and economic conditions.109  
Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans argue that MNCs and TNCs are maintaining profits by relying 
on unsustainable forms of production in resource extractive industries and other development 
projects. Corporations are making enormous financial gains using ‘neo-liberal economic policies’ 
that affect the society at large through higher levels of pollution, greater resource exploitation, less 
social security for workers, and displacement of local and Indigenous communities.110 The authors 
claim that human inequality is dangerous for environmental quality though not all people bear 
these costs equally, depending on the quality of environmental regulations. The countries in the 
global North have higher environmental quality than the global South, and they tend to be affected 
less.111 The above situation can be configured as ecological distribution conflicts, which was 
coined by Martinez-Alier and Martin O’Connor in 1996 to describe social conflicts evolving from 
a disproportionate share of burdens and benefits of environmental goods and bads among different 
actors.112 Scheidel et al. argue that the unsustainable use of resources creates both environmental 
destruction and ecological distributional conflicts.113 These conflicts put particular emphasis on 
distributional aspects and distributional justice claims, and therefore, sometimes “transform into 
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collective action which becomes very powerful when they challenge current understandings of our 
relationship with the government.”114 In other words, ecological distribution conflicts give rise to 
many environmental justice movements by requiring the distributional perspective; that is, the lack 
of participation and recognition leads to the unjust distribution of burdens and benefits.115     
1.3.7. Environmental Justice Movement to “Just Sustainability”  
 
The concept of ‘environmental justice’ is used to illustrate the fact that low-income 
communities and communities of color bear and face greater environmental and health risks than 
the dominant communities in their neighborhoods and workplaces.116 This disproportionate risk is 
linked to other injustices in economic and social conditions the disempowered communities face. 
The environmental justice movement emerged in the U.S.A. in the late 1980s when an African-
American community in Warren County of North Carolina organized a resistance movement when 
the area was chosen as the state’s waste dumping site without their consent.117 Although the 
struggle of ‘people of color’ against a government decision was unsuccessful, it gained enormous 
attention from both domestic and international policy and decision-makers, environmental 
scholars, and solidarity groups. Robert Bullard, a pioneer of the environmental justice movement 
in the USA who led the protest from the front, terms the condition as ‘environmental racism,’ 
which is one form of environmental injustice fortified by different government bodies.118 David 
Schlosberg makes a connection between the environmental justice movement and environmental 
racism: both are concerned with low-income communities and the disproportionate risks they 
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face.119 Bullard and Johnson call for the environmental justice movement to identify some firm 
objectives for eliminating existing unequal enforcement of environmental regulations, policies, 
and practices. These environmental regulations and policies often limit some individuals and 
groups from participation in decision-making.120 Additionally, government policies also allow 
MNCs and TNCs complete control over development projects.121 One of the fundamental goals of 
the environmental justice movement is to challenge the capitalist growth economy.122 Dayna Scott 
makes a clear distinction between the environmental movement and the environmental justice 
movement.123 Environmentalists in the environmental movement have been focusing on legal 
strategies to achieve social change, which she sees as problematic because law reform continues 
to privilege elites at the expense of people working on the ground.124  
David Pellow argues that the environmental justice movement is not a sustainability movement 
or an environmental movement; instead, it's about the fight for social, procedural, and distributive 
justice.125 Differentiating the environmental justice movement from the sustainability movement, 
Agyeman and Evans idealize Faber’s argument that the struggle for environmental justice is not 
about sustainability because environmental justice wants to share risks and benefits equally; it does 
not talk about how to get rid of jeopardies at the same time.126 The question of environmental 
justice can be addressed without solving ecological problems.127 Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans 
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contend that sustainability and environmental justice may conflict with each other, as the primary 
focus of the environmental justice movement is on the issues of social equity and equality, and the 
center of ‘environmental sustainability’ is on green issues.128 However, scholars and policymakers 
have placed environmental justice within the principles of sustainability and sustainable 
development. Therefore, the movement on two concerns can be found in local fights for just 
transport, community food security, and sustainable communities and cities.129 Dayna Scott states 
that although the environmental justice movement has focused on the health and wellbeing of 
people rather than protecting the natural environment, the activists of the movement started by 
concentrating on environmental impacts and harms to surrounding communities derived from air, 
water, soil contamination as well as toxic workplaces, urban planning, and transit decisions.130 
Scheidel et al. point out that environmental justice movements arise out of ecological distribution 
conflicts leading to ‘just sustainability’ that addresses both environmental quality and human 
equality.131 The authors argue that environmental justice movements can turn from victims of 
environmental injustices into fighters for sustainability by articulating creative forms of 
mobilization and action.132  
According to Agyeman and Evans, ‘sustainability’ ensures a better quality of life for all in a 
just and equitable manner by protecting ecosystems, whilst living within the limits of supporting 
ecosystems.133 Their definition focuses on four main areas of concern, such as quality of life, 
present and future generations, justice and equity in resource allocation, and living within 
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ecological limits.134 The authors single out ‘just sustainability’ and ‘environmental sustainability’, 
and mandate, “governments at the local, regional, national and international levels to learn from 
these environmental justice and progressive, or ‘just sustainability’-based organizations and to 
seek to embed the central principles and practical approaches of ‘just sustainability’ into 
sustainable development policy.”135 By ‘just sustainability’, the authors mean “an equal concern 
with equity, justice and, ultimately, governance on the one hand, and environment on the other,”136 
that has an equal value of environmental justice. The justice-sustainability coalition is being 
addressed through transnational activism and in the policy debates of international environmental 
regimes.137 Therefore, environmental sustainability concerns, both at the national and the global 
level, have become major binding constraints to development initiatives. 
1.3.8. Conceptions of Environmental Justice 
 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has a working definition of 
environmental justice, which has been widely used to define environmental justice. It states, 
“environmental justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless 
of race, color, income, or national origin concerning development, implementation, and 
enforcement of environmental laws, policies, and regulations.”138 In EPA’s definition, ‘fair 
treatment’ means that there should be fairness in the distribution of goods and bads among all 
actors resulting from industrial, governmental, or commercial activities. Again, ‘meaningful 
involvement’ affirms that affected communities should have the voice in the decision-making 
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process.139 The communities must be involved by the government bodies or project proponents 
while making decisions. EPA argues that the goal of environmental justice will not be achieved 
until everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from environmental harm, and equal access 
to the decision-making process.140 According to David Schlosberg, environmental justice is the 
equitable and fair distribution of risks and benefits associated with any development project, 
meaningful participation of communities in the decision-making process, recognition of rights, 
local knowledge, cultural differences and distinctiveness of surrounding communities, and the 
capability of individuals and communities to function in society.141 Therefore, environmental 
justice is a theory of justice and a social movement that is concerned about fair and equitable 
treatment towards all people regarding sharing benefits and bearing burdens of environmental 
harm, involvement in the decision-making process, and recognition of rights. 
Seventeen principles of environmental justice were adopted to build a national and 
international movement of all peoples of color to fight the destruction that is occurring on their 
lands, especially in Indigenous territories.142 All principles except the final principle include a 
social justice component (the seventeenth talks about environmental integrity). To sum up, 
environmental justice principles affirm to protect the sacredness of the ‘Mother Earth’ and 
maintain sustainability for protecting humans and other living things. Environmental justice 
confirms to uphold the fundamental right to social, political, economic, cultural, and 
environmental self-determination of all people, and as such, demand the right to participate as 
equal partners at every level of decision-making by enforcing the principle of informed consent. 
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The principles of environmental justice assure the safeguarding of the rights of all victims of 
environmental injustice by confirming they receive full compensation for damage as well as 
quality healthcare. The principles of environmental justice oppose the destructive operations of 
multinational corporations to sustain the complete protection of human beings and the natural 
environment.143 Robert Bullard puts forward that governments should adopt five principles of 
environmental justice to end unequal environmental protection: guaranteeing the right to 
environmental protection, preventing harm before it occurs, shifting the burden of proof to the 
polluters, obviating proof of intent to discriminate, and redressing existing inequities.144  
According to Dayna Scott, “employing an environmental justice lens means that we take 
account of the sharing of costs and benefits associated with environmental policy and natural 
resource development decisions, and the extent to which the decision-making has meaningfully 
included the participation of affected communities.”145 According to Schlosberg, the term 
environmental justice is used to cover two overlapping parts of the grassroots environmental 
justice movement: the anti-toxic movement and the movement against environmental racism.146 
According to Schlosberg, three conceptions of justice should exist in environmental justice 
movements such as equitable distribution, recognition, and participation. I will discuss each in 
turn.  




Most environmental justice movements focus on just, fair and equitable distribution of benefits 
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and burdens among various actors as well as the meaningful involvement of Indigenous persons 
and members of other marginalized communities in the environmental decision-making processes 
for developing resource extractive or other large-scale projects.147 However, environmental 
degradation cannot be separated from other problems afflicting low-income communities and 
communities of color. Young acknowledges Rawls’ ‘Theory of Justice’ as a useful apparatus for 
justice and claims that this is the most well-known and frequently applied approach to questions 
of justice that focus on ‘fairness’ of the distribution.148 This theory of justice can address the 
question of the ‘fairness’ of the distribution of burdens resulting from the authority’s decision.  
Young claims that a distributive analysis of justice considers what risks, benefits, and 
responsibilities should be distributed among various organizations, corporations, state organs, state 
environmental agencies, municipal governments, and local communities in a development 
project.149 Connecting to the unequal distribution of harms and disproportionate burdens, anti-
mining groups frequently argue that the approval of mining projects involves the misrecognition 
of their material and cultural dependence on the land and ignores the concerns expressed in 
participatory stages.150 It is crucial to intervene at the nation-state level to eliminate unequal 
distribution among various actors.151 
According to Schlosberg, there is more to the conception of environmental justice than just 
this distributional aspect, and a focus solely on distribution is problematic.152 The arguments and 
critiques of Young and Schlosberg regarding distributional justice exposed some new opinions 
about environmental justice. These ideals of distributive justice developed and recognized by 
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37 
 
various scholars, including Rawls, Young, and Schlosberg, are useful for extending the legal and 
social framework to analyze another dimension of environmental justice, e.g., procedural 
environmental justice.  
1.3.8.2. Participation in the Decision-making Process 
 
 
The right to meaningful participation of local people in the decision-making process of any 
development project is an essential component of environmental justice. It requires respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as part of the development process. Citizens should be 
the key actors in economic development, both as beneficiaries of modernization and as those 
affected by increasing marginalization.153 Indigenous peoples’ right to participate at every level of 
decision-making as equal partners can confirm their claim of environmental justice. Taking 
participatory justice into account, Richardson and Razzaque argue that public participation through 
community consultation is significant in the context of sustainable development.154 Public 
participation can occur through education, information dissemination, advisory or review boards, 
public advocacy, public hearings and submissions, and even litigation. By these means, public 
participation may assist decision-makers in understanding and identifying public interest concerns 
while formulating environmental policies.155 Emphasizing the access to environmental 
information, participation in administrative decision-making and access to justice, the authors 
claim that while these participatory reforms have improved the quality of many environmental 
decisions, they have hardly engendered a substantial paradigm shift to ecologically sustainable 
development.156 The issue of justice raised by communities in the development projects calls into 
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question just those institutional structures that justify some decision-making procedures. 
Therefore, communities, especially Indigenous and other marginalized people, should have the 
right to participate in the decision-making process with the power to approve or disapprove any 
project.  
Affected communities find themselves having to struggle with nation-states, which they 
perceive as representing interests other than theirs,157 but ideally, states are entitled to give priority 
to the interests of their citizens.158 Although state agencies have the responsibility to make a fair 
and equitable decision about the distribution of risks, they favor corporations over their citizens.159 
Young contends that a state has a significant interest in attracting large businesses within its 
borders and making the conditions of their operations favorable.160 The governments argue that 
the decision would bring the most significant benefit to the country. In many cases, where the 
primary conflict opposes the interests of corporations to those of residents affected by their 
operations, citizens rarely believe that nation-states act neutrally and impartially. 
1.3.8.3. Recognition of Communities and their Rights  
 
 
Environmental justice activists have called for a more substantial commitment to ‘recognition’ 
of affected communities that are being ignored by both mainstream environmental movements and 
governments. In this respect, Schlosberg believes environmental justice must focus on the political 
process to address both the inequitable distribution of social goods and the conditions undermining 
social recognition.161 Recognition requires that policies and programs for managing development 
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projects must meet the standard reasonably, considering and representing the cultures, traditional 
knowledge, values, and situations of all affected parties.162 Kyle Whyte emphasizes the integration 
of environmental heritage and recognition-based justice and argues that the heritage should be 
blended to the benefit of all affected parties.163 Schlosberg states that “lack of recognition is harm, 
an injustice, as much as a lack of adequate distribution of various goods is.”164 He further 
rationalizes Young’s claim and argues that lack of recognition is an injustice and a threat to human 
dignity because it harms by constraining people from their fundamental rights. Non-recognition or 
misrecognition can cause harm and imprisons oppressed communities in cultural and political 
dominance.165 If someone is not recognized, he/she cannot adequately participate in any process 
of decision-making.166 Moreover, it is also the foundation of distributive injustice.167 According to 
Young, lack of participation of local communities in decision-making derives from a lack of 
recognition of the victims of environmental degradation, which then leads to environmental 
injustice.168 
1.3.8.4. Integrating Distribution, Participation, and Recognition 
 
 
Schlosberg endorses Young’s argument and claims that the concept of justice needs to focus 
more generally on the elimination of longstanding domination and oppression. He argues that the 
central focus for Young is in addressing justice both as distribution and as the recognition of the 
 
162 Kyle Powys Whyte, “The Recognition Dimensions of Environmental Justice in Indian Country.” (2011) 4.4 
Environmental Justice at 201. 
163 Ibid. at 203. 
164 Schlosberg, supra note 119 at 82. 
165 Young, supra note 148.  
Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition.” in Ajay Heble, Donna Palmateer Pennee, J.R. Struthers eds. New 
Contexts of Canadian Criticism (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1997) at 98. 
166 Ibid. 




difference in decision-making structures.169 Kyle Whyte claims that distributive and procedural 
justice cannot be integrated into laws, programs, policies, and institutions without respect for 
Indigenous cultures, values, and particular situations.170 In this sense, increased participation can 
address issues of unfair distribution and misrecognition of Indigenous communities in any resource 
extractive development project. Arguments for procedural justice demonstrate how varied notions 
of justice can be incorporated into a single project. The demand for participation in the decision-
making process involving Indigenous and local communities is central to the environmental justice 
movement by which they can be appropriately recognized. 
Schlosberg puts forward the argument that unequal distribution of harm is perceived not only 
as an environmental injustice but also as a violation of human rights on a local as well as a global 
scale.171 But according to Young, the emphasis on only a distributive justice paradigm is 
misguided. She claims that lack of recognition itself causes damage to the oppressed communities 
because if they are not recognized, they cannot participate effectively in any decision-making 
process.172 Schlosberg agrees that justice requires not only an understanding of unjust distribution, 
and would include elements of recognition, but argues that these two are tied together in political 
and social processes.173 These conceptions of injustice are not competing for notions, nor are they 
contradictory or antithetical. Unequal distribution, lack of recognition, and limited participation 
all work to produce injustice, and claims for justice can be integrated into a decision-making 
process for any development project.174 This is a critical motivation. In the research, I hope to 
contribute insight to advance the literature on this point.   
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1.3.9. Local to Transnational Resistance in the Environmental Justice Movement 
 
Local communities and activists or justice organizations in the global South cannot succeed 
alone; national and transnational justice and advocacy groups and networks join with them and tie 
together to resist against development projects to establish rights and justice towards them. 
National justice groups and civil society members maintain communication with transnational 
coalitions for avoiding further intervention from project proponents in the long run.175 Since local 
protesters and right holders cannot trace a company’s most recent activities, transnational justice 
organizations through their strong networks can contact and bargain with the company, and to 
some extent, with states. Therefore, the justice groups act as a mediator in this case.  
Transnational networks campaign, negotiate and create pressure on states and foreign 
extractive companies through various means such as presenting evidence on websites, and in 
newspapers and social media, and by organizing events and street protests, and making companies 
accountable for their actions and through global attention. The campaigners also work with local 
communities and activists to assess needs and initiate a legal and direct campaign against 
corporations and governments’ oppression.176 The activities by the transnational and global justice 
organizations can be called the ‘transnational or cross-border social movement.’177 In other words, 
transnational social movements can be defined as movements involving activists from more than 
one country, which infiltrate from the local level (where the project is situated) to the national level 
(capital city or countrywide) to a transnational space (another country especially, the origin of the 
company).178 Additionally, activists themselves may be transnational such as citizens of more than 
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one country or solidarity groups supporting a movement in a foreign country. Alongside 
transnational methods and strategies may be applied, such as mobilization, protest, social media, 
or other web-based activities, and the movement requires cross-border interaction such as activism 
based in one or several countries where activists are located.179 
I argue that Indigenous peoples around the world tend to be disproportionately affected by 
resource extraction activities and have fewer technical, legal, and other resources to participate in 
the decision-making process effectively due to their non-recognition. This lack of adequate 
participation can be interpreted as procedural environmental injustice. The above discussion in the 
process of building a theoretical framework generates a hypothesis that I intend to test: inequitable 
or unequal distribution, lack of recognition, and limited participation, all work to produce injustice, 
and claims for justice should be integrated into a decision-making process for any development 
project. In doing so, my primary aim is to observe how and to what extent Indigenous peoples’ 
interests are reflected in the environmental decision-making process and how do they frame their 
claims by building coalitions with national and transnational environmental justice groups in a 
mining conflict situation by qualitative research and policy analysis.  
 
1.4. My Methodological Journey 
1.4.1. Plan of Research 
 
This research study involves human participants and maintains the ethical standards of conduct 
required by the Research Ethics Review Board of York University. The Research Ethics Review 
Board of York University approved my research project in April 2015. Before going to Bangladesh 
for field work in December 2015, I finalized my interview questionnaires and the scope of 
 
179 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin, “New Perspectives on Transnational Activism.” In Nicola Piper and Anders 
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interviews with the consultation of my supervisor. This research primarily utilizes a ‘case study’ 
approach to facilitate advanced understandings of the recognition, distribution of risks and 
benefits, and procedural environmental justice elements for Indigenous peoples. My case study 
examines Adibasi and activists’ accounts of the movement to analyze how their claims in the 
mining conflict fit into the environmental justice movement.  
I use both primary and secondary sources in developing the case study. Bearing in mind the 
scope of the project, its ESIA process, and the Adibasi resistance, I focused my fieldwork primarily 
on participant observation and key informant interviews with Adibasi communities and some 
Bangalees of the mining region, core activists of the movement, local government representatives, 
NGO representatives and civil society members that are opposing the proposed project. The 
purpose of the interviews is to explore the motivation for and background history of the movement 
and its claims. Moreover, interviews of Adibasi members gave me a basic idea about whether they 
were properly consulted or not, whether the consents they have given were free or not, and why 
they organized and resisted against the project. I learned about their conceptions of distributive 
justice and procedural environmental justice and whether they have or seek recognition as 
Indigenous peoples. I also completed a document review, including the analysis of reports and 
policy documents. 
1.4.2. Before the Journey 
 
I find it crucial to share my methodological journey for conducting this research, which can be 
helpful for future researchers in a similar case and area setting. Before my visit to Phulabri, several 
researchers warned me about the local rage concerning Dalal of the company. I was prepared to 
face the situation. A Dhaka University sociology professor who had conducted ethnographic 
research in the Phulbari mining region told me that when local people, even after a decade of the 
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Phulbari Khoni Andolon, see any Bohiragoto180 hanging around in their locality, “they assume 
that person is a Dalal of Asia Energy.” She offered me with a list of activists who organized the 
Asia Energy Office Gherao Kormosuchi. She also shared the experience of obstacles she had faced 
during her ethnographic research in Phulbari and suggested that I proceed with caution because 
once I am tagged as a Dalal of Asia Energy, I might not be able to complete my fieldwork in 
Phulbari. She suggested me to contact local activists and create peer relations with them before 
starting my field activities.  
Keeping the experience in mind, I contacted the member secretary of NCBD, Professor Anu 
Muhammad. The central NCBD members have had a considerable impact on local activists. Since 
I needed to conduct interviews with key activists of the Phulbari Khoni Andolon, researchers who 
had done fieldwork in Phulbari recommended me to talk to the professor. He knew about my 
research, as I had previously contacted him to get consent for participating in my research. After I 
reiterated the purpose of my visiting Phulbari, he assured me of help in Phulbari. He said that he 
would introduce me to regional NCBD leaders. He explained to me why local protesters and 
villagers are suspicious about Bohiragoto and how they are still keen on protesting the company 
and their activities. Awareness has been maintained among activists and local villagers because of 
the simultaneous efforts of company personnel in the mining area. The protesters and local farmers 
became proactive; many of them still believe that the company might develop the opencast mining 
project on their lands by influencing the government. Every other month, protesters meet in 
Phulbari town to inform people to be aware of Dalal. Professor Muhammad informed the convener 
 
180 Bohiragoto is a Bangla term meaning outsiders or strangers who have no connection or tie with anybody of a 
certain area. Local Adibasis and Bangalees call those people ‘bohiragoto’. Some people call them ‘refugee’ as they 
migrated and settled in the Khas lands of this area. 
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of Phulbari NCBD and requested him to help me. Although the convener could not help me in my 
research directly, he assured me that nobody would obstruct my field activities.   
As I knew that most of the regional NCBD members and activists of the movement were also 
the members of leftist political parties, I contacted my friend, a central Communist Party leader, 
to reach his comrades to assist me in conducting field activities in Phulbari town. He reached out 
to Nuruzzaman, a key leader of the movement in Phulbari town.  
1.4.3. The Journey Begins 
 
My field activities started in December 2016. I went to my wife’s grandparents’ house in 
Birampur sub-district, which is only ten kilometers from the mining footprint and twenty 
kilometers from Phulbari town. My father-in-law introduced me to the convener of the Birampur 
regional branch of NCBD, one of the organizers of the movement. I met the convener informally 
several times, and he became my local link until I moved to Phulbari town to meet other activists. 
The convener also gave me some names of local activists. He informed me that the current 
Chairman of Khanpur Union Council of the Birampur sub-district had been elected in a popular 
vote due to his active role in the movement. My wife’s grandmother told me that the Chairman is 
her relative and gave me his phone number. I called and expressed my intention of visiting him 
and informed him that I need a place in his area for ethnographic field activities with Adibasi 
communities. He agreed to help me and offered a room at his office complex free of charge.  
The next morning, I went to the Chairman’s office in the Khanpur Union Council complex. I 
could not meet him, as he left the office to go to the city for the day. But he had instructed his 
secretary to help me. The assistant told me that most of the villages (hamlets) in this Union are 
Adibasi villages and most of the Adibasis were involved in the Phulbari Khoni Andolon. He gave 
me the name of Cherobin Hembrom, the head of Birampur sub-district traditional institute and a 
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key person motivating Adibasis and organizing the movement. He is a Santal, one of the three 
communities (along with the Munda and the Mahili) recognized as ‘Indigenous’ or ‘Adibasi’ by 
Asia Energy in their official document (ESIA). Cherobin Hembrom is a retired village doctor 
popularly known as ‘Cherobin Daktar/Doctor’ in the area, as he served a long time as a leprosy 
doctor at the nearby hospital of a Catholic Church. 
Cherobin Hembrom told me about his involvement in the movement and his position in Adibasi 
society. I understood that he would be a very important key informant of my research. He knows 
all the leaders and core activists of the movement. He told me that a portion of his hamlet (mostly 
agricultural lands of Dhanjuri village) is included in the preliminary map of the projected mining 
area. After a short discussion about the social, political, and economic settings of Adibasi 
communities and the Phulbari movement, he invited me to enter his house made with mud and 
introduced me to his wife and other family members. Before leaving Cherobin’s house, I expressed 
my interest to stay at his house as a paying guest because I wanted to stay with an Adibasi family 
to understand their livelihoods more closely. He assured me to help in my research but could not 
confirm about keeping me at his house. However, he gave me the phone number of his younger 
son, Clinton Hembrom, who has been studying at a college in Dhaka. I observed that Adibasi 
family settings are different than non-Adibasi.  
1.4.4. Creating Connection in the Field 
 
I went to Phulbari town from Dhaka on January 10, 2016, intending to stay there for a week to 
create a connection with local activists. I went to the office of the chief executive of the Phulbari 
sub-district to inform him of my presence in the mining area and discovered he was a friend of 
mine from university. I described my reason for coming to Phulbari, and he agreed to help me 
within his official limit. He also arranged a room for me to stay in the government bungalow. I 
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stayed at the bungalow for seven days and observed the township. I saw many slogans of the 
movement written on walls throughout the town. When I was staying in Phulbari town, 
Nuruzzaman’s home became my regular destination, and he spoke about the movement more 
often. He showed me his collection of newspaper reports on the Phulbari Khoni Andolon. I 
photocopied them for my research. He gave me a list of prospective interviewees among activists 
and their phone numbers; I interviewed most of them at the later dates, and their accounts were a 
great deal of help for my research.  
I also shared my intention with the caretaker of the bungalow, and he convinced his son to be 
my guide during my stay in Phulbari town. His son accompanied me walking through the township 
and brought me to a neighboring Adibasi hamlet. Though most of the Adibasi adults were out of 
their homes working in the fields, I managed to talk to an elderly Adibasi man from the Munda 
community181 who shared his personal experience of getting involved in the movement. I returned 
to Dhaka after a significant improvement in conducting field activities in Phulbari.  
1.4.5. Into the Field 
I met Clinton Hembrom in Dhaka and requested him to persuade his parents to keep me at their 
home as a paying guest. I also asked him to be my research assistant (accompany me, recruit 
interviewees in their language, and help me with recording and note-taking). As I mentioned 
earlier, I wanted to stay close to Adibasis, and to stay at an Adibasi house was my priority. Clinton 
convinced his family and agreed to work with me as a research assistant since he was on a study 
break. I stayed at their home for two and a half months. For the first few days, I roamed around 
 
181 The Munda is also known as Pahan. All Munda people have ‘Pahan’ as their surnames. 
48 
 
the village observing Adibasi daily lives. Cherobin Hembrom gave me a list of Adibasi members 
from ten neighboring Adibasi 
hamlets and a non-Adibasi village. 
Talking to him at dinner became my 
daily task. Mr. Hembrom told stories 
about Adibasis’ social, political, 
legal, and economic issues, oral and 
sacred history, rituals, festivals, 
recognition politics, religion, and the 
movement. I took notes every night before sleeping. Cherobin formally gave me a three-hour 
interview about the recognition politics of Adibasis and protest issues on my last day at his house. 
It was a great experience to have such a knowledgeable person as my key informant for my 
research. 
After spending ten days of observing Adibasi communities, mining issues, movement, and 
collecting potential interviewees list, I started the data collection process. My father-in-law 
borrowed a motorbike for me, which my research assistant drove. This vehicle helped much in 
getting to interviewees in various places. I relied on my research assistant as a local Adibasi person 
who knew the area. Understanding and speaking Adibasi languages, he convinced most Adibasi 
interviewees to take part in my research. Clinton took me to Phulbari town many times. I conducted 
most of the interviews with activists in Phulbari and Birampur during my stay at Dhanjuri hamlet.  
1.4.6. Get Ready for Confrontation 
              
     “Agents of the company are roaming around. We will resist them at any cost.” 
- An Adibasi protester.  
 
Figure 2: My RA with the Bike we used for commuting 
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Although I was in an advantageous position entering the mining region,182 I faced multiple 
confrontations during my field activities in the mining region. When I was walking through an 
Adibasi hamlet, some residents stared at me as if I were a criminal. It took me a while to understand 
why they were staring at me. My research assistant told me, “They think that you are a Dalal.” I 
requested my RA to inform them that I am not a Dalal or a company agent; instead, I would be 
researching for their justice and rights. Another obstacle in Phulbari town was when a man, 
accompanying a regional NCBD leader, asked for an explanation of why I am doing this research. 
I tried to explain my research agenda and informed him that I am conducting this research as part 
of my doctoral study. He told me there is no point in researching. He did not give any explanation, 
but I felt that local protesters are frustrated of dealing with Dalal and Bohiragoto and do not want 
people to engage in the mining and movement issue.  
I also faced a confrontation at my RA’s house. My RA’s brother, the eldest Cherobin son, 
works for an NGO in Dinajpur town. He comes home every other two weeks. When he arrived 
home, he questioned me 
for a whole day, trying to 
find links with the 
company. I showed him 
the documents required 
for conducting field 
research. I even showed 
him the website where I 
had appeared in my 
 
182 My wife’s grandfather’s village situated only 10 kilometer s far from Phulbari mining footprint. 
Figure 3: Adibasi farmers busy working in the paddy field 
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university news for receiving scholarships for my study. He was not convinced and took a whole 
day to read the documents I provided to him. He talked to his father about the matter. I was worried 
that I would be kicked out, I would lose my RA, and I would not be able to conduct my field 
research in that area. I was waiting for responses from both persons. The next morning when he 
was leaving home for Dinajpur, he told me that I could stay at his house, but he was still confused 
about my roles. He later came back four to five times during my stay, and we discussed the Phulbari 
Coal Project, the movement, and the Adibasi lifestyle.   
During my fieldwork, I struggled to find people who could talk about mining development and 
the resistance movement because many people were busy with cultivating. The area became green 
all around with paddy fields everywhere. 
My landlord had 20 bighas (one bigha is 
equal to 1600 square yards) of 
cultivating lands. I felt that Adibasis in 
the mining area are now living in 
harmony with their existing agricultural 
practices. Though they are discriminated 
against socially with unequal treatment, 
they are happily living with their current 
economic settings. Although most of the 
people are poor, they have their own 
mechanisms to overcome their situation. 
Adibasi self-government institutions 
monitor if any Adibasi family is going 
Figure 4: Adibasi hamlets in the mining footprint collected from  
ESIA of Asia Energy 
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through financial hurdles, Majhi Parishad183 try to help. They feel that any changes in that area 
would harm their livelihoods and self-governing systems 
 
1.5. Methods Used 
 
I conducted forty-two semi-structured and open-ended interviews during my field activities in 
the Phulbari mining area and Dhaka, Bangladesh. I interviewed Adibasi elders (mostly from the 
Santal community, as they are majority in that region including Adibasi people from the Munda, 
Karmakar, and Robidas), farmers, and teachers; Adibasi leaders and activists; local government 
representatives; local Bangalee people; local and national activists, civil society members; experts, 
and NGO spokespersons. Out of forty-two interviews, twenty interviews were conducted in ten 
Adibasi hamlets of Khanpur Union of the Birampur sub-district such as (Koromtoli, Ratanpur, 
Dhanjuri, Dhakunda, Letason, Laxipur, Sonajuri, Bukshi, Swajanpukur, Dhantola), two from 
Phulbari sub-district and two hamlets from Nawabgonj sub-district. Most of these hamlets are 
included in the map of the mining footprint.  
 
183 Santals have Pargana Parishads (Circle councils). It is called Manjhi Parishad. Manjhi Parishad is the traditional 
governance institution of Santal people of Bangladesh and India. Through this institution, Santals practice their 
customary laws to govern the people in a hamlet. It has twelve members including a woman. Santals are known as 
Manjhi as well. There are four stages such as hamlet pargana hamlet circle), Union pargana (union circle), Upazilla 
Pargana (sub-district circle) and Zilla Pargana (district circle). In hamlets, the committee consists of 12 people under 
the leadership of a Mandal (chief). Mandal is responsible for all matters (land conflict, family matters, and other 
societal issues, small criminal matters) to resolve by discussing with other members. Santals governance system 
introduced to include women members in pargana system. According to their new rule, a woman can be a Mandal 
too. If the hamlet pargana is unable to resolve the issue, Union pargana, that also consists of 12 members under a 




Out of twenty Adibasi interviewees, fourteen are from the Santal community, six from the 
Munda community, one from the 
Karmakar, and one from the 
Robidas community. Interviewees 
included eight farmers and four 
women (one interviewee is elderly, 
and one is a local government 
representative. Two of them are 
farmers), two schoolteachers, four 
Mandal184 of Manjhi Parishad from four hamlets, one Adibasi representative in a government 
institute, one college student, and one national leader. I also interviewed two representatives from 
Adibasi NGOs. I interviewed two local government heads—the Chairman of Khanpur Union 
Council of Birampur sub-district and the Chairman of Phulbari Sub-district Council. Both are 
Bangalees. I interviewed five Bangalee farmers, including a woman in the Phulbari mining region, 
eight protest activists from Phulbari and Birampur, and one national leader. I also interviewed two 
spokespersons from environmental NGOs and two civil society members. I could not manage to 
find any person from the Mahili community—who are recognized by the company as ‘Indigenous 
peoples.’ I had a plan to interview company officials, but I could not find them in Bangladesh. 
Because the company shut its office and wound up activities in Bangladesh. I tried to contact them 
by telephone in its London office but could not get any response.  
I identified the locations by reading various research reports conducted on the Phulbari Coal 
Project and the movement. Before visiting the site, I talked to a researcher who gave me a vast 
 
184 The heads of the traditional institution of the Santal and Munda are called ‘Mandal’. 
Figure 5: An Adibasi respondent signing the Informed Consent letter 
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knowledge about the area, local peoples’ psychological states, and emotions about the region and 
minefield including the motivation about upholding the movement spirit. I got more information 
about local and national activists, and a few of them became my interviewees. I also talked to a 
researcher who was working in the area on an archeological excavation. He made me understand, 
for the first time, that the area is enormously valued not only because of agricultural lands but also 
for rich archeological sites. Moreover, Google Earth and maps used in the ESIA helped me to 
identify which areas would be affected most.  
My interview questions were divided into two segments. In the first part, I asked some open-
ended questions about Adibasi lifestyles, livelihoods, and their position in society. The reason for 
the division of questions is to identify the recognition and politics behind the government’s non-
recognition. I also asked similar questions to many interviewees from the Bangalee community 
and activists to locate their views about Indigenous peoples. I intended to assess ‘recognition by 
others’ criterion of defining Indigenous peoples. Various theorists suggest that to recognize 
Indigenous peoples, they need to be recognized by other people who live close to them.185 The 
second segment of the questions asked to all interviewees: why did they join and how did they get 
involved in the resistance movement? 
Most of the Adibasi interviewees gave interviews in the Bangla language. In Bangladesh, 
Adibasi languages have assimilated many Bangla words as their own. Many Adibasi groups speak 
in Bangla language because of their segregation and association of majority Bangalee people in 
Bangladesh. Adibasis who live close to urban areas are more likely to speak Bangla than people 
who live in remote hamlets. In many instances, I could not understand their Santal and Bangla 
mixed dialect, but my RA helped me understand the meanings. Only three interviewees spoke in 
 
185 Benedict Kingsbury, “’Indigenous Peoples’ in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian 
Controversy.” (1998) American Journal of International Law. 
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English; all live in Dhaka. Most of the interviews were transcribed. All participants in my research 
were informed in plain language about the nature of the project, condition, duration and topic of 
conversations, foreseeable risk, the methodology to be used, and potential benefits that may arise 
from research participation. I recorded most of the interviews by simple notetaking and audio tape-
recorder (subject to the consent of each participant). They could ask questions before and after 
each interview. Each interview ranged in length from forty-five minutes to three hours depending 
on the situation.  
During the consent process, each participant was asked if she or he would like to be assigned 
a pseudonym for the study; only two of them declined this option, choosing to have their real 
names used in any publications or presentations generated from the research. Except for those two 
persons, throughout the dissertation, I used initials of first names (in some cases both names) for 
their confidentiality. In Bangladesh, most Adibasi people are known by their first names. Their 
last names are almost similar. For example, all Munda people have ‘Pahan’ as their last/family 
names. Santals have twelve titles or clans, and they use twelve family names that I explained in 
Chapter IV. Bangalees are known by first names, family names, and nicknames. In some cases, I 
used initials for first names and family names when I acknowledged that a participant could be 
identified if I use their any name.  
People who were not aware of the movement were excluded. I selected a key informant first 
who had extensive knowledge about the Adibasi lifestyle and took part in the Phulbari Khoni 
Andolon in 2006. He helped me to identify the key people to be interviewed. I also identified many 
interviewees during interview procedures. To protect participant confidentiality, original research 
data will be protected from third parties, stored securely, and destroyed in a timely manner after 
the conclusion of the study. 
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Participant observations are also reflected in my dissertation. Participant observation activities 
included attending various events, such as protests, meetings, press conferences, and Adibasi 
festivals, campaigning in a local government election, as well as volunteering in the office of a 
local Adibasi NGO and living in Adibasi communities. In this way, I learned about involved actors 
in the project and the concurrent demands of Adibasis and local activists of the movement. To 
understand the existing knowledge about environmental management, Adibasi traditional 
knowledge, their accounts of joining the movement, and their participation (consultation and 
consent) in the planned project, I conducted an informal focus group meeting comprised of four 
Mandal of the Santal’ Manjhi Parishad from four separate hamlets whose knowledge represents 
the question of interest.  
I attended a street protest organized by a leftist party when a government geological survey 
team arrived in Phulbari, as the 
leftists believed the team 
would start another mining 
activity. I attended another 
meeting organized by NCBD 
in Dhaka, protesting the S. 
Alam project in the Banshkhali 
sub-district of Chattogram. 
The project is going to develop 
coal-fired powerplant in the seashore area, which will displace many fishers and farmers, and 
destroy the biodiversity conservation of the sea habitats. Local people protested, but the law 
enforcement agency fired upon them and killed six people. The meeting also discussed the Phulbari 
Figure 6: Street protest in Phulbari in 2016 
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project and the Rampal coal-fired power plant. I campaigned in a local government election of the 
Khanpur Union Council in favor of Cherobin’s wife, who had been contesting for reserved woman 
seats. By taking part in the election campaign, I learned a lot about the Adibasi lifestyle.  
I visited the DoE office in Dhaka several times. I used the library of the Department. I gathered 
first-hand information about the process of environmental clearance for a large-scale development 
project. I conducted an informal interview with an official who gave consent to use the information 
without referring to his identity. I visited two environmental NGOs in Dhaka and their libraries. 
Representatives from both NGOs did not respond when I requested interviews.  
I collected writings, data information, and other related documents from Adibasi and 
environmental NGOs and TEJOs to supplement my own empirical data in my dissertation. The 
materials include government policy directives, national legislation, reports, environmental impact 
studies, press releases, company reports, leaflets, newspaper articles, televisions reports, NGO 
reports, and academic publications. My analysis and accounts of TEJOs accounts are based on 
their activities in the UK and the USA, as published on their websites. For the purpose of 
supporting the understanding of the impact assessment processes, environmental justice and rights 
of Indigenous peoples, I examined some international instruments such as the Aarhus Convention, 
the ILO Convention No. 169, UNDRIP, Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (REDD), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). I investigated national 
and transnational legal and policy instruments in regulating the relationship between extractive 
industries and Indigenous peoples. 
 





My dissertation is comprised of three parts. Part I includes Chapters I, II and III. Based on the 
ESIA published by Asia Energy and the field data, Chapter II offers a description of the Phulbari 
Coal Project. Sub-sections include the neo-liberal context of resource development in Bangladesh, 
the location of the project, communities, livelihoods and the reservation of rights and interests for 
Adibasi communities in their official document. The chapter also highlights what would happen 
(impact of an open-pit mine) if the company were to develop it, such as the impact on livelihoods 
of Adibasi communities, loss of agricultural lands, destruction of cultural and religious heritage, 
sacred sites, and local biodiversity of the region. In this connection, Chapter II also offers a 
discussion about the importance of recognizing various rights of Indigenous peoples and engaging 
them in EIA. This part also incorporates a discussion about EIA practice in Bangladesh. I argue 
that access to participation and consultation for participating in the decision-making process must 
be incorporated in legislative and other mechanisms aimed at promoting procedural environmental 
justice. Based on qualitative research in the form of interview data collected from Adibasis of 
Phulbari, Chapter III highlights the historical and informative overview of the resistance 
movement of the Phulbari Coal Project following the finalization of mining operations in 
Bangladesh. Furthermore, the chapter accommodates national and transnational activists’ 
conceptions of the environmental justice movement. Different layers of organizing the protest 
against the multinational corporation give a broader perspective of resisting neoliberal intervention 
in Bangladesh which are framed through the accounts of leftist protesters or activists. Moreover, 
Adibasi accounts in this chapter also broaden the general meaning of fighting powerful forces.   
Part II includes Chapter IV, which is devoted to the recognition of Indigenous peoples in 
Bangladesh. Since the ethnic groups around the open-pit coal project and throughout Bangladesh 
are not perceived as ‘Adibasi’ or ‘Indigenous peoples’ by the government, I observe and report 
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how they frame their issues with a specific end goal to be heard. By analyzing various definitions 
and conceptions of Indigenous peoples developed by international law, experts, scholars, and 
accounts of surrounding Adibasi communities, I argue that the self-identified groups should be 
recognized as Indigenous peoples. The overall purpose of this chapter is to identify the ethnic 
communities of the mining footprint as a legal and political character through which they can apply 
their rights in the decision-making process by articulating different aspects of environmental 
justice.    
Part III includes Chapters V and VI. By locating environmental justice in the central argument 
through qualitative analysis, Chapter V examines the rights and interests of Adibasis, or 
Indigenous peoples were reflected in the decision-making process of developing the coal mine 
project in Phulbari. The chapter also analyzes the features and principles of the environmental 
justice framework in light of the claims of Adibasi communities in the Phulbari Khoni Andolon 
they had participated in 2006 and reservation of their rights in the ESIA. In this regard, Adibasi 
claims and the company activities to develop the project are analyzed considering the 
environmental justice framework. This chapter offers a discussion about different forms of 
environmental justice movement and examines if the motivations and elements of the Phulbari 
Khoni Andolon that I have conversed in Chapter III form an environmental justice movement that 
is perceived in the global South. This chapter also advances national, transnational and 
international legal strategies of engaging Indigenous peoples in managing natural resources in their 
territories. The final chapter concludes the arguments made in the previous chapters of the 














The dissertation examines one of the five principal coal mines in Bangladesh: the Phulbari 
Coal Project in the Dinajpur district. If opened, the proposed coal mine project would become one 
of the most massive open-pit or surface coal mines in the world. Thousands of local people and 
civil society members have protested since 2005 to stop its operation. According to the project 
proponent, Asia Energy Corporation (Bangladesh) Pty Ltd. (now GCM Resources PLC.), it will 
give a much-needed economic boost to the area, but critics fear it will also create several 
environmental and socio-political problems. A persistent eagerness arose in Bangladesh when it 
was discovered that there are vast reserves of high-quality coal in Phulbari. The media were fast 
to claim that extracting coal would ensure a reliable supply of energy to produce electricity, which 
would contribute to the economic development of Bangladesh. The media, the government, and 
industrialists were highlighting that the proposed coal mine would bring benefits to Bangladesh,1 
given the fact that the $2 billion project would establish a 1000 MW coal-based power plant and 
this mine would have provided support for up to 4000 MW of power generating capacity. 
However, it was originally indicated in the contract that the government will receive only a 6% 
 
1 Manoranjan Pegu, “The Phulbari movement: Resisting Neo liberalism in Bangladesh.” In Sustainability and 
Ownership in People Centred Advocacy in South Asia (Dhaka: National Centre for Advocacy Studies, 2011) at 26. 
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royalty on the proposed project, which was increased to 10% in response to the Phulbari Khoni 
Andolon.2 
Local communities, including a considerable number of ‘Adibasi’ in the project area, would 
be dislocated; these are people who depend upon agriculture since the lands are very fertile for 
crops year-round. Experts opined that local people would benefit more economically in the long 
run by cultivating their lands than developing an open-pit coal mine. The project would affect the 
productivity of agricultural lands on a large scale by contaminating the air, soil, and water in the 
mine area. Again, contaminated water, air, soil, and burning coal would also affect the health of 
Indigenous peoples and other community members.3 The biodiversity and ecosystem of the 
Phulbari area would be destroyed permanently. Besides, the extracted coal would be transported 
by vessels for export to the Mongla Seaport through rivers in the Sundarbans.4 According to 
experts, coal would be falling in the water during transportation, mixing with the water, and 
polluting the ecosystem of the UNESCO World Heritage Site.5 Moreover, the collective impact of 
an open-pit coal project, such as displacement that makes local people environmental refugees, 
permanent loss of agricultural lands, and destruction of cultural and religious heritage, would 
occur.  
Knowing all the impacts on the livelihoods and biodiversity of the local area and the 
Sundarbans, local people along with environmentalists and various activist groups began protests 
against the multinational company in 2005. The bloody movement was huge and attracted 
international media coverage; finding no other option, the company fled Phulbari, and the 
 
2 Philip Gain, Energy Challenges and Phulbari Crisis, (Society for Environment and Human Development- SEHD: 
Dhaka, 2013), at 143. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid 
5 Prof Mustafizur Rahman, Sustainable Exploration of Bangladesh Coal Resources: An Intractable (?) Policy 
Dilemma. European Report on Development (Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2011). 
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government signed an agreement with local protesters assuring that the mining operation would 
be stopped immediately, and the company would be expelled from Bangladesh.6 
Based on the company’s ESIA report, legislation, my interview data, and secondary sources 
such as newspaper reports, working papers, books, and scholarly articles, this chapter explores in 
detail the Phulbari Coal Project proposal and the importance of mineral resource extraction for 
economic development in Bangladesh. The chapter also includes a discussion on EIA in 
Bangladesh and whether the rights and interests of Indigenous peoples should be incorporated in 
EIA. Additionally, the chapter examines the implications of neo-liberal policy on resource 
extraction in the context of economic development. In this regard, it considers the intervention of 
MNCs and TNCs for extracting minerals or development projects in Bangladesh and how foreign 
companies deal with the environment and local people in project developments. Furthermore, the 
chapter considers the role of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) dealing with companies’ 
activities as this financial institution has policies for business negotiations between the company 
and the Bangladesh government.  
 
2.2. Coal Mining and Energy Context in Bangladesh 
 
 
Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated (1115 persons per sq km.), poverty-stricken, 
and energy-starved countries in the world. The country’s annual energy consumption per capita is 
one of the lowest in South Asia and the developing world due to its over-population with the small 
size of the area.7 There is a significant gap between the power supply and demand in Bangladesh, 
 
6 Pegu, supra note 1. 
7 According to World Population Review, Bangladesh has an estimated population of 166.37 million in 2018 




although the current government increased the number of power plants from 27 to 108.8 This gap 
is due to higher demand by consumers and producers. However, the government recently claimed 
that 80% of the country’s total population has sufficient access to electricity with daily power 
generation at a record high at 10084 MW.9 Bangladesh will need about 13,500 MW of electricity 
to attain a significant annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate projected at 8%, which 
should rise to 41,900 MW by 2021.10  
Natural resources are very limited in Bangladesh. Therefore, energy security is crucial for 
socio-economic development. The Ministry of Finance of the Bangladesh Government confirms 
that the share of natural resources for electricity generation in 2010 was natural gas 80%, oil 5%, 
coal 4%, and hydropower 3%.11 Even though the natural gas reserves bring hope, the quickly 
depleting reserves make it essential to seek alternative ways to produce electricity, such as oil-
based power plants and coal-based power plants. Since Bangladesh has a very limited oil reserve 
and depends on imports, expensive oil-based electricity generation is not economically viable for 
the country. Consequently, the five recently discovered coalfields sparked hope for the country. 
Since Bangladesh has significant coal reserves, its exploitation is seen as imperative for the 
achievement of the energy security needs.12 International financial institutions such as ADB and 
the World Bank suggested that the government should explore using coal for electricity generation.   
Coal is primarily composed of carbon, which is harmless to the environment when buried under 
the earth but has a wide range of environmental effects because of its extraction process.13 
 
8 BDNEWS24, “Bangladesh’s electricity generation crosses 10,000MW for first time” (20 March, 2018). Online:  
https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2018/03/20/bangladeshs-electricity-generation-crosses-10000mw-for-first-time  
9 Ibid. 
10 Rahman, supra note 5. 
11 Ministry of Finance, Power and Energy Sector Roadmap, (Ministry of Finance: Dhaka, 2012) at 58. 
12 Ibid. at 13 
13 Ananth Chikkatur, Ambuj Sagar, and T. Sankar, “Sustainable development of the Indian coal sector.” (2009) 3.8 
Energy, pp. 942-953. 
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According to Mear Angen, developed and industrialized countries can mitigate the adverse 
environmental impacts of extracting coal using new technologies by implementing strong 
regulations. After that, most of the countries are phasing out coal-based power plants because 
burning coal produces a massive amount of CO2, which is responsible for climate change.14   
Lands over the coal reserve areas in Bangladesh are incredibly fertile and usually sustain two 
or three crops a year. The area provides a permanent livelihood for the farming communities, 
which could be irreversibly lost if over ground open-pit mining is done. The experience of the only 
functioning underground coal mine shows that both water flow in coal layers and temperature are 
higher than in some other parts of the country. Thus, coal mining is particularly problematic in 
Bangladesh.15 Issues of the open-pit versus closed pit mining (i.e., loss of fertile agricultural land 
versus coal exploration, land acquisition versus displacement and resettlement of people, and water 
management in the coal areas versus possible environmental damage) have been extremely 
important for deciding on an acceptable solution for exploitation of the country’s coal resources. 
Therefore, environmental management, human development, and sustainable development 
dimensions are igniting debates on the exploitation of coal resources in Bangladesh.16 
Five coalfields with high-quality reserves have been discovered in the northwest region of 
Bangladesh. Among these five coalfields, only the Barapukuria Coal Project is in operation 
through underground mining in the Parbatipur sub-district of Dinajpur district, which contributes 
only 4% of the country’s total electricity.17 A government owned-company named Barapukuria 
Coal Mine Company Limited (BCMCL) is exploring coal from this project. Recently, the 
 
14 Mear R. Angen, Coal Mining in Bangladesh: Options to Mitigate Environmental Impacts. (2008) Thesis 
published by Simon Fraser University, BC. At 6. 
15 Rahman, supra note 5 at 11-12. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. at 14. 
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government has initiated exploration of coal from the Dighipara coalfield in the same district 
through an underground method and signed a 1.67 billion BDT deal for conducting a feasibility 
study on a 24 sq km area for 27 
months (June 2017- September 
2019) with BCMCL targeting 
to extract 3 million metric 
tonnes per year.18 In 1995, the 
Geological Survey of 
Bangladesh (GSB) of the 
Ministry of Power, Energy and 
Mineral Resources discovered 
the Dighipara coalfield, which 
has an estimated coal reserve of 
150 million metric tonnes.19 A 
study in 1962 found the 
possibility of 1053 million 
tonnes of coal reserve at 
Jamalganj, but neither its 
extraction nor any further 
exploration was conducted afterward. The government started studying this crucial depth coalfield, 
 
18 Daily Sun, “Govt to mine Dhigipara coalfield through underground method” (May 31, 2017) Online: 
http://www.daily-sun.com/printversion/details/230206/Govt-to-mine-Dhigipara-coalfield-through-underground-
method 
19 Geological Survey of Bangladesh Website: http://www.gsb.gov.bd/site/page/3c6dd187-a2b7-46e2-b6b6-
f603d450b48f/Discovered-Minerals. Also see: Dhaka Tribune, “Deal signing today for feasibility of Dighipara coal” 
(May 30, 2017) Online:  https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/power-energy/2017/05/30/deal-signing-today-
feasibility-dighipara-coal 
Figure 7: Mineral Resources Map of Bangladesh 
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and three wells have been drilled to explore natural gas and assess commercial viability.20 In 2015, 
Petrobangla (the government’s natural resource department) signed a deal with India’s Mining 
Associates Pvt. Ltd. for studying the methane reserve in the coalfield in a 12 sq km area.21 The 
GSB discovered the Khalashpir coalfield in 1989, but it was out of action until October 11, 2003, 
when the then BNP-led alliance government secretly gave Hosaf Consortium the license to explore 
the Khalashpir coal zone with 2,500 hectares of land. Hosaf applied for a mining lease for the area 
in the same year for mine development, although the company does not have previous mining 
experience. In July 2006, the company in association with a Chinese company named Shandong 
Ludi Xinwen Mining Group submitted a feasibility report to the Bureau of Mineral Development 
(BMD) with a plan to develop an underground mine.22 
Table 2: Coalfields in Bangladesh 
Name of the Coal 
Fields 
District Coal Reserve 
(Million Metric 
Tonnes) 
The depth of the 
field (in meters)  
Discovery 
year 
Jamalgonj Joypurhat 1053 640-1100m 1962 
Barapukuria Dinajpur 300 118-509m 1985 
Khalashpir Rangpur 143 257-480m 1989 
Dighipara Dinajpur 150 328-407m 1995 
Phulbari Dinajpur 572 150-240m 1997 
 
Source: GSB website 
 
 
2.3. Overview of the Phulbari Coal Project  
 
 
Asia Energy submitted its initial environmental examination (IEE) on 10th February 2005 and 
received an environmental site clearance (ESC) on 29th May 2005.  An EIA was submitted on 30th 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 BDNEWS24, “Fresh drilling at Joypurhat’s Jamalganj coal field to find gas” (January 7, 2007). Online: 
https://bdnews24.com/economy/2016/01/07/fresh-drilling-at-joypurhats-jamalganj-coal-field-to-find-gas 




June 2005. The company conducted an EIA including three technical reports that were published 
in 2005 (all four volumes together are called ESIA). The Department of Environment (DoE) of 
Bangladesh granted an environmental clearance certificate (ECC) on 11th September 2005 and 
approved the ESIA later in 2006 for the Phulbari Coal Project, which was submitted by Asia 
Energy.23 The company later published the ESIA in August 2006. Three hundred consultants from 
several international and national companies, Bangladeshi environmental organizations, and 
university academics, recruited by Asia Energy, prepared the ESIA for the project.24 The ESIA is 
comprised of four volumes, including an executive summary. Volume 1 discusses the main report 
of the project consisting of 18 chapters. Volume 2 consists of 13 sections and talks about mine 
development, infrastructure, and coal transportation. Volume 3 consists of 14 sections and deals 
with environmental management. Volume 4 deals with socio-economic issues, consisting of 9 
sections. Section 1 of this volume is dedicated to a report titled Public Consultation and Disclosure 
Plan (PCDP). Section 2 reports on resettlement plans. Section 4 deals with a report titled, 
“Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP)”. Asia Energy, in its ESIA report, claims that they 
initiated an open and informed consultation with stakeholders and affected communities to inform 
them of the project proposal and developments and assure their concerns would be considered in 
the decision-making process.25 According to the executive summary of the ESIA, the company 
consultants conducted consultations with environment-related government officials at national and 
local levels, NGOs, local government representatives, and local Bangalee and Adibasi 
stakeholders.26   
 
23 Asia Energy PLC, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment for Phulbari Coal Project: Executive Summary, 
(NSW: Asia Energy Corporation (Bangladesh) Pty Ltd, 2006) at 9. 
24 H. Withanage, Bangladesh: Phulbari coal mine -“Losses Beyond Compensation”. (2008) Bankwatch. Quezon 
City, Philipines: NGO Forum on ADB. 
25 Asia Energy PLC., supra note 23 at 9. 
26 Ibid. at 10. 
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Although the actual coalfield covers only 59 sq km, the project would extend over 135 sq km. 
Moreover, a nearly 656 sq km area would be affected directly or indirectly during the mining 
operation including de-watering.27 It has an estimated coal reserve of 572 million tonnes which is 
9th largest in the world, mainly consisting of bituminous thermal and metallurgical coal types, 
fossilized over 270 million years. The average thickness of the coal seam in Phulbari is 38m. An 
overburden ranging between 150m and 240m needs to be removed, creating a hollow of a depth 
of about 300m.28 ESIA stated that the coal would be extracted by open-pit method for assuring 
maximum extraction using hydraulic excavators and trucks. The company expected to recover a 
variety of valuable industrial mineral co-products such as high-grade silica (sand), Modhupur clay, 
ceramic clay, gravels, and high-quality rocks from the overburden during the excavation.29 Due to 
the mine development, the landscape of the area would be changed from farmlands to a hill that is 
14 sq km in area and 185 feet high, also featuring a lake that would cover six sq km. Consequently, 
this vast area would lose fertility permanently due to open-cast mining.30 The proposed large-scale 
project is in a red category according to domestic law and is classified as category ‘A’ by ADB 
with significant potential environmental impacts.31 Asia Energy pledged that they would 
implement the Equator Principles, environmental and social safeguard policies (on such issues as 
involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, and cultural property) of International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), ADB's Environment Policy (2002) and ADB’s Environmental Assessment 
Guidelines (2003), including the involuntary resettlement plan and Indigenous peoples 
 
27 Anu Muhammad, Development or Destruction: Essays on Global Hegemony and Corporate Grabbing and 
Bangladesh, (Dhaka: Shrabon Prokashoni, 2007). 
28 Rahman, supra note 5 at 16. 
29 Asia Energy PLC., supra note 23. 
30 Asia Energy PLC., Summary of Environmental Impact Assessment: Phulbari Coal Project, (2006) Environmental 




development plan, other guidelines of the World Bank and IFC, and proposed a new IFC 
performance standards on coal mining.32 
The proposed Phulbari Coal Project site is located on the Barind Tract in the northwestern part 
of Bangladesh, close to the India-Bangladesh border, which falls within four sub-districts of 
Dinajpur district such as Phulbari, Birampur, Nawabganj, and Parbatipur. The Little Jamuna River, 
Khari Pul and Nalsissa rivers are located to the east and west of the mine site. The Kharipul River 
drains into Ashoorar Beel, which is considered as an important natural resource for the Adibasi 
communities of the area.33  The mine footprint covers an area of 5,933 hectares or 59 sq km and is 
11 km long and 3 km wide; it includes more than a hundred villages and thousands of acres of 
cropland of eight unions in four sub-districts.34 Phulbari’s landscape is mostly comprised of flat 
fields with patches of flat forests, all of which would be destroyed to establish the proposed mine. 
Dinajpur is a major rice-producing district of Bangladesh with the production of high-quality 
rice.35 The Phulbari mining area has a similar pattern.  
Asia Energy documents state that the population of the four subdistricts was estimated at 
832,220 with an average density of 711 people per sq km. in 2001.36 According to the Community 
Report of Bangladesh Population and Housing Census of 2011, the Phulbari sub-district has a 
population of 176,023 living within 152 villages. The average density of people per square km is 
770. Moreover, the neighboring Birampur sub-district has a population of 170,806 with 806 people 
per sq km. A significant portion of the project area falls under the Khanpur Union of Birampur 
sub-district which has 18,318 population with a density of 496 people per sq km where Adibasi 
 
32 Ibid. at 2. 
33 Ibid. at 4. 
34 International Accountability Project (IAP), The Phulbari Coal Project: A Threat to People, Land and Human 
Rights in Bangladesh.  (San Fransisco: International Accountability Project, 2012). 
35 Sadid Nuremowla, Resistance, Rootedness and Mining Protest in Phulbari. (2012) Doctoral Thesis (PhD), 
University of Sussex. 
36 Asia Energy PLC., supra note 30.  
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communities live.37 The other two sub-districts such as Parbatipur and Nawabgonj have a similar 
or more population density. However, Phulbari township would fall under the projected plan where 
population density is several times (4245 per sq km.) higher than villages.38  
Figure 8: Phulbari Project Map 
 
 
Source: Executive Summary of the ESIA 
 
 
37 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Population and Housing Census 2011 “Dinajpur” at 63. 
38 Muhammad, supra note 27.  
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According to the ESIA report, the development of this mine would require the company to 
relocate 49,487 people of 11,287 households in the mining area in different phases over a 30-year 
lifespan of the mine.39 However, the neutral expert committee to study the feasibility of the project 
assigned by the government estimated that around 130,000 people would be immediately affected, 
and as many as 220,000 could be displaced during mining operations.40 The International 
Accountability Project (IAP) carried out a detailed analysis of the draft Resettlement Plan (RP) 
that the company conducted and determined that it grossly understated the number of people the 
project would displace.41 Consequently, thousands of families would be left homeless, become 
environmental refugees and destitute, and would not be protected.   
Most people at the project location are farmers consisting of Adibasi communities and 
Bangalees, who depend on their cultivated lands for food and other subsistence. JAP estimates that 
the project would displace 50,000 Adibasis belonging to various groups such as Santals, Mundas, 
Mahili, Mahato, Rajbonshis, Oraons, Karmakar (Blacksmith), Robidas or Ravidassia, and a few 
more.42 Although the company recognizes Adibasi of Phulbari as ‘Indigenous peoples’ through 
IPDP in the ESIA, as has become the norm in these procedures, they understated the number of 
affected people by a factor of ten.43 Moreover, the document identifies only three Adibasi 
communities (Santal, Munda, and Mahili) as ‘Indigenous peoples’,44 but JAP claims that some 
other ethnic communities, such as Mahato, Oraon, Karmakar, Robidas, who are not included in 
 
39 Asia Energy PLC, supra note 23.  
40 IAP, supra note 33.   
41 Ibid.  
42 Kate Hoshour, “The Indigenous Peoples Development Plan for the Phulbari Project, Bangladesh.” (2012), 
International Accountability Project. 
43 Pegu, supra note 1 at 23.  
44 Section 3.2 of the IPDP, “Indigenous Groups in the Project Area,” states that 7.3% of all households to be 
displaced are Indigenous. However, a footnote reveals that this estimate excludes households from groups that “are 
more appropriately classified as ‘small ethnic minority’ groups rather than ‘Indigenous’, given their historic past, 
their social structure, religious practices and non-agricultural livelihoods.”  
Also see: Hoshour, supra note 42.  
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the document should also be regarded as Indigenous peoples.45 As will be discussed in more detail 
later, it is important to note that the Bangladesh government does not recognize them as Indigenous 
peoples or Adibasi.46 Adibasi communities who live in the Phulbari project area have a similar 
race history. They have diverse cultures, language, customary laws, and traditions, which make 
them distinct from other communities including the majority Bangalee people (98% in 
Bangladesh). Regarding the Phulbari Coal Project, experts note that entire Indigenous dwellings 
and villages would be destroyed. Such land alienation leaves them separated from the grounding 
of their livelihoods, commercial interactions, and community connections.47  
Agriculture plays a significant role in the economy of this region, with 85% of the total 
population dependent on it for their livelihood.48 People of Phulbari are involved in agriculture, 
small business, and work as informal laborers, rickshaw pullers, and van rickshaw drivers to 
supplement their income. 
Farmers are growing crops such 
as seasonal rice, wheat, mustard, 
potato, corn, banana, jute, chili, 
garlic, onions, etc. three times a 
year. Their livelihood also 
depends on forest trees and fruits, 
river resources, and household 
 
45 Ibid.  
46 I have a separate chapter (Chapter III) on recognizing Adibasi of Phulbari area by analyzing international law. I 
have argued that although the communities are not recognized by the government, their rights on natural resources 
would not fail. 
47 Heather Bedi, “UN Special Rapporteur Human Rights Condemnation: Corporate Land Grabbing for Coal Mining 
in Bangladesh.” (2012) Land Grabbing II Conference: Cornell University, New York: Land Deals Politics Initiatives 
(LDPI) at 11.  
48 Asia Energy PLC. supra note 23.  
Figure 9: Two Adibasi women are taking care of cattle beside the forest and crop 




farms of fishes and cattle. Some are farming on their lands, some are sharecroppers, but most of 
them work as day laborers in other people’s fields, as they are landless. However, people of the 
area where the company planned to develop the open-pit coal project are happy with the production 
of crops, as this area is one of the most fertile in Bangladesh. Again, the ESIA report for the 
Phulbari project estimates that 78% percent of families reported having adequate water.49 The flat 
field nature landscape of the Phulbari mining region would be destroyed by developing the 
proposed mine.50 Local people were aware of the impact of the mining activities and they 
calculated the loss they would face. Since they are mostly farmers, they would not be able to 
purchase agricultural lands with their compensation money in another place. Consequently, they 
protested and resisted mining in their area. 
The extraction of coal and other mineral resources would result in various negative 
environmental impacts around the minefield. The displacement of small-scale farmers from lands 
they depend on would further worsen the situation. These farmers are a group representing between 
1.5 and 2 billion people worldwide, which is already marginalized and represents up to half of the 
people who are too poor to feed themselves.51 They face numerous problems in new places of 
residence. Therefore, resettlement caused by the implementation of any development project is the 
most irreparable form of forced internal migration.52 The displacement of people leads to a 
violation of many individuals and collective human rights. Problems associated with the displaced 
people with the development of mining projects are increasingly becoming the focus of human 
 
49 Ibid.   
50 Nuremowla, supra note 35 at 5.  
51  Bedi, supra note 47 at 10. 
52 Bogumil Terminski, “Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement: Social problems and Human Rights Issues 
(a Global Perspective)” (2012) Social Science Research Network.   
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rights organizations.53 They highlight that there should be mechanisms to support people who are 
displaced or affected by development projects.54  
The Phulbari Coal Project would have an enormous destructive impact on the environment and 
local communities. More than a hundred villages, croplands, forests, thousands of houses, markets, 
schools, colleges, mosques, temples, graveyards, forestland, and roads will be destroyed. 
Furthermore, the project would harm human health, destroy local biodiversity, and increase the 
salinity of the water. All the environmental impacts of the Phulbari project would fall on those 
displaced people. The people of Phulbari would also be deprived of their means of livelihood, as 
they would be displaced and dislocated from their land. 
Some of my respondents pointed out that they are ready to compromise for the economic 
development of the country, but their livelihoods should be considered. Although the company has 
informed the community that they would build a town for the displaced for resettlement purposes, 
local people understand that it is 
impossible to get similar 
opportunities to what they have 
been getting for generations in 
their own homes and 
agricultural lands. They 
understand that the company 
would only provide one or two 
rooms for a family whether it is 
a small or large family. Most of 
 
53 Ibid. at 5.  
54 Ibid.  
Figure 10: Adibasi houses in the mining footprint 
Photo: Fieldwork, 2016 
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the households have cattle, which are part and parcel of their livelihoods, and there would be no 
space for those in the town. They do not want to leave their ancestral graveyards and religious 
heritage. Moreover, the residents know that the replacement of land for lost land is not possible in 
land-scarce Bangladesh because of high population density. People are concerned about financial 
benefits, but they know instant cash compensation would not help them with similar livelihoods. 
ESIA recognized that the community wanted separate resettlement as a community; for example, 
Santals wanted a separate place for Santals so that they can live and maintain their cultural 
diversity. In current settings, ethnic groups are concentrated in hamlets. 
According to a summary of the EIA report submitted to ADB, there are six types of ecosystems 
that exist in the project area such as cultivated land, roadside vegetation, Sal forests, homestead 
vegetation, and wetlands that would be destroyed. The ecosystem carries 512 flora species, 89 fish 
species, and 158 terrestrial vertebrate species.55 The mining area also comprises a part of the 
Phulbari town with various schools, colleges, and other enterprises.56 There are many permanent 
religious sites and graveyards.  
The Phulbari Coal Project would cause massive environmental and ecological impacts. The 
project would pollute the soil, water, air, ecosystem and biodiversity of the local area, having a 
considerable adverse impact on local people including a considerable number of Adibasis. Many 
of the environmental issues of concern during the primary stages of the mining process continue 
throughout the entire process. During the reclamation stage, traffic to and from the coalfield area 
would be continued. The reclamation stage of mining involves restoring soil fertility, recreating 
the ecosystem and biological diversity, and landscape.57 Concerning land disturbance, the soil is 
 
55 Asia Energy PLC. supra note 30 at 6.  
56 Pegu, supra note 1 at 25 
57 Chikkatur, Sagar, and Sankar, supra note 13. 
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disrupted and can cause the land to be less productive after mining. The erosion of soil may lead 
to an increase in sediment in the surface water resulting in degradation of water quality of the 
Phulbari area.58 The groundwater in an area covering about 500 sq km would be lowered, and 
water would be toxic due to waste and burning. The proposed Phulbari Coal Project would divert 
a river and suck an aquifer dry for more than 30 years. For de-watering the mine, the project would 
prevent adequate water supplies for agriculture, fisheries, local industries, and households.59  
The open-pit coal project would cause noise and dust pollution due to dynamite explosions. 
More noise and dust will come from the trucks and trains that would haul coal away from the 
mine.60 The coal combustion waste contains pollutants known to cause cancer, congenital 
disabilities, reproductive disorders, neurological damage, learning disabilities, kidney disease, and 
diabetes. Phulbari’s 572 million tonnes of coal would generate 1.14 billion tonnes of carbon 
dioxide and release a substantial portion of methane gas into the air.61  
The Phulbari Coal Project threatens the Sundarbans since extracted coal would be transported 
through a river of the forest. The Sundarbans is the largest mangrove forest in the world, containing 
58 rare and threatened species including the Royal Bengal tiger.62 Up to 8 million tonnes of coal 
per year would be transferred from the barges to the shipping vessels at a floating offshore 
reloading facility in the forest. The ESIA of the project rates the risk that barge fuel could 
contaminate the reserve as ‘extremely high’, which would result in severe damage to mangroves 
and other shoreline plant species.63   
 
58 Angen, supra note 14 at 7.  
59 Pegu, supra note 1 at 26. 
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62 Mangrove Action Plan (MAP), “Save the Sundarbans—Stop The Phulbari Coal Mine” (2012). Online: 
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Asia Energy assured that the extracted coal 
would be used in domestic power generation 
(two 500mw power plants) and in domestic 
industries such as clay brick and coal briquette 
production, which would be transported mainly 
from Phulbari by rail. However, after meeting 
the domestic requirements, the surplus coal 
would be exported to international markets by 
rail, river, and sea.64 The company planned to 
build direct rail track from Phulbari to Khulna 
and a loading terminal at Khulna, navigation 
improvements to the Poshur River, a floating 
platform at Akram Point of the Sundarbans and 
channel dredging to the approach channel at the entrance of the Bay of Bengal. All these export 
processes would have a severe impact on the Sundarbans, although the company conducted a 
feasibility study.65 Beyond economic and social rights, the environmental rights of the local 
communities of Phulbari are endangered as well. The effect of mining on health is an equally 
pressing issue of concern. The deforestation of large areas of forest causes irreversible disturbances 
in local habitats. The environmental consequences are noticeable by the inhabitants at a distance 
from the epicenter of the open-pit mines.66 
 
64 Asia Energy PLC, supra note 23 at 6. In another document by Asia Energy submitted to the ADB, the company 
stated “At full production, about 8 million tonnes will be exported by rail and barges to an offshore reloading facility 
at Akram Point for export to international markets, some 4 million tonnes will be exported to India via railway, and 
the remaining 3 million tonnes will be used for a proposed mine-site 500 MW power plant and sold for domestic 
use.”  
65 Ibid.  
66 Terminski, supra note 52 at 5.  
Figure 11: The Sundarbans 
Photo: Khasru Chowdhury 
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According to the project agreement, Asia Energy assured to generate more than $21 billion in 
economic benefit to Bangladesh over the 36-year lifespan.67 The company claimed a benefit of 
$7.8 billion for Bangladesh and $13.7 billion as multiplier benefits that would contribute to 1% 
per annum to the total GDP of the country.68 The company further pledged that the project would 
bring 2,000 jobs to an impoverished area of Bangladesh and invested $260 million in building 
schools and hospitals for local people.69 Also, the project would spend a total of $314 million on 
rail and port development to provide a reliable export route.70 According to Anu Muhammad, 
Bangladesh would be economically more benefitted than an exploration of coal during the thirty-
six-year lifespan. He explained that $225 million per year would be generated from the production 
of agriculture, households, and other economic activity of local people in the planned area. On the 
other hand, according to the company’s information, Bangladesh would get $216 million per year 
by way of six percent royalty and taxes. According to the company’s account, considering the 
adverse effect on production and economic activities, loss of coalfield and environment, the total 
loss for Bangladesh would be $300 million (BDT 21 billion) per annum.71 However, this loss does 
not include biodiversity destruction, destruction of environmental sustainability and human health, 
and uncertainty of current and future generations.72  
 
2.4. Significance of EIA in Bangladesh   
 
There is no denying that local people are most affected by any development project. Since 
people in the close vicinity of any development project are more affected, their concerns should 
 
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Pegu, supra note 1 at 26. 
70 Asia Energy PLC, supra note 23 at 6. 
71 Anu Muhammad, Phulbari Koyla Khoni: Kar Lav, Kar Kkhoti. 
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be taken into consideration. In this regard, the project proponents and the government agencies 
must identify the impact of the project on local people and the local environment by adopting a 
proper environmental assessment plan. A large development project needs proper EIA through 
which social, biophysical and other effects of a development proposal are identified, predicted, 
evaluated and mitigated.73 In other words, EIA can be an effective tool, which is seen as a route to 
involve people at the project level and can be used as a form of social bargaining. EIA is the proper 
venue where concerns of affected communities can be properly recognized through their 
involvement and participation. Socially marginalized groups can use EIA as a platform from which 
to influence the social order. In the case of Phulbari, Adibasi communities have frequently been 
raising the issue of their discriminatory status in society and due to their vulnerability, the project 
proponent and the government never considered them as ‘qualified’ in the decision-making and 
other processes of assessment for the open-pit coal mine project.  
2.4.1. What is EIA?   
 
EIA is defined as a systematic process of determining and managing the potential impacts of 
proposed human actions on the environment.74 EIA has become a critical space for the evaluation 
and mitigation of potential environmental and social impacts of a proposed development project 
or plan, and sometimes it is the only space in which the public has meaningful participation through 
a public hearing and consultation before going ahead with the project. The USA was the first 
country that incorporated EIA in their national legislation for mitigating adverse environmental 
impacts in any development project. In the USA, the government’s actions created some major 
 
73 International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA), “Principles of Environmental Assessment Best Practice” 
(1999). Online: http://www.iaia.org/modx/assets/files/Principles%20of%20IA_web.pdf  




environmental problems in the 1960s, which resulted in widespread support for the National 
Environmental Policy Act 1969 that manifested the legislative basis for EIA. This legislation 
required all government agencies to consider the environmental consequences of their actions.75 
National EIA legislation of any country shall also include participatory provisions allowing public 
consultation and public participation at every stage. The 1992 Earth Summit provided additional 
momentum to these developments. Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration states: “Environmental 
impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are 
likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a 
competent national authority.”76 Though the right of access to information has been given little 
formal recognition in EIAs of the global South, attempts are being made to disclose general 
environmental information by corresponding public participation and access to environmental 
justice for Indigenous communities who are largely affected by development projects. 
2.4.2. EIA Practice in Bangladesh 
 
Government legislation and rules, as well as guidelines of the donor agencies,77 play significant 
roles in the incorporation of human elements in environmental assessment in Bangladesh. The key 
pieces of legislation for the environmental approval of a project in Bangladesh are the 
Environmental Conservation Act (ECA) 1995, and the Environmental Conservation Rule (ECR) 
 
75 Salim Momtaz, “Environmental Impact Assessment in Bangladesh: A Critical Review.” (2002) 22.2 
Environmental Impact Assessment Review at 164. 
76 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, which 
resulted Agenda 21, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Statement of Forest principles, the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the UN Convention on Biological diversity.  
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1997. Only industries and large-scale projects received full attention in ECR with provisions of 
full-scale environmental assessment to reduce the potential adverse impact on the environment. 
ECR contains a list of projects and industries according to the significance of impact and classifies 
them into four categories: Red, Amber A, Amber B, and Green.78 Normally, mining and other 
large-scale development projects fall under the Red category, which requires EIA.  
Apart from this basic legislation based on EIA, several government departments and NGOs 
have prepared guidelines for conducting an EIA on a specific sector or intervention.79 Bangladesh 
Flood Action Plan (FAP) is one of the first governing authorities that incorporated EIA in 
Bangladesh to study ongoing and future FAP and similar flood control, drainage, irrigation, and 
water management projects in 1992.80 The Department of Environment (DoE), under the Ministry 
of Environment and Forest, is the regulatory body responsible for enforcing the ECA and ECR 
and has prepared EIA guidelines only for large-scale development projects.81 Although it is the 
responsibility of the company to conduct an EIA of the development proposal, the responsibility 
to review EIAs to issue ECC rests on DoE.82 
According to the DoE Guidelines, the EIA process consists of three stages: screening, IEE, and 
detailed EIA.83 The guidelines provide some techniques for public participation and set the 
structure of IEE and the EIA reports. Ahammed and Harvey note that IEE is needed before moving 
forward to the full-scale EIA for most development projects in Bangladesh.84 Special emphasis is 
 
78 Momtaz, supra note 75 at 165.  
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placed on site selection for industries with significant potential for environmental impacts, and the 
respective corporations are required to consider alternative sites keeping in view the criteria put 
forward by DoE.85 The procedure of EIAs in Bangladesh encourages the direct involvement of 
community leaders to gather basic data about the affected community and face-to-face engagement 
with community members and local NGOs working in the area of the project.86  
Despite these widely accepted legal norms, one of my respondents who is also an EIA expert 
claimed that the EIA regime in Bangladesh is non-transparent. It is a practice in Bangladesh that 
an EIA can be approved if the project looks lucrative. DoE only determines whether the EIA report 
is prepared following national regulations and donor guidelines, they do not consider whether 
affected people’s concerns are reflected or not.87 EIA consultants are appointed by a project 
proponent for completing the study. The appointed consultants are told that “we will develop the 
project here and you have to prepare EIA accordingly so that we get ECC from the DoE.”88 They 
must prepare the EIA report following the project proponent’s dictation because not only the 
project proponent instruct them to do so, but also the government agencies direct them to prepare 
a ‘sound’ EIA so that there is no bar to starting the project. Another EIA expert, who has been 
working on the water sector for more than twenty years, told me during the interview that donor 
agencies impliedly create pressure on the government so that the project is taken place. According 
to him, consultants followed donor guidelines properly, but local peoples’ voices are not reflected 
in the final study of the Phulbari Coal Project.89 Although an EIA report, what consultants prepare 
for the project proponent, is not final, because the report is reviewed, monitored, and passed by 
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decision-makers of DoE. Consultants are planners, they prepare the report. They are not decision-
makers. There is an opportunity to check transparency in reviewing the report.90 In Bangladesh, 
decisions are given by technocrats or by bureaucrats in the decision-making process. Since 
decision-makers are part of the government, they are bound to follow the government’s order 
regardless of the question of feasibility. Even if the project is not feasible, even if local people do 
not want the project in their area, the decision-makers often allow the project anyway.91 In almost 
all cases, if the government says ‘yes’ to a project, the DoE also approves that project and issues 
environment clearance certificate. There are hardly any instances where the DoE has taken a stance 
that is against the stance of any other government agency.92 
Further, my interviews indicate that the EIA report is never pro-actively disclosed in 
Bangladesh. The EIA report is often not reviewed by people who are qualified. It is not presented 
to the public at any stage. However, there are cases where affected people object on their own. 
Since there is no provision on public hearing in the EIA process and the environmental clearance 
process, those objections are not taken into consideration. Hence, the DoE is just serving as a 
clearing agent for other government departments.93  
The only NGO that is directly associated with the EIA activities in Bangladesh is the National 
EIA Association of Bangladesh, which was formed in late 1997. It provides a manifesto for the 
EIA planners, practitioners and enforcing agencies in Bangladesh.94 Having been a development 
partner of Bangladesh for a long time, the World Bank has developed its own EIA procedures for 
the projects it funds. The Bank has effectively incorporated EIA provisions into its project cycle 
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and the organizations implementing concerned projects must conduct an EIA. Also, the World 
Bank has an environmental section that examines EIAs for approval.95 ADB has developed a new 
environment operational strategy for Bangladesh to address the major environmental problems. In 
addition to IEE and EIA, an initial social impact assessment is required for every development 
project in order to identify its consequences on people of the project area.96 The Bangladesh 
government introduced the ‘Equator Principles’ in 2006 as a financial industry benchmark for 
determining, evaluating and managing social and environmental risk in project financing.97 
Equator Principles Financial Institutions adopt these principles in order to ensure that the projects 
financed are developed in a manner that is socially responsible and reflects sound environmental 
management practices. Accordingly, foreign corporations have a very crucial role to play in the 
development and promotion of corporate social and environmental sustainability which can be 
seen in a limited manner in Bangladesh.98  
Though there are some legislative rules and guidelines for EIA, a strict and effective EIA 
regime is absent in Bangladesh. There is no legal requirement for public participation and 
disclosure of information or for making the EIA document public at any stage of the process.99 For 
this, in every development project, the responsible company can exploit the communities of the 
project area. The FAP’s EIA guidelines, ECA, ECR, and the DoE’s guidelines do not mention the 
requirement of social assessment separately. Consequently, there is a danger of ignoring social 
factors where there are no apparent consequences on the natural environment.100 A reasonable 
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number of people should be contacted through all possible means of communication to ensure 
maximum and efficient participation in EIA.101 I think implementing the elements of SIA can be 
a vital step for sustainable development. SIA is a process that should inform people not only of the 
details of the proposed projects but also of the possible positive and negative consequences. An 
appropriate amendment to the legislation on EIA is required to emphasize the importance of 
SIA.102  
Legislation related to EIA in Bangladesh contains provisions for complaints from the public.103 
But those complaints are not heard properly by DoE. Very few people know about the process 
with DoE due to a lack of their campaign and access to information. DoE receives complaints from 
some individuals, however, when complainants see the process takes a long time, they lose their 
interest. Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA), a prominent environmental 
NGO in Bangladesh, has established its own process for dealing with public complaints. BELA’s 
process is easily accessible and quick. The executive director of BELA told me during an 
interview, “We receive many complaints from communities against specific industrial units. After 
receiving complaints from the communities and verifying news reports, we file cases.”104 She also 
added:  
“BELA tries to find out whether a particular industrial unit or that commercial venture has 
got an ECC. If it has an ECC, then we see whether the EIA report was detailed out properly; 
whether it is adequate, and whether it covers all aspects of environmental management 
required for that given industry. If we find that it has any deficiency, then we do the media 
campaign. If there is no environmental clearance, then we right away challenge the project. 
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If there is an environmental clearance, then we try to say that the public consultation 
requirement has not been fulfilled. Because people gave objection.”105  
 
If the industrial unit is already in operation and if it has an environmental clearance and EIA 
report, there is very little any NGO can do. The only option for challenging the actions of the 
company or industry is going to the court. However, going to the court with the deficient EIA 
report may not be feasible because the court might say that the EIA has been submitted and ECC 
has been given based on the EIA. The court would not see whether the EIA is deficient, whether 
it’s faulty or not.  So, the court would not be interfering in this case.106  
The EIA process involves the identification of all positive and negative environmental impacts. 
It is observed that the guidelines for legislative control over the EIA system in Bangladesh are not 
yet well established.107 The politicization of the EIA process and pervasive corruption has made it 
nearly impossible to conduct fair EIA or social assessment in these sectors.108 The absence of 
strong legal provisions for some essential components of EIAs all around the world may result in 
weaker legislative control over the EIA process. To me, the DoE of Bangladesh should develop a 
code of conduct for the consultants conducting EIA for projects that are beyond the supervision of 
donor agencies. Moreover, strengthening DoE and making it more efficient, transparent and 
accountable would place it in a better position as a lead environmental organization. Some concrete 
statutory provisions and active legislative or administrative control over the EIA process are 
necessary for meaningful and effective EIA. This can reduce the anger and protests of those 
affected communities and motivate them to support the projects.   
2.4.3. Employing Indigenous Rights and Concerns in the EIA Process 
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2.4.3.1. Participatory Rights of Indigenous Peoples in EIA 
 
The participatory rights of procedural justice play a vital role in environmental decision-
making. Employing public participation in EIA can theoretically enhance the public trust of the 
government’s decision-making, reduce litigation, and serve to coordinate and reconcile various 
environmental strategies.109 Public participation can be defined as ‘any form of interaction between 
government and corporate actors and the public that occurs as part of the EIA process’.110 The 
fundamental goal of public participation in EIA is to achieve a more equitable distribution of 
political power and change existing decision structures. Public participation can be a platform 
allowing the decision-maker to draw an ultimate decision in any developing project.111 
Community participation in the decision-making process of a development project concerning 
natural resources is recognized as essential for the creation and maintenance of a healthy and stable 
society.112 Razzaque claims that procedural justice (access to information, public participation, and 
access to justice) advances the credibility, effectiveness, and accountability of government 
decision-making processes. The effectiveness of participatory rights depends heavily on the 
national legal system, courts, and other government agencies.113 Effective participation also 
depends on the quality of information available to the community. O'Faircheallaigh argues that the 
powerless in society are least likely to participate in EIA, both because they lack the resources to 
do so and they often find the processes involved mysterious and intimidating.114 UNDRIP affirms 
that Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their political, legal, economic, 
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social, cultural and decision-making institutions through which they will apply their right to 
participate in the decision-making process.115 
For achieving an increased understanding of EIA, the evaluation of public participation in EIA 
is essential. The impact of public participation in the decision-making process should always be 
evaluated, though it is widely documented in the literature as being a valuable component of the 
EIA process. If the results of the consultation are not considered, then the whole exercise might be 
considered a waste of time and resources.116 It is the time for regional and international agencies 
to support and encourage countries to manage trans-boundary shared resources jointly with rules 
on EIA for affected communities. The 1998 Aarhus Convention contributed to bringing about one 
of the unique developments in participatory rights to protect the environment and livelihoods.117 
But governments of the global South may not be willing to ratify this Convention since it contains 
a detailed EIA procedure for development projects, which may be expensive and time-consuming. 
Bangladesh has not ratified the Convention. 
2.4.3.2. Indigenous Right to FPIC in EIA  
 
Papillon and Rodon argue that the most effective way to implement free, prior and informed 
consent (FPIC) in the EIA process is by integrating Indigenous peoples fully into the various 
aspects of the assessment process such as involving them in the design of process and early stage 
of evaluation.118 Performance Standard 7 of IFC incorporated guiding principles to ensure FPIC, 
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prior consultation, and participation of the affected communities of Indigenous peoples throughout 
the project.119 IFC’s policy is generated to eliminate the numerous economic risks that accompany 
large projects. Such risks include the risk of project disruption because of civil unrest, local 
protests, or violence directly related to a project. In theory, obtaining FPIC of Indigenous peoples 
prior to a project could curtail these risks, which in turn could affect the economics of a project.120 
ADB’s Indigenous peoples’ policy number 21 states that development initiatives should be 
conceived, planned, and implemented with the informed consent of affected communities, and 
include respect for the dignity, human rights and cultural uniqueness of Indigenous peoples.121 
Though the right of access to information has been given little formal recognition in EIAs in the 
global South, attempts are being made to disclose general environmental information by 
corresponding public participation and access to environmental justice for local and Indigenous 
communities who are largely affected by development projects. 
2.4.3.3. Indigenous Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) in EIA 
 
The inclusion of Indigenous TEK in the policy-making process in their territories is important 
for the participation of Indigenous peoples. Employing Indigenous TEK effectively in EIA can 
enable Indigenous peoples to participate in the environmental decision-making process. Appiah-
Opoku contends that Indigenous TEK could be used to reveal scientific data and information in 
the global South. Consultations and community hearings may facilitate the incorporation of 
Indigenous TEK, especially during the preparation and review phases of environmental 
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assessment.122 Further, the timing of public consultations in Indigenous communities is crucial to 
the success of the assessment process.  
TEK in the EIA process may also help the assessment team to understand handling local natural 
resources and can demonstrate local sets of values to interpret, evaluate, and monitor project 
impacts on local communities. In this sense, EIA could become part of the solution to the continued 
loss of Indigenous TEK by enhancing the participation of Indigenous peoples in environmental 
assessment studies.123 Moreover, it is possible to gain the trust of the local and Indigenous 
communities through community participation, and incorporation of local and Indigenous TEK in 
project development will help to accelerate the smooth implementation of projects.124 Therefore, 
Indigenous TEK could be a tool in the decision-making process of EIA, which is one of the 
dimensions of the environmental justice paradigm. Christensen and Grant argue that the inclusion 
of Indigenous TEK in EIA is particularly significant because it entails shifting control of the social 
production of space and effectively emphasize a right to representation and participation in 
decision-making for resource management.125  
Through their traditional knowledge, Indigenous peoples can contribute through consultation 
and public participation, which may ultimately lead to better decision-making.126 Furthermore, 
effective participation of Indigenous peoples in decision-making processes should principally be 
recognized for strengthening their democracy and environmental sustainability.  
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2.5. MNCs and TNCs in Bangladesh 
 
 
Governments of the global South often follow neoliberal policies and invite multinational and 
transnational corporations (MNCs and TNCs) to invest in their mineral resource extraction 
industries. Bangladesh is no exception. In Bangladesh, the government agencies are not willing to 
use expensive modern technology for extracting mineral resources.127 The government wants the 
economic development most cheaply, and policies are liberalized for foreign investors. MNCs and 
TNCs from the global North are often interested more in mining natural resources from the global 
South. They invest in the global South because the regulations and policies are made favorable for 
them by eliminating barriers to foreign investment, trade liberalization, privatization of public 
sectors, and weakening industry regulations.128 The misappropriation of MNCs and TNCs has 
caused adverse economic and environmental consequences that constrained sustainable 
development options in the global South.129 Justifying Ruchi Ananda’s argument, Carmen 
Gonzalez states, “the ongoing unsustainable extraction of the South’s natural resources to satisfy 
Northern’s consumers, and transfer of polluting industry and hazardous wastes from the North to 
the South.”130 Communities from the global South are often excluded from the benefits of growth 
despite historically high commodity prices and record corporate profits.131  
In Bangladesh, neoliberal intervention is characterized by corporate land grabbing and 
displacement of people, and governments are friendly to activities of MNCs. Foreign mining 
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companies have been trying to grab mineral resources in Bangladesh, and to ensure the highest 
profit they are pushing for extracting the utmost, such as in the case of Phulbari.132 Moreover, the 
guidelines and policies of international financial institutions such as ADB, the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Financial Council (IFC) favor Northern 
investors in the global South,133 because the North dominates decision-making in most of the IFIs 
and multilateral environmental and human rights treaty negotiations.134 There have been several 
cases where foreign companies have created a significant loss for Bangladesh, but those companies 
could not be made accountable.135 Before moving into the historical journey of neoliberal policy 
in Bangladesh and how it has impacted mineral extraction, the next section starts with a discussion 
about neoliberalism.  
2.5.1. What is Neoliberalism?  
 
Neoliberalism is the philosophy that fortifies economic globalization through the free market 
and minimizes barriers to the flow of goods and services.136 It consists of a set of ideas of economic 
liberalization policies such as privatization, deregulation, free trade, individualization, the 
transformation of state-citizen relationship, and reduction of government expenditures to increase 
the private sector’s responsibilities in the economy and society.137 The neoliberalism approach 
advocates that economics should be separated from politics and argues that markets should be free 
from the interference of government.138 According to the supporters of neoliberal theory, a free 
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market will allow efficiency, economic growth, appropriate income distribution, and technological 
progress.139 They also argue that neoliberal policy benefits both rich and poor nations because 
every nation can enjoy a comparative advantage from flowing their capital, goods, and services.140 
Sometimes, neoliberalism is understood to refer to the process of opening up national economies 
to global actors such as MNCs, TNCs and IFIs.141 However, critics argue that any state intervention 
to encourage these moves will worsen economic performance.142 Advocates of neoliberal policies 
tend to contend that MNCs and TNCs need to be free to pursue operating businesses in host 
countries with little national government constraint or regulation.143 On the other hand, critics of 
neoliberalism contend that neoliberal economic intervention is not sustainable environmentally, 
culturally or socially in many ways.  
Isabel Altamirano-Jimenez complicates the connection between neoliberalism and Indigeneity 
and argues that the recognition of cultural difference and the compensatory measure of granting 
collective rights to Indigenous peoples are integral to neoliberalism.144 These cultural rights 
including other socio-economic rights, and distinguish neoliberalism as a specific form of 
governance that shapes, delimits and produce differences. The author argues that neoliberalism 
opens up a space for the recognition of Indigenous rights as well as for the institutionalization of 
management practices.145  Gabrielle Slowey studies the self-determination of Indigenous peoples 
of Canada in the neoliberal context. According to her, “the neoliberal ideal of the common good 
rests on market-oriented values such as self-reliance, efficiency, and competition. The neoliberal 
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ideal is for citizens to recognize their obligation to work longer and harder in order to become 
more self-reliant.”146 She argues that self-determination re-establishes the proper balance between 
First Nations and the neoliberal marketplace.147 However, it is important to know whether 
communities want external investment opportunities or not. Slowey argues that First Nations alone 
can generate more jobs by combining the corporate support and First Nations enterprise. This 
means Indigenous peoples can become self-reliant with their own initiatives.148 It is common in 
both poor and rich countries that MNCs and TNCs are taking advantage of the policies of host-
states to ensure higher profits. Since national governments, especially in the global South, 
encourage foreign corporations to invest in projects for their own economic benefit, they pursue 
trade liberalization in the interests of investors. Thus, MNCs and TNCs can shape the rules and 
regulations of the host country with the help of the host government.  
 
2.5.2. Neoliberal Intervention in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh became an independent country after a bloody war in 1971 against Pakistan. The 
new nation adopted a socialist approach, and foreign investment from MNCs and TNCs was 
discouraged by the policy.149 However, after the assassination of the founder of the nation, 
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his four key ministers by a military coup in 1975, a 
military-backed government came into power. The subsequent military governments adopted 
neoliberal policies as part of a structural adjustment program (SAP) during the 1980s with the 
development process confined by the suggestions and regulations of the World Bank, IMF, ADB, 
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IFC, and other international financial institutions. The military governments had become more and 
more hostile towards the public enterprises, and the crisis of public institutions of health, 
education, and other essential services intensified. 150 During that time, the energy and power sector 
was handed over to the private sector under the new policy.151 Anu Muhammad argues that 
privatization of natural resources and leasing those resources to MNCs for exporting gas and coal 
pushed Bangladesh into the “resource-curse” model.152  
Developing the mining sector in Bangladesh through MNCs began in the early 1990s when a 
new democratic government took power. The new government invited foreign companies to invest 
in Bangladeshi mineral resources such as gas, oil, and coal with production sharing contracts (PSC) 
in line with the regulations of  IFIs. The contracts used by IFIs have always been secretive.153 In 
1993-1997, ten PSCs were signed between the Petro Bangla154 and various MNCs in two rounds.155 
Besides IFIs, the US, the UK, Germany, and Australia worked together to promote neoliberal 
policies in Bangladesh.156 The subsequent governments continued with this trend for the economic 
development of the country. According to the agreements with foreign extractive companies, the 
government agencies started purchasing Bangladesh’s own extracted natural resources with hard-
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earned foreign currency initially at a price that was at least 30 times higher than that offered by 
public-sector companies.157  
According to Anu Muhammad, legality and transparency in the environmental sector are not 
maintained properly due to the weak policy implementation. MNCs and TNCs used this advantage 
in every mineral resource investment case, thinking that they would manage by bribery.158 As a 
result, the government in Bangladesh force people to leave their ancestral lands and provided 
minimal compensation.159 In most of the cases, MNCs benefit from weak environmental 
enforcement and continued corruption among government officials. Due to this, MNCs are never 
held accountable for their negligence, which I have tried to demonstrate in the subsequent section 
by describing two accidents in gas fields that occurred just before Asia Energy attempted to begin 
coal mining in Phulbari. In each case, responsible foreign multinational corporations violated 
regulations, bribed influential persons to change the existing policy, which was implemented by 
the party in power, committed negligence, and did not pay compensation for blowouts.    
 
2.5.2.1. Occidental in the Magurchara Blowout 
 
 
A massive blowout occurred in the Magurchara Gas field on June 14, 1997, when the US-
based energy company Occidental was drilling a well. The gas field was situated very close to the 
Lawachara Reserve Forest of which 96 acres of the forest was entirely burnt by the blowout, 
including a teak grove which was raised between 1944 and 1950, bamboo shacks, and a strip of 
plantation established in 1994.160 Moreover, 50% of the forest resources and 30% of the 
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surrounding Indigenous peoples’ lands were damaged. Most of the wild animals  those left after 
the blowout have still not returned to the forest. According to an expert report, the damage to the 
forest resources alone was BDT 98.6 billion along with BDT 460 million loss of the surrounding 
29 tea gardens. Furthermore, the Bangladesh Electricity Department, Jalalabad Gas Company, and 
Bangladesh Railway suffered a loss of more than BDT 250 million.161  
The National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports of 
Bangladesh (NCBD) estimated that the blowout caused about 245 billion cubic feet of the gas 
reserve to burn in the explosion, worth BDT 90 billion. Experts opined that the burnt gas could 
have met two years of the country’s electricity demand.162 NCBD was formed in 1998 after a 
blowout in the Magurchhara gas field. NCBD protested the gas export policy and PSC with MNCs 
and TNCs, leasing ports, some ground projects by an Indian company, TATA, which were 
postponed.163 However, environmental, ecological and wildlife loss were not included in this 
estimation.164 Occidental left the country and handed over the license to Unocol Corporation 
(2003), which was later merged with Chevron Corporation (2005). Although the total loss was 
BDT 200 billion, the government claimed only BDT 39 billion due to PSC between the company 
and the government, but Chevron only paid BDT 120 million in compensation as of June 30, 
2016.165 Recently, the company wished to sell its assets in Bangladesh for $2 billion. Although the 
government wants to buy the assets, environmentalists and economists requested the government 
realize the rest of the claimed compensation first. In another note, Chevron lodged an arbitration 
suit at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID), an institute of the 
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World Bank Group, against Petrobangla regarding a transmission charge the company paid to the 
government. Petrobangla also lodged a suit in a domestic court against Chevron, which they 
decided to withdraw and fight at the ICSID.166    
 
2.5.2.2. Niko in the Tengratila Blowout 
 
On January 8, 2005, drilling well operated by a Canadian multinational company, Niko 
Resources Ltd., exploded in the Chhatak Gas Field in Tengratila of Sunamgonj district. Around 
ten thousand people had to flee from their homes due to the blowout, which was visible from 30km 
away. A second blowout happened on June 17, 2005, in the same gas field, while the company 
was trying to control the first blowout.167 The blowouts and the subsequent payments in bribes to 
settle the issue drew the Canadian company into controversy. Niko stopped their operation after 
the blowouts and faced legal challenges when BELA and some other organizations filed a writ 
petition (petition number 5673 of SCB) challenging the validity of the joint venture agreement 
signed in 2003 between Niko and Bangladesh Petroleum Exploration and Production Company 
(BAPEX) to develop two gas fields.168 
Furthermore, many lawsuits have been filed against political leaders of Bangladesh in local 
and international courts over corruption related to Niko. The Anti-Corruption Commission of 
Bangladesh filed two cases in 2007 against the current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the then 
Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia over bribery that occurred between 1997 and 2006. Later, in 
2010, the case against Hasina was dismissed, a year after she took office.169 However, the case 
against Khaleda, her three ministers, and a few acquaintances are under trial. Niko made a mess in 
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Bangladesh with corruption, mismanagement of resources and cases. The Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh in 2009 ordered the government not to pay for the gas they purchased from Niko until 
the company pays the compensation for the blowouts. In 2008, the government filed a damage suit 
with a Dhaka court against Niko, claiming BDT 7.5 billion in compensation for the destruction of 
properties and gas reserves in and around the Chhatak gas field. The case is still in process.170 
Again, Niko Canada pleaded guilty before a Canadian court for bribing Mosharraf and agreed to 
pay a $9.5 million fine in 2011, which was investigated by the ACC, the RCMP, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).171 
On the other hand, Niko filed lawsuits at the ICSID of the World Bank Group in 2010, claiming 
the remaining payments for the gas it supplied to Petrobangla. In September 2014, the tribunal 
gave its first decision in favor of Niko with insiders alleging Bangladesh's legal battle was timid.172 
 
2.5.2.3. Asia Energy in the Phulbari Coal Project 
 
The government of Bangladesh is always silent about implementing the proper regulations in 
cases of MNCs involved in exploring natural resource projects. Following the trend of adopting 
neoliberal policies, the government allowed an Australian company, Broken Hill Proprietary 
(BHP), to explore coal deposits in Phulbari under a comprehensive licensing and investment 
agreement with the Bangladesh government in 1994. BHP exploration confirmed a significant 
amount of coal deposits (382 million tonnes) between 1994 and 1997.173 However, they realized 
at one point that the existing water resource could not be appropriately managed, and a disaster 
might happen. Bearing in mind their negative experience in Papua New Guinea regarding water 
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management, the company decided that it would extract coal through underground mining. The 
company reported that it would not pursue the project in Phulbari.174  
As a result, BHP left Phulbari in 1997, realizing that it would not be technically feasible for 
open-pit mining in Phulbari because of its depth, water system, and geological and geographical 
structure. Surprisingly and mysteriously, a new company was formed under the name of Asia 
Energy Corporation (Bangladesh) Pty Ltd., targeting only Phulbari, with some Australian and 
Bangladeshi persons involved, and the license of BHP was transferred to a newly formed company 
without any public notification.175 According to Anu Muhammad, although BHP, a world-leading 
mining company, quit Phulbari after finding it too risky,  it transferred the license to a newly 
formed mining company. The government of Bangladesh has given all sorts of concessions for 
mine development in Phulbari to Asia Energy.176 Asia Energy conducted a pre-feasibility study 
that confirmed the economic viability of the project as large-scale open-pit mining. Although DoE 
approved the EIA and granted the ECC for the project, it was still missing the government’s 
approval.177  
The government violated its own rules and many international guidelines to facilitate the 
Phulbari project; no transparency was maintained in the dealings.178 Clause 41 of the Mines and 
Minerals Rules (MMR) 1968 (amended in 1987 and 1989) categorically mentions that only 400 
hectares will be allowed for mining and that a company can lease it for only ten years; furthermore, 
extensions would only be given after discussions and negotiations. However, in this case, the initial 
project area was 10,000 hectares that were later reduced to 5,933 hectares, and the project would 
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operate for approximately 30 years at up to 16 million tonnes per annum.179 The license BHP 
transferred to Asia Energy was already expired, which was found in an investigation report after 
the Phulbari Khoni Andolon.180 The amended MMR of Bangladesh provided that the royalty 
percentage for any company would be 20%, which was radically lowered to a minimal 6% for 
Asia Energy.181 After the agreement, the government amended the rules, setting the royalty 
percentage at 6%. It seemed that lowering the royalty percentage was done for BHP only to hand 
over the project to a foreign company. However, there was an agreement signed between the 
BCMCL and the BMD with a 20% royalty only a month before the agreement between BHP and 
the BMD.182 
Furthermore, Asia Energy did not submit 3% of the total investment money to the government 
according to the MMR. The environmental clearance for Asia Energy was given even before they 
had submitted the ESIA report without any public notification.183 Soon after the transfer of the 
license, Asia Energy started drilling at a few points across Phulbari.184 Again, people’s consent is 
the primary prerequisite for a project of such colossal gravity to be implemented. The issue of 
‘public consent’ assumes greater importance because Phulbari also has a considerable number of 
Indigenous communities. Thus, the government had acted imperiously while consenting to the 
project without having public consent.185 Also, the company declared that the project would bring 
forth sustainable energy in Bangladesh without rationale. Moreover, they manipulated local people 
by concealing information. They also created local agents working in favor of the company, 
influencing and forcing people to support the project, the issue is detailed out in the Chapter V. 
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Civil society members and environmental activists were unaware of all discrepancies, as the media 
were silent.186 Some of my respondents claimed that the media were purchased by the company to 
write in favor of them. 
The government of Bangladesh drafted a National Coal Policy allowing the open-pit coal mine 
in August 2008 to accommodate the multiple concerns regarding mining in Phulbari, but this 
policy is being scrutinized and criticized by national environmental and economic activist groups 
involved in promoting the protests. The draft coal policy has never been implemented after all 
these years. Meanwhile, an expert committee formed by the government submitted its report which 
opined that the project should be canceled for environmental, economic and legal 
considerations.187 
The Phulbari Coal Project flows directly from this history of neoliberal intervention. The 
government of Bangladesh facilitated the entry of BHP and Asia Energy for extracting mineral 
resources. Asia Energy is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a British company named Global Coal 
Management (GCM) Resources PLC.188 The company was incorporated on the London Stock 
Exchange Alternative Investment Market (AIM) (Ticker code: GCM) in September 2003, and it 
acquired 100% of Asia Energy Corp.189 The largest shareholder in GCM Resources is RAB 
Capital, a London-based hedge fund manager. Other shareholders include some private banks and 
hedge funds such as UBS, Fidelity Group, Credit Suisse, and Barclays, LR Group, Ospraie 
Management, Capital Group, and Argos Europe Fund.190 Although the company claimed in their 
official document that it owns 100% of the project,191 Wikileaks revealed in 2010 that between 
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40% and 60% of all GCM shares are owned by a US-based group of the company named Luxor 
Capital Group and a U.S. citizen who operates a New-York-based hedge fund in his name.192  
London-based transnational environmental justice organizations (TEJOs), including the 
NCBD and Bangladesh Communist Party London branches, have been protesting at every annual 
general meeting of the company. They demand that the company scrap the project and stop doing 
business in AIM because the company does not have any existing contract with the Bangladesh 
government on the Phulbari coal project. After a long struggle by TEJOs over the company’s 
illegal activities in the London AIM, the Bangladesh government finally acknowledges that the 
company has been selling shares to shareholders by providing false information about the mining 
project.193 The State Minister of Power, Energy, and Mineral Resources states that the company 
got a license from BMD in 2004 for two years which expired in 2006 and was never renewed. 
Since there is no valid lease agreement between the Bangladesh government and Asia Energy, the 
company has no right to engage in share business in the name of the Phulbari coal project. The 
Minister points out that the Bangladesh government is in the process of suing the company.194         
 
2.6. The Role of ADB in the Phulbari Coal Project 
 
 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been involved in the energy sector of Bangladesh 
since the early 1980s in formulating policies to privatize common property and to create a 
favorable path for MNCs and TNCs. Along with the World Bank, ADB helped foreign and private 
companies snatch natural resources through various favorable terms and conditions towards them. 
On the other hand, ADB’s loans to public sectors are meant to dismantle institutions and national 
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capabilities.195 By these means, ADB has been using its power and influence derived from public 
money in different countries to serve MNCs and TNCs at a cost to people and the environment. In 
the case of the Phulbari Coal Project, ADB makes its stand clear against the people's verdict of 
stopping the project because local people and Adibasis would never accept any foreign investment 
that goes against national interest and destroys the environment and livelihoods. ADB’s Private 
Sector Operations Department (PSOD) was promoting the Asia Energy’s Phulbari Coal Project 
for an investment loan and a political risk guarantee, although there was an immense obstacle from 
local people, experts, and national environmental activists.196 The Department emphasized that the 
open-pit coal project would economically benefit Bangladesh and provide the country with much-
needed energy. ADB approved the Summary of Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA), which 
was submitted in 2005 in accordance with its request to complete the resettlement action plan and 
Indigenous peoples’ development plan by following ADB’s Energy Policy (1995), Indigenous 
Peoples Policy (1998), Involuntary Resettlement Policy (1995), Environment Policy (2002), and 
Communication Policy (2005).  
Although ADB’s PSOD cleared the concept for this project on 14 October 2005, 64 civil 
society and environmental organizations in a joint statement to the ADB Board of Directors to 
discontinue the project contended that the project violates ADB’s policies and human rights.197 
Followed by the civil society organizations’ letter, various community leaders and representatives 
of the Phulbari area wrote a letter to the ADB’s Executive Directors in December 2007 protesting 
the ADB’s involvement in the project. However, earlier the same year in October, the ADB’s 
mission head in Bangladesh, Kunio Senga told journalists that coal mining is very effective and 
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would give a huge potential benefit for power generation in Bangladesh.198 As international NGOs 
point out that the project would cause extensive damage to the Sundarbans where the port facilities 
for exporting the coal are to be constructed. As several of the ADB’s Executive Directors began 
raising questions about Phulbari, the Bank’s management finally decided to take the project out of 
the ADB’s funding pipeline.199 In a statement, ADB said, “We think it is premature to continue 
dialogue with the private sector under current circumstances. So, at this stage, we are open to 
suggestions of the Government of Bangladesh, civil society, and other stakeholders and prepared 
to review our engagement in this project.”200 
Not only in Phulbari, but ADB has also so far funded numerous projects in Bangladesh, 
including the Meghna Power Project, various forest projects for eco-parks, and rubber plantations 
in Chokoria and Madhupur, water and irrigation projects in southern regions. Those projects 
created high insecurity amongst local and Adibasi communities. Moreover, in the education sector, 
the ADB projects created a path for privatization, high corruption, and disastrous reform. Protests 
from teachers and students compelled the previous government to stop implementing ‘reforms,’ 
but huge money was wasted in the process.201 Anu Muhammad argues that ADB was successful 





The Phulbari Coal Project forms a perfect manifestation of contemporary neoliberalism. In the 
above discussion, it is shown that the primary intention of corporate intervention is to grab lands 
 
198 The Daily Star, “Asia Energy wants to renegotiate deal” (October 4, 2007). Online: 
https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-6567  
199 The Guardian, “Asian Bank Scuppers UK Mine Project in Bangladesh” (April 6, 2008). Online: 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/apr/06/mining.bangladesh    
200 Ibid.  
201 Muhammad, supra note 153. 
202 Ibid.  
105 
 
and natural resources where poor and Indigenous peoples live. The governments of the global 
South see the interests of MNCs and TNCs instead of seeing sustainability because they want 
immediate visible economic development. International financial institutions (IFIs) such as the 
World Bank, ADB, and IFC influence governments to hand over their natural resources to MNCs 
and TNCs. In Bangladesh, the governments were ordained to take neoliberal policy in line with 
the rules and regulations of those IFIs where companies were given excessive opportunities to 
explore natural resources. Governments are attracted to privatization and foreign investment with 
loans and aids by IFIs.203 However, governments never consider that this neoliberal policy and 
opening of the mining sector to MNCs and TNCs will lead to the destruction of areas where poor 
people live. I have exemplified three examples including the Phulbari Coal Project, where foreign 
companies could not be found accountable for their negligence and violation of environmental 
regulations. In the case of the Phulbari Coal Project, the entry of BHP and Asia Energy was 
facilitated by the Government of Bangladesh. Instead of seeing the interests of citizens, the 
government also liberalized and indemnified the destructive activities, whether their good deeds 
or bads deeds, of foreign investors in Bangladesh, which gave rise to public interest groups and 
civil society.  These groups have frequently been raising voices against the government’s 
neoliberal actions, especially leasing mineral resources out to MNCs. Other grassroots groups are 
being educated and started articulating that they are the owner of natural and mineral resources 
found in the territory and should not be transferred or leased out to foreign investors without their 
consent.   
The following chapter (Chapter III) will encompass the accounts of people’s struggle against 
the neoliberal intervention. I detail the protesters’ views of the popular Phulbari Khoni Andolon 
 
203 Ibid.  
106 
 
as their fight manifested against local and multinational powerful actors. According to them, 
different layers of organizing movements have led towards the protest’s success. These layers of 
the movement strategies created the foundation for an environmental justice movement in the 











Local resistance against mining projects rarely achieves success, especially in relation to 
transnational and multinational corporations (TNCs and MNCs) operating in the global South.1 
One explanation for this relates to how national governments or ‘host-states’ and international 
financial institutions (IFIs) prioritize the interests of the MNCs or TNCs rather than the interests 
of their citizens. In the interest of pursuing economic benefits, regardless of how hazardous the 
projects are, the governments often support corporations in developing their projects. In the global 
South, this is a common phenomenon. In this case, the Government of Bangladesh was technically 
forced by IFIs such as the World Bank, IFC, and ADB to enter into an agreement with an MNC 
since Bangladesh does not have the technology to extract coal through the opencast mining method 
on its own. Moreover, the government had been looking for foreign investors as part of its 
neoliberal policy agenda.2 However, according to my interviewees, Asia Energy took the 
opportunity because they knew that they could bypass the country’s weak environmental 
regulations and pressure the government to implement the open-pit project.3 In the case of the 
Phulbari Coal Project in Bangladesh, the government wholeheartedly supported the British 
company’s open-pit coal mine project in order to glean economic benefit by neglecting the interest 
of local Adibasi and non-Adibasi farming communities. The Phulbari region is densely populated, 
 
1 M. Omar Faruque, Mining and Subaltern Politics: Political Struggle against Neoliberal Development in 
Bangladesh, (2017) 26(1) Asian Journal of Political Science, at 67.  
2 Anu Muhammad, Development or Destruction: Essays on Global Hegemony and Corporate Grabbing and 
Bangladesh. (Dhaka: Shrabon Prokashoni, 2007). 
3 Ibid.  
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notably by Adibasi farming communities as well as Bangalee farmers. Consequently, local 
grassroots started protesting; the objective was not only to drive the foreign company away from 
the country but also to pressure the government to stop projects which, according to them, would 
go against local and national interests. Local resistance to the mining project built a coalition with 
the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports of Bangladesh 
(NCBD), who successfully fought back against the multi-dimensional powerful forces (the 
government, the company, and  IFIs) through a bloody resistance movement in 2006. In turn, these 
local and national protesters have built coalitions with different transnational environmental justice 
organizations (TEJOs). According to key organizers, the Phulbari Khoni Andolon was successful 
because movement actors and the Adibasi peoples of Phulbari were able to overcome the divide-
and-conquer tactics attempted by Asia Energy.  
 




The people of Phulbari and surrounding areas raised their voices and joined a movement to 
protest the MNC and the open-pit coal project for the sake of the affected people and the country’s 
economic and environmental broader interest. Protesters were not convinced that coal extracted 
from the open-pit mine would create benefits surpassing the overall losses and environmental 
impacts. They countered the company’s claim about the low number of people that would be 
evicted and displaced. For these reasons, local opposition against the project was strong. A group 
of local politicians took the initiative by forming a committee to protest Asia Energy, which later 
became weaker due to political influences. A national public interest group mediated the process. 
Their goal was to increase awareness of the potential negative impacts of mining and to help local 
communities organizing protests against the company, their means of manipulation, and the open-
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pit mining method.4  The popular Phulbari resistance uprising that happened on 26th August 2006 
has multiple layers. It built over eighteen months of campaigns, networks, meetings, assemblies, 
and discussions. The protest was locally called the Asia Energy Office Gherao Kormosuchi5 
(Occupy the Asia Energy Office), which was organized and declared by NCBD to expel Asia 
Energy from Bangladesh and drop the open-pit mining method everywhere in the country.  
 
3.2.1. Adibasi Accounts of the Movement  
 
 
(We don’t want coal mining by destroying humanity, civilization, and environment; we don’t want 
coal mining by destroying mosque, temple, graveyards; we don’t want coal mining by destroying 
a thousand years’ heritage and archeology.)  




When the company technologists drilled in different places to test the feasibility of the Phulbari 
project, including on household properties and agricultural lands, they never informed local people 
that the project would be an open-pit mine. An elderly Santal farmer elucidated that he had learned 
about the negative impact of the proposed mining project through an Adibasi leader of his hamlet. 
He was also complaining that no consultants informed the local people that the mine would destroy 
the households, agricultural lands, graveyards, schools, playgrounds, and small businesses of the 
area.6 When the Adibasi villagers overheard that the Committee to Protect Phulbari or Phulbari 
Rokkha Committee (hereinafter PRC), which was formed by Phulbari towners, was holding 
 
4 Sadid A. Nuremowla, Resistance, rootedness and mining protest in Phulbari, DPhil Thesis. 
University of Sussex, (2012) at 170. 
5 Bangla words ‘Gherao Kormosuchi’ are used more often in political movement in Bangladesh to mean encircling 
or surrounding of politicians or office buildings until the protestors’ demands are met. 
6 Interview with P. Murmu, Boro Bukshi, Birampur, Dinajpur, March 3, 2016. 
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meetings and rallies to stop the operation, some Adibasi leaders met them and expressed their 
concern. Initially, Adibasi respondents complained that PRC leaders did not adequately recognize 
the interests of the Adibasis. 
Before the popular 26th August Phulbari Khoni Andolon, Jatiyo Adibasi Parishad (JAP), with 
the support of NCBD and a few local Adibasi NGOs, organized a mass gathering named Adibasi-
Krishok Somabesh (Indigenous-Farmers Rally) on 29th April 2006 at Phulbari College field. 
Researchers, media, national and transnational advocacy, network, and solidarity groups never 
focused and highlighted this rally where local Adibasis from 68 hamlets, including Adibasi leaders, 
activists, traditional institutional members from various parts of the country, attended and 
demanded sharply to suspend the mass destruction project.7 JAP organized the rally to demonstrate 
that Adibasis do not want mining activity on their traditional lands and forests they have cherished 
for thousand years. The rally was also held to counter the company’s phony campaign, ‘Adibasis 
want the mining,’ which they had been circulating to local non-Adibasi villagers and Phulbari 
town.8 National Adibasi leaders such as Jatirindra Bodhipriyo Larma (popularly known as Shantu 
Larma), leader of the Parbatya Chattogram Jana Songhati Samitee, Sanjib Drong, chairman of 
the Bangladesh Adibasi Forum, Anil Mardi, former president of JAP, Rabindranath Soren, current 
president of JAP, and Professor Mesbah Kamal, a university teacher and researcher on Indigenous 
issues traveled to Phulbari and vowed to fight the transnational corporation. Shantu Larma stated 
in the rally:  
“We cannot accept this open-pit mining project in this heavily populated Adibasi region. 
Not only Adibasis, I believe, but other communities also will not accept this extremely 
 
7 Biplab Das, Phulbari Coalmine and the Broken Dreams of a Corporation, (Dhaka: Jatiyo Sahitya Prokashoni, 
2015) at 66. 
8 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016 
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destructive project. The government must consult with Adibasis before constructing any 
development project in their area.”9 
 
From this initial rally, Adibasi leaders had got the impression that they should organize another 
rally with local and national activists to attract national and international media coverage. 
According to Adibasi leaders I interviewed, Adibasi-Krishak Somabesh was the foundation of the 
popular Phulbari Khoni Andolon.10 A national Adibasi leader stated:  
“We had requested NCBD leaders to organize a protest rally to send the company a 
message that most people from Adibasi and local Bangalee communities do not want 
mining, and the propaganda the company was spreading is not true. However, we also had 
fixed a date to hold another rally; rather, NCBD failed to organize a mass rally. Our 
declaration was published in the local newspaper which was later circulated to national 
media.”11   
 
After observing the spirit towards fighting the company among Adibasis, NCBD activists, who 
had already been campaigning against the project and planning for a mass gathering, 
acknowledged that the upcoming event would be successful. Members of NCBD met Adibasi 
leaders and formed a coalition to stop open-pit mining operations in Phulbari by collaborating with 
all people in the area. Before the Phulbari resistance, the regional NCBD members and JAP gave 
an ultimatum to the company saying, “If you do not leave Phulbari, you would be evicted through 
mass protest.” Many local activists and Adibasi leaders from different hamlets traveled together 
and educated people about the negative impact of the project and inspired people to join the 
movement. A local Adibasi leader claimed:  
“From our meeting, we told Asia Energy to stop their mining activities, but they continued. 
Consequently, we had no other option but to organize that mass protest rally on August 
26th, 2006. We had learned about the negative impacts of experts that we transmitted to 
 
9 Das, supra note 7. 
10 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016 
11 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016 
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Adibasi and local people throughout the campaigning period. We successfully educated 
people that if the open-pit coal mining project would have been implemented, human 
capital, water, sacred sites, biodiversity, archeological sites, and other natural and 
ecological resources would be destroyed.”12  
 
Among the seventy thousand protesters in NCBD’s Asia Energy Office Gherao Kormosuchi rally, 
at least fifteen thousand protesters were Adibasis who attended from various parts of the North-
western part of Bangladesh.13 Though the rally had begun as a peaceful protest, after a few Adibasi 
youths were shot and wounded by paramilitary forces, it turned into a violent mass struggle for the 
next four days by blocking and boycotting the state machinery. The violence ultimately led to the 
destruction of the Asia Energy office, houses, and business centers of the local agents of the 
company.  
National and regional NCBD 
members also recall the Adibasi 
participation in the movement. 
Adibasi leaders told organizers in 
the rally that Adibasis were 
prepared to sacrifice their lives but 
wanted to fight before dying. It 
was a huge gathering in Phulbari 
where Adibasi communities 
vowed that they would protest 
with their lives to protect their traditional lands and natural resources from the foreign company’s 
 
12 Interview with Ram Soren, Phulbari Bazaar, March 11, 2016. 
13 Das, supra note 7. 
Figure 12: “No Coal Mine in Phulbari” the Asia Energy Office Gherao rally at 
Phulbari, 2006 
Photo Courtesy: SEHD 
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intervention.14 Most of the Adibasis, especially Santals, thought they were going to a battlefield as 
their ancestors joined in Santal Rebellion15 that happened centuries ago against British colonial 
power.  They wanted to bring their traditional bow and arrow. But NCBD organizers had requested 
them not to carry because they wanted a peaceful assembly although some of them did bring bow 
and arrow in the rally to show their anger. Adibasis were present in the rally with their traditional 
dresses, played dhak and dhol, and energized protesters with their traditional songs and dances.16 
Cherobin Hembrom, an Adibasi leader and key informant, told me that although not all the Adibasi 
protesters would be affected, they were concerned about Adibasi communities of the mining area 
and joined the movement in solidarity. If the mining company could successfully develop the 
operation in the area, Adibasis would have been affected. That is why they moved forward to say, 
“we do not want any mining in our region, which would displace us and make us refugee”.17 
According to Cherobin Hembrom, local Adibasis were the first communities who started 
raising their voices against the projected open-pit mining. He was one of the speakers who stated 
in the Adibasi-Krishak Somabesh that Adibasis of the area had been facing various vulnerabilities 
throughout their existence. They were never given a voice, and all decisions whether they are good 
or bad, are imposed on them without their consent. The government should have consulted Adibasi 
and non-Adibasi communities of this area, whether they want any large-scale developing project 
on their lands. He also stated that the foreign company had not consulted adequately with Adibasi 
communities and their traditional institutions. The company had continued deceiving local people. 
 
14 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
15 Thousands of Santals of Bhagnadihi at Santal Parogana in Jharkhanda State of India, under the leadership of 
Sidhu, Kanu Chand, Bhairab, Fulmoni and Jhano, revolted on June 30, 1855 against the misrule, torture and 
extortion by zamindars, wholesalers and police. The revolution lasted eight months and thousands of Santals and 
other people were killed.  
See: Abul Barkat et. Al., Life and Land of Adibashis, (Dhaka: Pathak Shamabesh, 2009) at 244. 
16 Interview with A.M., Dhaka, April 08, 2016. 
17 Interview with Cherobin Helmbrom, Dhanajuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
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Mr. Hembrom’s statement supports the global trend of environmental injustice with the unfair 
treatment of Indigenous peoples by nation-states and corporations, as will be discussed in the next 
section.  
 
3.2.2. Local and National Activists Accounts of the Movement 
 
3.2.2.1. Building a Local Movement to Resist the Mining 
 
As the grievances and dissatisfaction grew, and the temptation was intensifying among many 
local people who were misinformed through Dalal. Local experts, leftist politicians, Adibasis, and 
civil society members gathered together in Phulbari town and unfolded a roadmap to protest the 
foreign company.18 They formed a committee named Phulbari Shohor Rokkha Committee-PSRC 
(Committee to Protect Phulbari Town) on 15th March 2005, taking activists from different political 
parties to save the township and its residents from destruction due to the projected mining. While 
this organization was the first to mobilize against the proposed mining activity, they were unable 
to mobilize against the MNC at this stage. Simply put, PSRC members and other leaders had no 
information—whether the open-pit mining would impact negatively or not— and they could not 
campaign actively against the company.  
 
18 Interview with N.Z., Phulbari, April 01, 2016.  
“Go back Asia Energy, Leave Phulbari, We don’t want Coal Mine” 
‘Go Back Asia Energy, Save the environment’ 
“Go Back Asia Energy, Save Adibasi”    
“We don’t want to be displaced, we don’t want a so-called coal mine”  
“My soil is my mother, we don’t want a so-called coal mine” 
“Save Humanity, We don’t want a so-called coal mine”.  
Some Popular Slogans of the Movement 
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When rural Adibasi and non-Adibasi (Bangalee) villagers realized that they stood to be 
displaced and impoverished, they contacted the PSRC and showed their interest in getting 
involved. They complained that the project would not only destroy the town but also destroy vast 
rural villages and agricultural lands including Adibasi hamlets. By late May 2005, this new scope 
prompted the members of the PSRC to remove 
the word ‘town’ from their name, to reflect the 
interests of a broader Phulbari community as the 
Phulbari Rokkha Committee-PRC (Committee 
to Protect Phulbari).19  
People started mobilizing more frequently. 
The Phulbari bazaar became a colorful place 
with posters, leaflets, wall slogans, and festoons. 
On Sundays, thousands of people attended street 
assemblies where PRC members inspired people 
to say “No” to the project. Phulbari Entrepreneurs Society or Phulbari Byabosai Somitee 
(hereinafter PBS), which was already formed in Phulbari bazaar to protect the interest of 
businessmen, started campaigning against the company’s activities. PBS wholeheartedly 
supported PRC’s every event. PRC submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister through the 
executive head of the Phulbari sub-district and organized human chains and hunger strikes to 
attract attention from the media and the government agencies. After submitting the memorandum, 
thousands of people roamed around the bazaar and chanted various slogans for saving households, 
 
19 Das, supra note 7. 
Figure 13: A wall slogan written in Bangla ; Bachao 
Sundarbans’ (Save Sundarbans) still exist in Phulbari 




agricultural lands, school-college-madrasa, mosques, temples, graveyards, business centers, 
heritages, archeological sites from destruction.  
PRC’s events, confined to Phulbari, did not attract the attention of the national media, though 
they were regularly covered by the local press. The reach of PRC’s message did not always reach  
to their audience, leading to a feeling of atrophy and demoralization. Some progressive members 
of PRC identified that they were failing to convey their messages to local peasants and Adibasis, 
who stood to be the most impacted. Because they did not want to alienate foreign investors, most 
major political parties kept silent on PRC’s campaign.20 Most of the members of PRC are 
influential political leaders from various political parties, and all political parties want to keep 
foreign investors in their hands so that they can use them as a weapon to come into power. 
Consequently, local political leaders were threatened by central leaders to leave PRC and work for 
the company. It was found that the chairman and other influential committee members had been 
maintaining connections with the company officials and their local agents. It was observed that 
PRC was not raising any question of methods of extraction, environmental degradation or 
displacement of people; their main concern was only to get compensation.  
Many members of the PRC got frustrated at one point and failed to communicate among 
themselves as well as creating roadmaps to stop operations of the company. Moreover, they 
realized that those local leaders would never go against their central leader’s order and 
consequently, the ongoing movement could be destroyed. Finding no option to go against them, 
some members resigned from the committee.  They realized that it would not be possible to fight 
locally against the company that is backed by the government and needs to form a coalition with 
national organizations that protest to protect the national interest.  
 
 
20 Interview with A.M., Dhaka, April 08, 2016.    
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3.2.2.2. Local to National: Coalition with NCBD  
 
David Szablowski’s ‘social mediation’ can be a compelling idea in mining development that 
“refers to the task of addressing community and civil society calls for the construction of a new 
framework for governing the distribution of the costs and benefits generated by mining activity.”21 
He contends that by constructing a new governance framework for demands, a ‘social mediation’ 
strategy gains a certain level of acceptance when communities engaged in conflicts are denied 
benefits and opportunities that are expected to arise from mining activity.22  According to 
Szablowski, grassroots pressures can create new forms of political consciousness, higher quality 
of life among local actors, and changes in the existing governance systems.23 Giving the example 
of Andean communities’ strong demand for social mediation, Szablowski finds that national NGOs 
and transnational allies had facilitated the formation of a national coordinating organization for 
mining-affected people. For example, the National Confederation of Peruvian Communities 
Affected by Mining (CONACAMI) has later served to raise the profile of individual struggles and 
to press for change at the national policies.24 A similar type of organization is seen in Bangladesh 
named the National Committee or NCBD.  
NCBD helps to uphold community rights by resisting corporate and neoliberal policies. 
Initiated and participated in by left political leaders and party representatives, NCBD was formed 
in 1998 when they got the news of production sharing contracts (PSC) and gas exports between 
the government and MNCs. NCBD was already well-known in Magurchhara and Tengratila gas 
explosion cases, where they successfully made the government accountable for regulating 
 
21 David Szablowski, Transnational Law and Local Struggles: Mining, Communities and the World Bank. (Portland: 
Hart Publishing, 2007) at 28.  
22 Ibid. at 42.  
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid.  
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MNCs.25 Moreover, NCBD received substantial positive responses from mass people for their 
protest against the government’s policy of leasing land ports to India and other countries. The 
government was forced to cancel those policies due to NCBD’s pressure since they made clear to 
policymakers that those policies regarding natural resources would go against the interest of the 
country. Although NCBD gained the general reputation of being a left-led forum, people of 
Bangladesh realized that ‘where there is an anti-interest activity, there is NCBD’.26   
In the case of Phulbari resistance, some young 
leftist party activists of PRC thought about 
NCBD. They realized that if NCBD would help 
them, they could succeed. They went to Dhaka 
and met members of NCBD. After an initial study 
in the meeting, the activists were assured that 
NCBD would look at the merit of the project. 
Local activists also contacted students from 
Phulbari who were studying in Dhaka and 
requested them to create a coalition with NCBD. 
After returning from Dhaka, the young leftist group arranged a demonstration named Chhatra Jubo 
Shomabesh (Student Youth Assembly) at Phulbari without the support of PRC. This was the first 
instance an event was organized in Phubari without PRC’s involvement. It is to be highlighted that 
people who contacted NCBD were harassed by leaders of PRC and party in power afterward.  
NCBD responded positively after reviewing and discovering that the project would have been 
mass destruction which would displace thousands of people including many Adibasi communities. 
 
25 Interview with A.M., Dhaka, April 08, 2016. 
26 Interview with A.M., Dhaka, April 08, 2016. 
Figure 14: Leaflet in English circulated by NCBD Collected 
from  Nuruzzaman 
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The scope of NCBD was limited only on protesting the issues related to natural gas, oil, and ports 
before the Phulbari Coal Project issue. Before the communication from the Phulbari activists, 
NCBD members did not know much about the project since the company had been conducting 
their activities secretly and no information was published in the national media.27 The NCBD 
modified its name and inserted “Mineral Resources” in the organization making the name “The 
National Committee of Bangladesh to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports”. A 
central leader of NCBD told me in an interview:  
“We started working on the issue, contacted responsible ministries, examined a geological 
survey of the project, and after our investigation, we have not found any related document. 
The government had no document related to this project. They did not conduct any study, 
did not have any assessment report. The government completely relied on the documents 
made by the company. We collected documents of the company made for circulation 
purposes and started working on the project.”28  
 
After a wide range of analyses on economic and environmental issues and consideration, 
NCBD published a document titled Phulbari Koyla Khoni: Kar Lav, Kar Kkhoti (Phulbari Coal 
Project: whose profit and whose loss?) written by Professor Anu Muhammad in November 2005. 
Many experts and civil society members contacted and met with NCBD leaders. After an open 
discussion with them, NCBD informed local activists that they would join the fight to stop the 
project. 
NCBD first came to know all inconsistencies and illegalities when they talked to local people 
of Phulbari and surrounding other sub-districts. Local people were unsure if they would be 
compensated for their lands to be acquired by the company. However, the compensation was not 
vital to them because local political activists who are also members of PRC found that they would 
 
27 Interview with A.M., Dhaka, April 08, 2016.  
28 Interview with A.M., Dhaka, April 08, 2016. 
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not be able to protect the area even by going against their personal interests. NCBD decided to 
protest the company’s activities in Phulbari after discussing it with experts.29  
NCBD formed two regional branches of the organization, one in the Phulbari sub-district and 
another in the Birampur sub-district to enter into the area. Regional NCBD members, facilitated 
by central NCBD leaders, started coordinating with PRC by helping organizing rallies and other 
events. NCBD had become popular among local protesters in a short period of time because of 
their strategies and their strong motivational skills. Most of the central leaders had frequently been 
traveling to and mobilizing in the mining regions. On the other hand, PRC became silent, but some 
leaders had been supporting NCBD.  A regional NCBD leader told me:  
“Our intention was to establish a non-partisan movement where people from all political 
parties will have voices. Most of our activists forgot their political interests and started 
focusing only on one issue, that is ‘saving humanity and environment, and protesting the 
company’s activities’. A spirit was created among all people with a new pace, and voices 
were becoming stronger day by day. We started feeling that this force can break all evil 
powers and motives. We realized that PRC might not stay, but we have to fight until it is 
confirmed that the company left the country, and the project is canceled.”30  
 
During the mobilization for organizing protests, in the first week of August 2006, the company 
published an environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) in the English language. The 
central leaders of NCBD translated important issues into Bangla language and forwarded those to 
regional NCBD, which had been circulated to the villagers. The members educated Adibasi and 
non-Adibasi (Bangalee) villagers through focus group discussions, street rallies, bazaar 
assemblies, showing documentary films and PowerPoint presentations. When local people learned 
about the consent and consultation issues which were recorded in the ESIA, they claimed that the 
 
29 Interview with A.M., Dhaka, April 08, 2016.  
30 Interview with N.Z., Phulbari, April 01, 2016. 
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company lied about obtaining consent from Adibasis. When JAP organized the Adibasi-Krishok 
Somabesh in April 2006 to inform the company that they had not given permission and they are 
against the project, NCBD helped. However, many programs were held throughout the 18-month 
period, such as road march, rallies, student-teacher rally, civil society assembly, street protest, 
campaign, mass signature, etc. As a result of continuous pressure from local people, especially 
Adibasi communities, NCBD declared the Gherao Kormosuchi on August 26, 2006, to show 
people’s power through a mass protest. 31  
The regional NCBD leaders informed PRC of the decision and requested them to cooperate. 
But PRC disregarded NCBD’s decision and filed a general diary (GD) at a local police station 
stating that ‘the upcoming protest is solely organized by NCBD and PRC would not take any 
responsibility if anything happens’. Asia Energy took the opportunity; they obtained a copy of the 
GD and circulated the information everywhere. The company had been telling people that ‘the 
protesters are divided, and they became weak’. Their intention was to demotivate people and 
refrain people from going to the Gherao event.  
On 26th August 2006, thousands of people from surrounding sub-districts started gathering in 
Phulbari town to express their grievances against the company and their open-pit coal project. 
Adibasi and local Bangalee farming communities, teachers, students, small entrepreneurs, women, 
children, and solidarity groups from the capital gathered in Phulbari outskirts to send a message to 
the government, the company, and IFIs that they do not want open-pit mining which would destroy 
their livelihoods and the surrounding environment. Protesters from the rally decided to boycott the 
company. No sooner had the demonstration been concluded, the security forces opened fire on the 
 
31 Interview with A.I.B., Phulbari Bazaar, March 14, 2016.  
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rally. Three young boys were killed, and as many as three hundred people were injured. But this 
incident only heightened public opposition to Asia Energy. 
Over the next four days, more people, especially women and children, gathered in Phulbari 
town and blocked all major roads. The storming masses cut down communication between major 
cities. During this period, many activists faced obstacles. The company employed influential 
people as their agents who threatened movement activists. The security forces raided and arrested 
some activists after criminal cases were filed by the company. Both Adibasi and non-Adibasi 
activists shared their experiences of terror from the events of August 26th and the following four 
days. Only after a six-point demand agreement between the protestors and the government was 
signed did the tension dissipate. In this action, thousands of people occupied major streets and 
effectively shut down all communication with the capital city Dhaka. Rumana Hashem, the 
president of the Phulbari Solidarity Group, which she runs from London, the UK for connecting 
the local actors with TEJOs, shared an event in Saptahik 2000, a Bangla weekly. She went to 
Phulbari the day before from Dhaka and joined the Phulbari Khoni Andolon. She took shelter at a 
regional NCBD leader’s house in Phulbari town after the mass violence where police force raided 
at night to arrest him, but he escaped. The day after the movement, Rumana saw thousands of 
people occupying major streets and effectively shut down all transportation systems. There were 
multiple clashes between protesters and security forces. Security forces became intolerant. They 
tortured unarmed protesters throughout the period and raided houses of leaders of the movement 
during the night.32 Shop owners of Phulbari town closed their shops voluntarily and joined the 
protest. Many people selflessly donated cooking materials and foods for protesters. Hundreds of 
people brought beds and created temporary shelters on the streets. Protesters remained unmoved 
 
32 Rumana Hashem, “Rokto Diye Koyla Rokkha: Ekti Onnorokom Gono Ovvutthan” (Protecting Coal by Blood: A 
Different Mass Uprising), Saptahik 2000, November 2006. 
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in front of the government offices and forced them to refrain from working. The situation continued 
until 30th August 2006. When local people heard that ‘three people were killed, and hundreds were 
injured’, they got scared but took the street as their weapon to show their strength. Adibasi 
children, men, women, and the elderly went to major roads to block the mobilization of transport.33 
Two ministers of the government contacted the leaders of NCBD, met them in the office of 
Parbatipur sub-district council, and signed the agreement on 30th August 2006. The ministers 
promised to implement the deal quickly. Although protesters adjourned their protests and returned 
home, they swore that demonstrations would be continued until all demands are fulfilled. 34  
The six-demands included: a) banning Asia Energy in Bangladesh and canceling open-pit 
mining everywhere in the country; b) compensating the victims of police firing; c) trying the 
officers responsible for indiscriminate firing on the protesters; d) returning the dead bodies and 
those gone missing; e) founding a memorial for the three deceased protesters; f) compensating the 
owners of affected shopkeepers, houses, vehicles, and g) trying Dalal of Asia Energy, and 
withdrawing cases filed against the protesters.35  
 
3.2.3. Torture and Intimidation  
 
My Adibasi respondents told me that while organizing the Phulbari Khoni Andolont, Dalal of 
the company threatened the movement actors and Adibasi community members not to get involved 
in the movement. An Adibasi farmer from the Munda community shared his experience of 
encountering a company agent who tried to elicit greed and threatened after failing. According to 
him,  
 
33 Interview with Ram Soren, Phulbari Bazaar, March 11, 2016. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Das, supra note 7.  
124 
 
“Dalal were given huge economic benefits. I have seen a few Dalal from Adibasi 
communities, but most of them were from non-Adibasi or Bangalees. Most of them are 
already economically benefitted in the society, and their households and lands would not 
be destroyed. Some poor Adibasi people, I knew, were manipulated by them and took 
unethical benefits from the company. However, when the movement started, many 
villagers rejected the company’s offer and joined the movement. A Dalal threatened to stab 
me as I had refused to work in favor of the company.”36  
 
Another Adibasi leader from the Santal community told me: 
“Dalal could not dare to come to me with the company’s benefit because they knew that I 
am inspiring my community members to join the movement. However, I saw a Dalal file 
a false case against an Adibasi activist of Sonajuri hamlet. The police came to the hamlet 
several times to arrest him but could not arrest him due to the resistance of his fellow 
villagers.”37  
 
One NGO worker who was supporting the movement was killed inside her parked car,38 and 
many fake criminal cases were filed to harass the protesters. Before the Phulbari Khoni Andolon, 
the former executive director of Action AID UK, Nasreen Huq, was brutally killed in her car 
because of her opposition to the project. The Guardian report revealed that Nasreen Huq told her 
sister that David Wood, the chief of the UK Department for International Development in Dhaka, 
asked her to drop the campaign against the mine. According to the report, the Department was 
becoming increasingly concerned by her opposition to the scheme. Action Aid UK wholeheartedly 
supported the company.39  
The security forces went irrational when the military government came to power on January 
11, 2007. The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), special joint forces of Bangladesh, were deployed 
 
36 Interview with N. Pahan, Belpukur Hamlet, Birampur, March 11, 2016.   
37 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
38 The Guardian “The mystery death, a town in uproar and a $1bn UK mines deal.” (September 3, 2006). Online: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/03/bangladesh    
39 Ibid.  
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in Phulbari to suppress activists so that they could not organize any protest. The force started 
tracking activists’ phone calls and their mobilization. RAB arrested Nuruzzaman40 on February 
11, 2007 and was searching for other activists. Around 20-30 members of the force tortured him 
in the open bazaar first, and again in the police station. They also arrested Prakash Banik from his 
rice shop but released him on the same day. Key activists of Phulbari fled the town for a few days, 
but a mass of people gathered in Phulbari and raised their voices against the government’s action. 
Although Nuruzzaman was released on bail after 36 hours of detention and torture, police filed a 
corruption case against him, which is still pending. Moreover, he has been still attending court 
hearings for a criminal lawsuit filed by the company in 2013 for vandalizing the Asia Energy office 
along with 40 other activists. Again, there were several false criminal cases filed before the August 
26, 2006 Phulbari Khoni Andolon, although those were withdrawn due to lack of evidence. All the 
activists must attend regular court hearings, which are deemed to be harassment. 
 Still, the protests continue this day. The protesters claim that all demands are not yet fulfilled. 
The families of the deceased and injured people received partial compensation from the 
government. I have interviewed a victim of the movement who was a rickshaw-van puller and the 
only earning person of his family before the movement. A bullet hit in his waist, which made him 
paralyzed. His wife is now working as a maid for their livelihood. He told me that he had received 
partial compensation from the government. He refused the company’s compensation and told, “if 
you come to me again, I will kill you. I do not need any support from you. I do not want blood-
 
40 Nuruzzaman is one of the first persons to raise his voice against the government’s decision to lease out the mining 
area to an MNC to explore coal through an open-pit mining process. He is a local leader of the Bangladesh Communist 
Party and an important member of NCBD in the Phulbari branch. He has been fighting to establish the rights and 
support the demands of farmers and laborers since he was a student. His work for the suppressed class and leftist 
ideology inspired him to get involved in the Phulbari resistance. Throughout the period of organizing the movement, 
motivating, inspiring and educating people, corresponding and networking with national and transnational justice 




soaked money from a foreign mining company.”41 He told me that although his household and 
lands are not included in the mining footprint, he thought about the future generation and attended 
the rally. According to him, “the government’s position is political. The government is misusing 
its power. Once we have given blood, we will give more, but we will not let the company develop 
mining in Phulbari. I am still attending every event in Phulbari going with a wheelchair.”42   
Following the days of bloodshed in August 2006, the then opposition leader and the current 
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina went to Phulbari with a promise that her party would never allow 
open-pit mining in hugely populated and agricultural areas.43 Yet, from then on until 2019, this 
commitment was never revisited. In fact, even crucial points of the demand agreement, including 
an investigation into three deaths resulting from the August 2006 protests, remain unfulfilled.  
 
3.2.4. Activists Visited Indian Mining Fields and Made Documentary a Film 
 
Following a strong protest and bloodshed on August 26, 2006, against the open-pit mining, the 
project has remained in limbo for the last 13 years. However, the plan of open-pit mining in 
Phulbari is still alive as a discussion of the concerned authority of government on this issue is on-
going. Local people still think that the government may restart mining at Phulbari, although the 
Prime Minister and other Ministers have insisted on multiple occasions that it is canceled. NCBD 
members along with local Adibasi leaders and movement activists visited several open-pit mining 
projects in India in 2013, 5 years after the Phulbari Khoni Andolon. The members observed the 
settings of mining projects. They talked to local Adibasis, who have been settled in neighboring 
areas. When I was talking to Adibasi villagers and activists in the Phulbari mining area, most of 
 
41 Interview with B. Roy, Sujapur, Phulbari, March 13, 2016.    
42 Interview with B. Roy, Sujapur, Phulbari, March 13, 2016.  
43 Interview with A.I.B., Phulbari Bazaar, March 14, 2016.  
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them mentioned the Jharkhand visit of activists and Adibasi leaders. They said that they had 
watched a documentary film called Phulbari Debona (“We will not hand over Phulbari”) made by 
NCBD on their Indian mining site visit. I collected the film and examined the global trend of power 
politics and the negative impacts of open-pit mining in Indigenous settings. I identify that the 
Adibasis of the Phulbari mining region have been inspired to carry their spirit of resisting any 
hazardous activity on their lands. Professor Anu Muhammad, who led the visit, said in the film:   
“Our intention of the visit was two-fold: one, sharing the experience of the Phulbari 
movement with activists and local people of mining areas, and two, gaining experience of 
local people and environment of mining projects. By that, we could connect through the 
process and fighting strategy in future days.”44  
 
Open-pit mining projects in Jharkhand are located in mountainous areas where most of the 
residents are Adibasi people, especially Santals. They were displaced from their ancestral lands 
and households for the benefit of the country, which made them destitute. Displaced people are 
living with various health problems due to mining operations effects such as air pollution, dust, 
soil erosion, and water scarcity, which are directly impacting local Adibasi peoples.45 Although 
coal is extracted to mitigate the electricity demands of the country, the local people have no 
electricity available. A local Adibasi resident said in the film:  
“The land you see was ours. We used to cultivate our lands, and our livelihood was 
dependent on this land. We must have rights on that land, although the land was acquired 
by the government. We want the development of the country although we have lost 
everything. However, as we have rights on the lands from which coal is being extracted, 
we must have a share of benefits the government gets.”46  
 
 
44 The Film titled “Phulbari Debona” 
45 Mathew Areeparampil, “Displacement due to mining in Jharkhand.” (1996) Economic and Political Weekly.  
46 Ibid.  
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Because of poverty among local people, they work as daily laborers in the mining project. The 
company promised to offer jobs in the mining activity, but most of them did not get jobs. The 
company later said that there are no jobs for unskilled people. Since affected Adibasis have no 
technical skills and the company did not make any reservation for training them, strategically those 
people were excluded from job qualifications. The existing workers are working in hazardous 
conditions.47 An accident occurred on December 29, 2016, in an open-pit coal mining where 11 
workers died, and 50 were trapped.48 As livelihoods of the local Adibasi and non-Adibasi farmers 
are affected tremendously, consequently they take the risk of stealing wasted coal and selling it at 
local markets.  
 
3.2.5. People are still Active to Confront the Company in Phulbari 
A group of geoscientists arrived to conduct a soil test during my fieldwork in Phulbari town in 
2016. I was talking to one of the key activists at his home. After hearing the news, he rushed to 
the area where the scientists tried to conduct a geological test and survey. I followed him. I saw 
some activists were shouting slogans against the company. The administrative head of the Phulbari 
sub-district, whom I have known since my undergrad study at Dhaka University, told me, “I know 
the geoscientists have no connection with the company. I gave permission after a sincere inquiry. 
Although I know local people will protest, I have to implement the government’s order.”  
The government attempted to survey in Phulbari in 2012, which was stopped amid a protest. 
The survey team had to escape the area. NCBD declared a rally against the government’s action 
and demanded to implement the six-point agreement in November 2012. But the government 
 
47 Ibid.  






declared an emergency in Phulbari and deployed hundreds of police from 10 sub-districts to hinder 
the rally. An NCBD central leader, who went to Phulbari from Dhaka to hold the rally, told me, 
“throughout the period of holding rallies and protests in Phulbari after the resistance event in 2006, 
no violence occurred. There was no division among activists, and there is no point of incoming 
violence.”  In that situation, the government assured the survey team to continue the survey, but 
they could not start their work. Around twenty thousand protesters started a procession in Phulbari 
streets, violating the emergency.49 
NCBD leaders managed to make the 
police force understand that there is 
no chance of the protesters engaging 
in any violence. Seeing the situation 
might get worse, the police left the 
area.  
On January 12, 2013, villagers 
opposing the Phulbari Coal Project confined two staff members of the Research and Development 
Centre (RDC), believing that they were Dalal and spies of Asia Energy. Rumana Hashem 
describes the incident as the “power of the resistance and the passion of people to halt the long-
disputed open-pit coal project.  The company and their lobbyists are still trying to develop the 
mine, but yet to recognize the power of community resistance to the proposed open-pit mine in 
Phulbari.”50 Local protesters claimed that the government officials are helping the company by 
 
49 Interview with A.M., Dhaka, April 08, 2016. 
50 Phulbari Solidarity Blog, “Fascinating Story of Resistance: RDC personnel imprisoned by villagers in Phulbari” 
Online:  https://phulbarisolidaritygroup.wordpress.com/2013/01/13/fascinating-story-of-resistance-rdc-personnel-
imprisoned-by-villagers-in-phulbari/  
Figure 15: A street protest in Phulbari during my fieldwork, 2016 
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providing security forces to facilitate the company’s activity in the area.51 Earlier in the same year, 
Adibasi and non-Adibasi farmers led by NCBD of Bangladesh and Phulbari Byabosayi Somitee 
(Association of the Phulbari Entrepreneurs) gave an ultimatum to remove Asia Energy’s two local 
offices by March 30, 2013.52 It is relevant to mention here that I have not seen any office of the 
company in Phulbari, not even in Bangladesh, in 2016, during my field activities. I said in the 
scope and limitation of the methodology that I could not get company personnel including 
company consultants for my 
research.   
On January 29, 2013, local 
and Adibasi people of Phulbari, 
Birampur, Parbatipur and 
Nawabgonj sub-districts staged a 
demonstration protesting the 
planned visit of the company’s 
chief executive officer and country director Gary Lye to the company office in Phulbari, and 
different Adibasi hamlets and non-Adibasi villages of the mine footprint including Raghunathpur 
of Nawabganj sub-district and Khanpur of Birampur sub-district to distribute warm clothes among 
poor.53 However, due to the protest, Lye could not visit the planned areas but had to conduct a 
meeting with the Deputy Commissioner and the Police Super of Dinajpur in the town. A daily 
newspaper reported, “Gary Lye wanted to give bribes to local people, but he did not know how 
local people are spirited to suspend the company from the country. He brought his wife so that he 
 
51 Ibid.  
52 Das, supra note 7.   
53 The Daily Star, “Top Asia Energy official's visit sparks protest in Dinajpur” (January 30, 2013).  
https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-267051  




would not face any violence, but locals expelled him completely.” 54 Local people brought out a 
procession protesting the visit and obstructed him. Despite mass people’s protest and demand, 
lease and license of Asia Energy for exploration of natural resources on the area are not yet 
canceled. Gary Lye initiated a criminal charge against 13 local activists, which is still pending, 
and harassment continues.55  
The local and national protesters who participated in the 2006 Phulbari movement are still 
confronting the company and the project together. Every year on August 26, NCBD leaders travel 
to Phulbari to join the ‘Phulbari 
Day’ rally, which regional NCBD 
leaders organize in memory of the 
three martyrs and injured people 
of the Phulbari resistance 
movement. Thousands of people 
attend the rally each year. When I 
was talking to my Adibasi 
respondents, they mentioned that they are motivated by the people who died, and they will always 
remember them. Through the rally each year, protesters get a new spirit to fight corporate greed.     
3.3. Building a Coalition with Transnational Environmental Justice Groups 
 
Local communities and activists in the global South cannot succeed alone against TNCs; 
national and transnational justice and advocacy groups and networks must join with them and act 
together to resist mining companies and to establish rights and justice. Transnational networks 
 
54 Ibid.  
55 Interview with A.M., Dhaka, April 08, 2016. 
Figure 17: Observing Phulbari Day in 2015 by Bangladesh Communist 
Party. Courtesy: Nuruzzaman 
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campaign, negotiate and pressure the states and foreign companies through various tactics such as 
presenting evidence in websites, newspapers, and social media, organizing events, street protests, 
etc. to make them accountable for their actions and gain global attention. The campaigners also 
work with local communities and activists to assess needs and initiate the legal and direct campaign 
against corporations’ and governments’ oppression.56 The activities in combination with the 
transnational and global justice organizations, can be called a ‘transnational or cross-border social 
movement.’57  
According to Khagram and Alvord, transnational social movement means “phenomena and 
dynamics that cross, alter, transcend, and even transform borders and boundaries.”58 In other 
words, transnational movements can be defined as movements involving activists from more than 
one country, which infiltrate from the local level (where the project is situated) to the national level 
(capital city or countrywide) to transnational space (another country, especially the origin of the 
company).59 Additionally, activists themselves may be transnational such as citizens of more than 
one country or solidarity groups supporting independence movement in a foreign country. 
Alongside, transnational methods and strategies may be applied, such as mobilization, protest, 
social media campaign, or other web-based activities, and the movement requires cross-border 
interaction such as activism based in one or several countries where activists are located.60  
Samina Lutfa, a Bangladeshi researcher, investigates how the coalition of local, national, and 
transnational activists for resisting the Phulbari coal mine project in Bangladesh was created and 
 
56 Joe Bandy, “Reterritorializing Borders: Transnational Environmental Justice Movements on the US/Mexico 
Border.” (1997) Race, Gender & Class, at 90. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Sanjeeb Khagram and Sarah Alvord, “The Rise of Civic Transnationalism.” In Srilatha Batliwala and L. David 
Brown (eds.) Transnational Civil Society: An Introduction. (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press Inc, 2006).  
59 Samina Lutfa, “Transnational Ties and Reciprocal Tenacity: Resisting Mining in Bangladesh with Transnational 
Coalition.” (2017) 51.1 Sociology at 128.  
60 Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin, “New Perspectives on Transnational Activism." In Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin 
(eds.) Transnational Activism in Asia: Problems of Power and Democracy. (New York: Routledge, 2003) pp 1-25 
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is still resisting, even after a decade of a successful campaign to suspend the project.61 The author, 
through qualitative research, shows that as local activists were experiencing repression by the 
military-backed government and false criminal cases filed by the company, it was likely that 
mining would begin again and local resistance re-emerged. Lutfa’s research has explored the 
transnational coalition activities in a larger scenario for resisting a mine operation in Bangladesh, 
but it has not focused on the dynamics of environmental justice for Indigenous peoples in global 
settings.  
Protesters have attracted considerable attention from national and international groups. 
International campaign groups from the UK and the USA working for environmental protection 
and human rights collaborated with national groups and organizations using the internet and social 
media campaigns. Over the years, those transnational environmental justice organizations created 
a network with national and local organizations. They have been researching the company’s 
activities and created pressure on the company and the government through publications and 
shared them with the NCBD and other local organizations. Moreover, some TEJOs in London62 
continued attending the company’s annual general meetings and pressuring its shareholders by 
asking questions about the company’s activities in the Phulbari Coal Project.  
On the other hand, the company continued to lobby through different influential channels to 
resume mining while the community mobilization against the mining project kept on. It is 
important to note that the military-backed interim government came into power in January 2007, 
and the company continued to manipulate them and tried to take it as an opportunity to go ahead 
with the project. A month after the new government’s formation, Asia Energy appointed a retired 
 
61 Lutfa, supra note 59 at 130.  
62 London had become the minerals capital of the world, providing a critical proportion of global mine capital 
investment and playing a pivotal role in the fixing of world metals prices. Two of the world's four most influential 
mining companies’ headquarters are located in London. 
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Army General to implement the project to strengthen its power. An NCBD leader told me, “the 
company started publicizing through their website that there is a military government in 
Bangladesh; they resolved the issue, and they were going to implement the project without any 
protest.”63 However, the company consultants became active and started mining activities in 
Phulbari with the protection of the security forces. Since the RAB force had started repression of 
local activists, there was no strong protest due to fear of torture. Nuruzzaman’s arrest and torture 
was a signal that if activists come forward to protest, they would be stifled in a similar way. The 
situation of Phulbari became vulnerable, and NCBD members started thinking that the government 
could begin torturing innocent people any time, which has become normalized in some extractive 
contexts in the global South.64 NCBD central members and civil society in the name of Udbigno 
Nagorik (Worried Citizens) organized a protest rally on February 12, 2007, demanding the release 
of Nuruzzaman in Dhaka. A central NCBD leader told me:  
“From that rally, we started thinking of contacting international solidarity and advocacy 
groups, especially ones who are campaigning and advocating for local protesters from 
London, the UK. We informed them that local protesters in trouble could be increased, and 
national pressure groups would not be able to handle the repression of the non-democratic 
government. Our perception of creating transnational ties was to create pressure on the 
company as well as the government.”65  
 
Another reason for thinking of building a transnational coalition by NCBD was to inform 
others of the existing situation of Phulbari and the company’s activities so that they can spread the 
news. NCBD thought that it would be tough for them to continue the tie between them and local 
activists for a more extended period without the outside entities continuing the movement against 
 
63 Interview with A.M., Dhaka, April 08, 2016. 
64 Macarena Gómez-Barris, The extractive zone: Social ecologies and decolonial perspectives. (Duke University 
Press, 2017). 
65 Interview with A.M., Dhaka, April 08, 2016. 
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the company.66 Moreover, public interest groups maintain communication with transnational 
coalitions to avoid further intervention from the company in the long run.67 Since local protesters 
and Adibasi right holders cannot trace the company’s most recent activities, TEJOs, through their 
secure networks, advocacies, and contact, bargain with the company and to some extent, with 
states. Therefore, the national and transnational justice and solidarity groups act as mediators in 
this case whose actions and voices reach the company, host and home states.  
Lutfa identifies two dimensions, such as ‘reach out’ and ‘pick up connections’ and ‘direct ties’ 
and ‘mediated ties.’ For the first dimension, local and national activists first reach out to TEJOs, 
and transnational groups may or may not ‘pick up’ the case depending on meeting their criteria 
and institutional goals. In the second dimension, the connection or coalition can happen through 
direct contact or through mediated communication.68 In the case of the Phulbari Khoni Andolon, 
to build a transnational coalition, NCBD informed Bangladeshi immigrants to connect the 
movement to the transnational arena through the Bangladesh Environment Network (BEN).69 BEN 
experts started writing about the adverse impact of this mine and mediated NCBD’s ties with other 
organizations. Through this network, some TEJOs came to know about the Phulbari open-pit coal 
project and the Phulbari Khoni Andolon.70 TEJOs from the UK, the USA, Japan, Germany, and 
Australia responded and successfully built a coalition with NCBD.71 Some groups were contacted 
directly by NCBD, and some were mediated through BEN and  the Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon 
(BAPA).72 BAPA and BEN closely work on issues and have a connection through their 
 
66 Interview with A.M., Dhaka, April 08, 2016. 
67 Lutfa, supra note 59 at 133.  
68 Lutfa, supra note 59 at at 133.  
69 BEN is a network group where emigrant Bangladeshi professors and other professionals in different countries are 
connected to campaign against environmental wrongdoings. 
70 Interview with S.J., Dhaka, April 12, 2016.  
71 Lutfa, supra note 59 at 132-133.  
72 Ibid.  
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advocacies.73 At the later stage, TEJOs mediated through other transnational networks and created 
a coalition and started working together with solidarity. 
Samina Lutfa’s research shows how transnational organizations have their own interests in 
getting involved with a movement like the Phulbari Khoni Andolon—to make their struggle to 
save the environment more meaningful. Since this is a global movement against mining 
corporations, they sometimes come forward to contact local protesters and national activists on 
their own initiatives. To expose the interests of transnational groups involving in the movements, 
Lutfa argues, 
“These transnational–local connections support each side’s goals, and the relationship is 
reciprocal. Despite claims that transnational partners are more dominant than the local 
groups, the Phulbari case shows us that the transnational groups were not always saviors 
rather they also benefited from the resistance showing their potential funders or boards or 
supporters that they have achieved measurable impact through it.”74    
 
David Naguib Pellow argues that TEJO activists articulate a conception of global political 
economy as “shifting risks and hazards from North to South, from rich nations to poor communities 
between and within nations, and from racially privileged communities to racially despised 
communities.”75 Pellow further argues that many TEJOs originated not only to combat growing 
global environmental problems but also to take responsibility for hazards being transmitted from 
the global North to the global South as an ethical obligation.76 In this way, these groups tend to 
challenge the most powerful actors such as governments, TNCs and MNCs, and IFIs.77 Despite 
developing the cultures of solidarity and its successes, Bandy presents criticisms on transnational 
 
73 Interview with S.J., Dhaka, April 12, 2016. 
74 Lutfa, supra note 59 at 136.  
75 David N. Pellow, Resisting Global Toxics: Transnational Movements for Environmental Justice, (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2007), at 95.  
76 Ibid. at 57 
77 Ibid.  
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environmental justice movements. The author argues that ideological agendas may exclude 
influential supporters and coalition members, which can hinder the purposes of transnational ties 
and the more significant cause.78  
 
3.3.1. Involved TEJOs in Phulbari Khoni Andolon 
 
The following TEJOs got involved in the Phulbari Khoni Andolon through different 
activities:  
 
3.3.1.1. NGO Forum on ADB 
This is an Asian-led civil society networking and advocacy organization formed in 1992 to 
hold ADB accountable, transparent, and transparent by frequently monitoring of whether the rights 
of local communities are affected by the ADB’s policies and large-scale development projects. On 
its website, the network group recognizes,  
“the perilous situation Asia is facing in the midst of the rising inequality, illegitimate debts, 
environmental degradation, displacement, human rights violations and increasing 
vulnerability of the poor. The Forum had also strengthened the capacities of its members 
through research and policy advocacy on safeguards. It had fought with the struggles of its 
members calling for justice in elevating the grievances of project-affected communities to 
the Bank.”79 
 
This organization has frequently protested ADB’s statement by cross-checking with local 
groups and residents. For example, when ADB claimed in a statement that most of the protesters 
were non-residents of Phulbari, this advocacy group countered and told ADB, “this is in complete 
contradiction to statements made by local people that most of the demonstrators, including all the 
 
78 Bandy, supra note 56 at 97.  
79 NGO Forum on ADB Website: https://www.forum-adb.org/background  
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victims who were killed and injured, were Phulbari residents.”80 After continuous pressure on 
ADB by this organization, and a community letter by several Adibasi leaders, the country director, 
at last, declared in 2008 that ADB would not fund the project anymore.81  
 
3.3.1.2. Japan Centre for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES)  
JACSES is a networking group that works for the accountability of the Japanese government 
on environmental issues.82 Throughout the period of its involvement with the Phulbari Khoni 
Andolon, this advocacy group protested through writing action papers to pressure the Japanese 
government to pull their support back from the Phulbari Coal Project. 
 
3.3.1.3. International Accountability Project (IAP) 
IAP is an international advocacy organization that supports through advocacy skills local 
activists and communities to access and exchange information on development that affects them. 
This group seeks to advance development projects that prioritize human rights, environmental 
rights, and community participation in the decision-making process. IAP supports the community-
led priorities and recommendations directed towards financial institutions, governments and 
project proponents connected to the project through their campaign activities. IAP exchanges 
expert advice, training, and materials to communities likely to be affected and the civil society 
groups supporting them.83 IAP still maintains a frequently updated webpage on the Phulbari Coal 




80 NGO Forum on ADB, “Bangladesh: Phulbari Coal Project”. Online:  https://www.forum-adb.org/project-
monitoring-south-asia  
81 John A. Schertow, “Development Bank Pulls Away from Phulbari”, Intercontinental Cry (April 22, 2008). Online: 
https://intercontinentalcry.org/development-bank-pulls-away-from-phulbari/  
82 Japan Government is one of the funders of ADB.  
83 The International Accountability Project website: https://accountabilityproject.org/about/  
84 Lutfa, supra note 59 at 140.  
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3.3.1.4. Cultural Survival 
Cultural Survival is a US-based advocacy organization that helps Indigenous communities in 
mining areas to prevent the destruction of their land and natural resources.85 Since its inception in 
1972, Cultural Survival has partnered with Indigenous communities to advance Indigenous 
peoples’ rights and cultures worldwide. The organization employs a participatory, rights-based 
approach to strengthen Indigenous rights, support access to information, bolster freedom of 
expression, and assist them in organizing protests. Lutfa explores that in the case of Phulbari 
resistance, Adibasis of Phulbari needed to prove that their traditional agricultural lands, forests, 
ecosystem, and their livelihoods were endangered, and consequently, they needed to invite 
Cultural Survival. JAP contacted this transnational group to get involved to observe their 
situation.86 Paula Palmer, the Director of Cultural Survival’s Global Response Program, stated in 
an interview with IAP:  
“The project threatens some of Bangladesh’s most vulnerable Indigenous peoples, who 
trace their ancestry in the region back 5,000 years. Indigenous leaders fear that if their 
small communities are broken apart and dispersed, they will not be able to maintain the 
cultural traditions, religious practices, and languages that have sustained them for 
thousands of years.”87  
 
3.3.1.5. The London Mining Network (LMN) 
LMN is a network of organizations concerned about human rights, Indigenous rights, social 
justice, development, and the ecological integrity of the planet. Most of the world’s biggest mining 
companies and many smaller mining companies are listed on the London Stock Exchange, and on 
 
85 Ibid.  
86 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016 




its Alternative Investment Market (AIM).88 Since Asia Energy started a business in the AIM, LMN 
has initiated share-holder activism inside the company’s annual general meetings, participated in 
demonstrations and seminars, and organized many advocacy meetings with the UK government 
officials. It has also provided research support to activists of other solidarity, networks, and 
coalition groups.89  
 
3.3.1.6. Mines and Communities (MAC) 
Launched in 2001, MAC is another London-based network group with the purpose to provide 
affected communities, especially Indigenous peoples, NGOs, activists, the media, and the public, 
information about aspects of global 
mining and its impacts.90 This network 
group’s founding document is named 
‘the London Declaration,’ and it 
encapsulates key demands being made 
by many communities affected by 
mining around the world.91 
 
3.3.1.7. Global Justice Now  
Global Justice Now, formerly known as the World Development Movement, is a democratic 
social justice group based in the UK which campaigns and works in solidarity with those fighting 
global injustice, especially in the global South.92  This organization has been campaigning against 
 
88The London Mining Network Website: http://londonminingnetwork.org/about/  
89 Lutfa, supra note 59.  
90 Ibid. at 141.  
91 Mine and Communities website: http://www.minesandcommunities.org/  
92Global Justice Now website: https://www.globaljustice.org.uk//about-us  
Figure 18: Protest by TEJOs in front of AGM of Asia Energy in London 
Photo: Peter Marshal and PSG 
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Asia Energy’s activities in London and challenged the company ’s allies, such as Barclays Capital, 
RBS, and the UK government.93  
3.3.1.8. The Bank Information Centre (BIC) 
 
BIC, a transnational campaign group, supports “those whose health, livelihoods, homes, sacred 
sites, and support systems are threatened by the development process, and work[s] to reform the 
development finance system to prevent harm to people and the planet.” BIC recognizes that the 
policies and programs of IFIs such as the World Bank, IFC, and ADB can exacerbate climate 
change, undermine human rights, and further marginalize people who have historically faced 
discrimination.94 In their campaign, this group shares information and initiates capacity building, 
project monitoring, and policy reform of IFIs.95  
 
3.3.1.9. Phulbari Solidarity Group (PSG) 
PSG is a London-based transnational activist group that originated from activists who 
participated in the Phulbari Khoni Andolon in 2006 and later moved to different countries. As a 
joint effort of national and transnational activists, this group supports and represents the 
communities of the Phulbari mining region, opposes the project, and sought to build a transnational 
coalition to halt the open-pit coal project in Bangladesh. Through their advocacy, campaign, 
network, and solidarity, PSG sought to ensure that the company quit Phulbari and kept pressuring 
the Bangladesh government to fulfill the demands made after the movement.96 In partnership, PSG 
works closely with LMN, Coal Action UK, Foil Vedanta, Grow Heathrow, Global Justice Now, 
 
93 Lutfa, supra note 59 at 139.  
94 Bank Information Centre website: https://bankinformationcenter.org/en-us/about/  
95 Ibid.  
96 Phulbari Solidarity Group blog. Online: http://phulbarisolidaritygroup.org/  
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MAC, Cultural Survival, Mangrove Action Plan, IAP, Reclaim the Power, and South Asia 
Solidarity to build transnational resistance and solidarity with local people.97 
 
These are some organizations that made a significant contribution to halting the project and 
have been defending communities in Phulbari through their direct and interpersonal advocacy 
work, campaigns, and protests against Asia Energy in London.98 IAP was interested in the Phulbari 
case since it was highly destructive and in an area where IAP could add their value. IAP had 
reliable regional partners and local grassroots were strong, as they required; it was easy for them 
to take the decision to get involved with the Phulbari khoni Andolon.99 Although JAP contacted 
Cultural Survival to get involved to observe their situation,100 IAP mediated a tie with them. LMN 
was involved with a direct connection from NCBD. MAC was mediated through LMN and built a 
coalition to support Adibasi communities, protesters, and activists.101 When NCBD reached out to 
Global Justice Now, they responded quickly and created an alliance in 2008.102  BIC actively 
connected with the coalition partners and with media outlets on the Phulbari issue, indicating that 
 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid.  
99 Lutfa, supra note 59 at 134.  
100 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016 
101 Ibid.  
102 GJN Website. Online: <https://www.globaljustice.org.uk/blog/2016/aug/25/phulbari-day-action>   
Figure 19: NCBD and CPB protesting in front of the Asia Energy Office in London. Photo courtesy: PSG 
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they continue to be committed.103 Since the Phulbari Coal Project was supposed to be partly funded 
by ADB, NGO Forum on ADB kept an eye on it and built a coalition with national grassroots 
groups. However, they built a network when a community organization contacted them directly.104 
When JACSES learned that the Phulbari mine was funded by ADB, they decided to work against 
it. Moreover, the London branch of the Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB), NCBD activists, 
and concerned Bangladeshi expats in London have been organizing protest rallies and programs 




The Phulbari Khoni Andolon happened more than a decade ago, in 2006, but Adibasis and 
local Bangalee people are still thriving in the spirit of the movement, which they shared in 
interviews I conducted. The protest was the largest against any foreign company in Bangladesh 
and set an example for MNC’s and their mining initiatives. Despite threats, criminal cases, 
terrorization, corruption, manipulation, and the use of lethal force against local activists and 
Adibasi communities, they are still fighting to protect their lands and livelihoods. Indigenous 
peoples around the world tend to be disproportionately affected by resource extraction activities 
and have fewer technical, legal, and other resources to participate in the decision-making process 
effectively. This lack of adequate participation can be interpreted as a procedural environmental 
injustice. The issue of justice raised by community residents in the development projects calls into 
question the institutional structures that justify some decision-making procedures.  
 




The resistance to Phulbari was based on the belief that communities, especially Indigenous and 
other marginalized communities, should have the right to participate in the decision-making 
process by having the power to approve or reject any project. In many cases, where the primary 
conflict opposes the interests of a corporation with those of residents affected by its operations, 
citizens rarely believe for long that the state is neutral and impartial. They find themselves having 
to struggle with the nation-states, which they perceive as representing interests other than theirs,105 
but states should ideally give priority to the interests of their citizens.106 The governments argue 
that the decision would bring the greatest benefit to the most significant number. However, the 
Government of Bangladesh’s actions, in this case, could not assure the protesters that their interests 
would be protected. In the Phulbari case, the protesters challenged the government’s decision on 
the mine and successfully created a discourse among citizens that ‘not all mining would bring the 
greatest benefit to the greatest number.’ They argue that the government has the responsibility to 
make decisions based on a fair distribution of risks and benefits among different actors in the case 
of mineral resource extraction. Adibasi communities of Phulbari resisted because they thought that 
they might not be appropriately compensated, and their voices would not be heard adequately due 
to longstanding lack of recognition of their rights.  
 
 
105 Eyal Benvenisti, “Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign 
Stakeholders.” (2013) 107.2 American Journal of International Law at 298. 





INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 




Indigenous peoples are being persecuted systematically around the world by nation-states and 
multinational and transnational corporations (MNCs and TNCs) in the name of development in 
their own territories. Moreover, Indigenous peoples are also widely deprived of political and social 
participation and engagement in various decision-making processes, although different 
international legal instruments such as the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (ILO 
Convention No. 169), the United Nations Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 
2007, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) have established rights of self-determination 
so that Indigenous peoples can take a decision over their territories and determine their own 
identity. Indigenous peoples are defined by the United Nations (UN) as the descendants of the 
earliest and original peoples who settled in a region and with new arrivals later became dominated 
and marginalized through conquest, occupation, oppression, settlement, or other means.1 As a 
result of 500 years of European imperialism, more than 100 million people, mostly Indigenous 
peoples, moved away from homelands and have been increasingly marginalized.2 Colonizers tried 
to eradicate the cultural identity of Indigenous peoples through the erasure of their sacred histories, 
traditional knowledge, customs, and geographies that provide the foundation for Indigenous 
 
1 The United Nations, “Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues: Report on the Fifth Session” (2006) Online: 
https://undocs.org/E/C.19/2006/11  
2 Brian Goehring, Indigenous Peoples of the World: An Introduction to Their Past, Present, and Future. Purich's 
Aboriginal Issues Series. (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 1993) at 13. 
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cultural identities and a sense of self-identification.3 Despite all these challenges, Indigenous 
peoples retain social, cultural, economic, and political aspects of governing themselves and have 
remained distinct from other dominant groups by practicing their unique traditions, customs, 
cultures, beliefs, histories, and languages.4 Before they rooted in particular places, they trekked 
through one hamlet to another hamlet, from one valley to another valley, and encountered the 
power of assimilationist nation-states, making strong claims for self-determination and legal 
personality, or for various forms of sovereignty.5 
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) estimates that there are around 
400 million Indigenous peoples situated in 90 countries around the world,6 (80% of them live in 
Asia, 7% in South America, 6% in North America, 4% in Africa, 3% in Australia/Oceania and 
0.1% in Europe)7 that makeup 5-7% of the world population.8 Roughly, 5000 Indigenous groups 
speak over 5000 languages and are regarded amongst the poorest sections of the world population 
though they mostly live in rich biodiversity and resource surroundings.9  
In this chapter, I observe and report on various approaches to defining Indigenous peoples 
developed by scholars and international legal instruments. Based on my qualitative data, my 
attempt in this chapter is to identify whether Adibasi communities of the Phulbari mining region 
and throughout Bangladesh could establish the definition of Indigenous peoples under 
international law.  
 
3 Isabel Altamirano-Jiménez, Indigenous encounters with Neoliberalism: Place, women, and the environment in 
Canada and Mexico. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) at 30-34.  
4 FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), Free, Prior and Informed Consent: An Indigenous Peoples’ Right and 
a Good Practice for Local Communities, Manual for Project Practitioners (Paris, 2015) at 4. Online: 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6190e.pdf     
5 James Clifford, “Indigenous Articulations” (2001) 13:2, The Contemporary Pacific at 469-472.  
6 Ibid. 
7 The United Nations, supra note 1 at 1. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ulia Popova-Gosart, “Indigenous Peoples: Attempts to Define1.” (2012) 151 Biomapping Indigenous Peoples: 




4.2. Indigenous Peoples: From Past to Present 
 
 
Throughout the process of developing international law, the idea of Indigenous peoples has 
evolved.10  Francisco de Vittoria11 stated that nobody could possess the lordship over Indigenous 
lands even if s/he were an Emperor or Pope because Indigenous peoples own exclusive territorial 
rights over their lands.12 Though Vittoria supported the European invaders apprehending 
Indigenous peoples’ lands through his theory of ‘just war’, he suggested that the colonizers should 
respect certain autonomous powers and land claims of the original inhabitants.13 The United 
Nations (UN) agrees that the concept of Indigenous peoples was developed from the colonial 
experience, in which ‘original inhabitants’ were either deported or became marginalized by 
colonizers through different types of colonialism.14 The term ‘colonialism’ is broadly used to 
describe the atrocious experience that Indigenous peoples and original inhabitants faced, but the 
colonial systems could not fully capture Indigenous peoples’ desires, visions, and strategies.15 
Through their long encounter with European settlers and colonizers, Indigenous peoples did not 
always remain tied to their homelands and often had to migrate to different places, holding distinct 
languages and cultures.16 
Altamirano-Jiménez identifies ‘settler colonialism’ and ‘extractive colonialism’ in her critical 
contribution to the debate over Indigenous peoples. In settler colonialism, the colonizers evicted 
 
10 Andre Beteille, “The Idea of Indigenous Peoples.” (1998) 39.2 Current anthropology, at 188. 
11 Francisco de Vittoria is considered one of the founding scholars of international law. 
12 Francisco de Vittoria, “On the Indians Lately Discovered” The expansion of Europe: The first phase, ed. J. 
Muldoon (1977).  
13 Ibid. 
14 UNDESA, State of the World's Indigenous Peoples. Vol. 9. (United Nations Publications, 2009) at 6. Online: < 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/SOWIP/en/SOWIP_web.pdf>  
15 Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel, “Being Indigenous: Resurgences against contemporary colonialism” (2005) 
40:4 Government and Opposition, at 601. 
16 Altamirano-Jiménez, supra note 3 at 30-34.  
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Indigenous peoples from their lands and established new settlements for the settlers.17 Patrick 
Wolfe termed settler colonialism as “a structure and not an event”, based on what he called the 
‘logic of elimination’.18 In most of the British colonies, especially in North America, Indigenous 
peoples were evicted from their lands for settlement purposes, but “were not killed, driven away, 
romanticized, assimilated, fenced-in, bred White, and otherwise eliminated as the ‘original 
owners’ of the land but as ‘Indians’”.19 Altamirano-Jiménez contrasts this to extractive colonialism 
that involved practices of reproductive labor, controlling resources, and labor distribution. Spanish 
colonizers used ‘extractive colonialism’ approaches where they did not expel Indigenous peoples 
from their land but instead employed them to reproduce mineral resources for the colonizers’ 
interests.20 However, these types of colonial experiences are not the same everywhere.  
Indigenous identity should not be exclusively determined according to the history of European 
colonization.21 Altamirano-Jimenez’s insights on settler colonialism are accurate for the Americas, 
Russia, Arctic, and some parts of the Pacific but are not applicable for all African and Asian 
countries where European colonizers did not displace the whole populations and replace them with 
European settlers.22  As Clifford argues, Indigenous movements are positioned in relation to their 
experience of dispossession, but not always connected to the European or other imperialist 
influences.23 The UN recognizes that it was not only European rulers and settlers but also existing 
dominant groups that marginalized Indigenous peoples and displaced them from their lands.24 
Nevertheless, arguments are made by many Asian state governments, such as India, Bangladesh, 
 
17 Ibid.  
18 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialization and the Elimination of the Native”, (2006) 8:4 Journal of Genocide 
Research at 390.  
19 Ibid. at 388.  
20 Altamirano-Jiménez, supra note 3.  
21 UNDESA, supra note 14 at 6. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Clifford, supra note 5 at 472.  
24 UNDESA, supra note 14 at 6.  
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China, and Myanmar in the UN system, that as there was no large-scale European settler 
colonialism in many Asian and African countries, “there can be no Indigenous peoples in a given 
country and, therefore, there can be no distinction between the original inhabitants and 
newcomers.”25 It can easily be argued that in the context of European colonization, Africans are 
Indigenous to Africa, and Asians are Indigenous to Asia.26 But, some contend that colonial rule 
had destroyed the earlier territorial boundaries and communal mapping of the region by creating 
new administrative units, which led to increasing dispossession of marginalized communities.27  
Differences among Indigenous peoples around the world can be observed in their cultures, 
ethnicities, political-economic situations, and in their relationships in some cases with settler 
societies created by colonizers. However, Indigenous peoples’ struggle to survive as distinct 
communities is ongoing throughout the world.28 One reason is the challenge of identifying their 
status in society. Bartholomew Dean and Jerome Levi investigate the puzzle of why and how the 
circumstances29 of Indigenous peoples are improving in some places in the world while their 
human rights continue to be abused in other places.30 The authors identify that in postcolonial 
societies, state actors and their political, intellectual, and development partners (MNCs and TNCs) 
marginalized Indigenous peoples for the sake of modernization, development, and economic 
prosperity within their national territory.31 Furthermore, contemporary nation-states uphold the 
colonizers’ mandate, not by attempting to uproot the physical presence of Indigenous peoples as 
 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Kawser Ahmed, “Defining ‘Indigenous’ in Bangladesh: International Law in Domestic Context” (2010) 17:1 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, at 71.  
28 Alfred & Corntassel, supra note 15 at 597. 
29 Dean and Levi identify the following issues: Indigenous land rights, cultural rights, ownership and exploitation of 
natural resources, self-determination, environmental degradation and incursion, poverty, health and discrimination. 
30 Bartholomew Dean and Jerome Levi, At the Risk of Being Heard: Indigenous Rights, Identity and Postcolonial 
States, eds. (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2003). 
31 Ibid. at 11-12.  
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‘human bodies’, but by trying to eradicate their existence as ‘peoples’.32 Equally, the current state 
practices corrupt the relationship between Indigenous groups and settlers by the process of 
assimilation which produces state-sanctioned legal and political definitional approaches to 
Indigenous identities.33 Transnational alliances (between environmental groups, political parties, 
human rights organizations, and social movements), Indigenous intellectuals, and leaders have 
used ‘strategic essentialism’34 in their efforts to define Indigenous identity, secure the recognition 
of Indigenous peoples and uphold their distinct cultural traditions.35 Therefore, ‘Indigeneity’ is 
reconstructed and reshaped through every process of colonial arrangement and actively enacted by 
Indigenous peoples when they fight against state oppression and external interference. 
 
4.3. Defining Indigenous Peoples  
 
4.3.1. Debates about the Definition of Indigenous Peoples 
 
The debates over defining and identifying Indigenous peoples have attracted enormous concern 
in the international legal arena. As a result, various non-governmental and intergovernmental 
organizations have attempted to institutionalize their own definitions of Indigenous peoples, 
bringing the category within contemporary international human rights discourse and practices.36 
However, little progress has been made. It is still contested in many nation-states and within 
Indigenous communities themselves how to identify ‘Indigeneity’. In fact, the real question might 
be who ought to have the authority to define Indigenous peoples. Definitions by scholars, policy-
 
32 Alfred & Corntassel, supra note 15 at 598.  
33 Ibid. at 600.  
34 The presence of essential characteristic distinguishing Indigenous from non-Indigenous identity. See: Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, and Sarah Harasym. The post-colonial critic: Interviews, strategies, dialogues. (Routledge, 
2014). 
35 Dean and Levi, supra note 30 at 14. 
36 Douglas E. Sanders, “Indigenous Peoples: Issues of Definition.” (1999) 8.01 International Journal of Cultural 
Property, at 12. 
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makers, and legal instruments have considered the circumstances, geographies, distinctiveness and 
diversity of peoples or communities or groups to identify them as Indigenous peoples.37  
Observers from various Indigenous organizations at the Working Group of the Commission on 
Human Rights38 (hereinafter the Working Group) in 1996 took a common position and rejected 
the idea of a ‘formal’ definition of Indigenous peoples adopted by the state agencies.39 
Governmental delegations from different countries expressed the view that it was neither desirable 
nor necessary to elaborate a universal definition of Indigenous peoples.40 Finally, the Working 
Group, at its fifteenth session in 1997, concluded that “a definition of ‘Indigenous peoples’ at the 
global level was not possible at that time, and indeed not necessary for the adoption of the United 
Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”.41 Neizen argues that a “rigorous 
definition of Indigenous peoples would be premature and ultimately futile. Debates over the 
problem of definition are more interesting than any definition in and of itself.”42 However, setting 
a standard and universally accepted definition of Indigenous peoples have been emphasized both 
by Indigenous groups/nations and state authorities. Therefore, the definition or identification of 
Indigenous peoples and other minority groups is contested, inadequate, and incomplete.  
Altamirano-Jiménez observes that the formation of strict definitional standards in international 
and national laws excludes some Indigenous groups who need protection.43 Taking consideration 
of the set of rights vested in the communities, they can benefit from adopting Indigenous political 
 
37 Ibid. at 17. 
38 ECOSOC, “Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
on its Fourteenth Session”. (1996) online: https://undocs.org/E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/21  
39 Siegfried Wiessner, “Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal 
Analysis.” (1999) 12 Harv. Hum. Rts. J., at 113. 
40 Ibid. 
41 ECOSOC, supra note 38.  Paras. 153-154. 
42 R. Neizen, Origins of Indigeneism: Human Rights and Politics of Identity (University of California Press, 2003) at 
19.  
43 Altamirano-Jiménez, supra note 3 at 20. 
152 
 
identities.44 It is also observed that an inadequate universal definition of ‘Indigenous peoples’ gives 
many state governments a chance to repudiate the existence of Indigenous peoples within their 
national borders.45 The pressure continued from some states such as Bangladesh, India, and 
Nigeria for a universal definition.46 The Bangladeshi observer in the Working Group stated that a 
definition could be an essential step for safeguarding the rights of Indigenous peoples. He said, 
“ambiguity or absence of criteria could be a convenient cover for states to deny or grant recognition 
of Indigenous status since there would be no international standard to go by.” 47 Both India and 
Bangladesh took the chance of non-existence of any formal definition of Indigenous peoples.   
Since the Indian government classified ‘all ethnic communities into ‘scheduled tribes’, 
‘scheduled castes or forward castes’, and ‘other backward classes’ in the Constitution, India is 
motivated to gain support for its position that ‘no category of people in India can be singled out as 
‘Indigenous peoples’.48 Indian Courts on different occasions use both ‘Scheduled Tribes’ and 
‘Adibasi’ terms interchangeably to mean Indigenous peoples, however, the communities are not 
recognized by the Indian government as Indigenous peoples or Adibasis.49 According to Pooja 
Parmar, “though Adibasis could certainly be protected by the Constitutional recognition of their 
status as ‘backward section of peoples’, that recognition would not include a fundamental right not 
to be alienated from the lands they lived on.”50 Following the Indian government’s position of 
recognizing Indigenous peoples, the Bangladesh government outright rejects the existence of 
Indigenous peoples or Adibasi in Bangladesh; instead, the government in 2011 through 15th 
 
44 Ibid. at 37 
45 Marcus Colchester, “Indigenous Rights and the Collective Conscious.” (2002) 18.1 Anthropology Today at 2. 
46 ECOSOC, supra note 38.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Pooja Parmar, “Undoing Historical Wrongs: Law and Indigeneity in India.” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall Law Journal  
at 496.  
49 Ibid. at 498. 
50 Ibid. at 512. 
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Amendment of the Constitution identified them as ‘the tribes, minor races, ethnic sects and 
communities’51 and ‘small ethnic minority’.52  
Given the circumstances, Indigenous leaders and organizations often advocate for the direct 
endorsement of the accepted international definition of Indigenous peoples and reject any 
reference to national laws in identifying Indigenous peoples.53 As Indigenous leaders in the United 
Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) announced in 1996, “We categorically 
reject any attempts that governments or states define Indigenous peoples”.54 They argue that states 
should comply with international legal instruments in this regard and implement them in national 
legislation.55 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) claims, “The recognition or 
identification of certain collectivities as ‘Indigenous Peoples’ shall not be dependent on whether a 
national government has recognized them as such.”56 Indigenous grassroots groups demand that 
only Indigenous peoples can define ‘Indigenous peoples’, and believe that this right of ‘self-
definition’ derives from international human rights instruments such as ICESCR and ICCPR. 
Article 1 of both instruments reveal, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By that 
right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.” Thus, while Wiessner argues that the search for the definition becomes 
tainted if interpretations are sought for the purposes of excluding specific communities from the 
application of international instruments,57 others argue that formal definitions might help to protect 
 
51 Article 23A of the Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh states, “The State shall take steps to 
protect and develop the unique local culture and tradition of the tribes, minor races, ethnic sects and communities.” 
52 The Small Ethnic Groups Academy Act 2010 uses the term.  
53 Jeff Corntassel, “Who is Indigenous? ‘Peoplehood’ and Ethnonationalist Approaches to Rearticulating Indigenous 
Identity” (2003) 9.1 Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, at 76. 
54 The United Nations, supra note 1.  
55 Indira Simbolon, “Law Reforms and Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ Communal Rights in Cambodia” 
Jayantha Perera eds. Land and Cultural Survival: The Communal Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Asia 
(Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2009) at 65-66.  
56 FAO, supra note 4.  
57 Wiessner, supra note 39 at 113.  
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Indigenous peoples against governments’ positions of denial.58 The UN has acknowledged that 
“no formal universal definition of the term is necessary, given that a single definition will 
inevitably be either over or under-inclusive, making sense in some societies but not in others.”59  
4.3.2. Definitions of Indigenous Peoples in International Law 
 
Though there are various contentions of identification or definition of Indigenous peoples, 
international legal instruments provide guidance on what criteria constitute Indigenous peoples 
globally.60 However, there still exists unambiguity about what constitutes its global legal status. 
The following part of the chapter examines some features of ‘becoming Indigenous’61 by analyzing 
various working definitions and approaches to identify Indigenous peoples provided by 
international instruments and scholars.  
One of the most cited working definitions of Indigenous ‘communities’, ‘peoples’, and 
‘nations’ was given by José R. Martínez Cobo62 in 1982, which is endorsed by Indigenous 
representatives in the report of the 1996 Working Group. The working definition reads as follows:  
“Indigenous communities, peoples, and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, 
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those 
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are 
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral 
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in 
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions, and legal system.  
 
58 Ibid.  
59 UNDESA, supra note 14 at 7.  
60 Patrick Macklem, “Indigenous Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations” (2008) 30:July Mich 
J Int’l L at 177. 
61 Corntassel, supra note 53.  
62 The First UN Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, in his famous Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations (1981).  
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This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching 
into the presence of one or more of the following factors:  
a. Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them 
b. Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands 
c. Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a 
tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, 
lifestyle, etc.) 
d. Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual 
means of communication at home or in the family or as the main, preferred habitual, 
general or normal language) 
e. Residence in certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world 
f. Other relevant factors. 
On an individual basis, an Indigenous person is one who belongs to these Indigenous 
populations through self-identification as Indigenous (group consciousness) and is 
recognized and accepted by these populations as one of its members (acceptance by the 
group). 
This preserves for these communities the sovereign right and power to decide who belongs 
to them, without external interference.” 63    
 
Indigenous peoples’ representatives have advocated the significance of Martínez Cobo’s ‘self-
identification’, as the essential element for identifying Indigenous peoples.64 Taking Cobo’s 
definition into consideration, Wiessner categorizes Indigenous peoples as: “peoples with historical 
continuity suffering from invasion or colonization; self-identification as distinct from other groups 
of the society; a present non-dominant status; and the determination to preserve the groups’ 
ancestral land.”65 However, Kingsbury takes a different position regarding the working definition 
of Martinez Cobo. According to him, “this definition takes potentially a limited and controversial 
 
63 ECOSOC, Martinez Cobo Study. Online: 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/publications/martinez-cobo-study.html  
64 ECOSOC, supra note 38.    
65 Wiessner, supra note 39 at 111. 
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view of Indigenous peoples by requiring ‘historical continuity’ with pre-invasion and pre-colonial 
societies that developed on their territories”.66  
ILO was the first international agency that addressed Indigenous issues. ILO has been working 
to protect Indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights since the 1920s. The Indigenous and Tribal 
Populations Convention, 1957 (ILO Convention No. 107) defines both the ‘Indigenous 
population’ and ‘tribal population’ that has experienced conquest or colonization in the past.67 It 
also explains the term ‘semi-tribal’ as “groups and persons who, although they are in the process 
of losing their tribal characteristics, are not yet integrated into the national community.”68 
However, the difference between ‘Indigenous’ and ‘Tribal’ communities, according to the 
definition of the ILO Convention No. 107, is minimal since Indigenous peoples are defined as “not 
only encompassing descendants of the inhabitants of the territory ‘at the time of conquest or 
colonization,’ but also descendants of people residing there at the time of ‘establishment of present 
state boundaries’”.69 
The ILO Convention No. 169 definition ascertains the principle of ‘self-identification’ to be 
recognized as ‘Indigenous peoples’.70 The Convention introduces the concept of ‘self-recognition’ 
for protecting Indigenous peoples71 and provides self-identification as a ‘fundamental criterion’ 
 
66 Benedict Kingsbury, “’Indigenous Peoples’ in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian 
Controversy.” (1998) American Journal of International Law at 420.  
67 Article 1(1) of the Convention states: (a) members of tribal or semi-tribal populations in independent countries 
whose social and economic conditions are at a less advanced stage than the stage reached by the other sections of the 
national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by 
special laws or regulations; 
(b) members of tribal or semi-tribal populations in independent countries which are regarded as indigenous on 
account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the 
country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation and which, irrespective of their legal status, live more in 
conformity with the social, economic and cultural institutions of that time than with the institutions of the nation to 
which they belong. 
68 Article 1(2) of the ILO Convention No. 107 
69 Wiessner, supra note 39 at 112 




for determining the groups to whom the Convention applies.72 The following definition proposed 
by the Convention is recognized all over the world. Article 1 of the Convention defines Indigenous 
and Tribal peoples as: 
“(a) Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic 
conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose 
status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws 
or regulations; 
(b) Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as Indigenous on account of their 
descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to 
which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of 
present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of 
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.” 
 
The World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) has initiated the following definition of 
‘Indigenous peoples’:  
“Population groups who from ancient times have inhabited the lands where we live, who 
are aware of having a character of our own, with social traditions and means of expression 
that are linked to the country inherited from our ancestors, with a language of our own, and 
having certain essential and unique characteristics which confer upon us the strong 
conviction of belonging to a people, who have an identity in ourselves and should be thus 
regarded by others”.73  
 
According to the ILO Convention No. 169 definition, disruptions caused by colonization or by 
present government actions as a form of imperialism if they continue to struggle, are regarded as 
elements of a group’s identity as ‘Indigenous peoples’.74 Corntassel argues that the definition of 
 
72 Kingsbury, supra note 66 at 440. 
73 IUCN, Indigenous Peoples and Sustainability: Cases and Actions (Utrecht, The Netherlands: International Books, 
1997). 
74 Corntassel, supra note 53 at 86.  
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the Convention emphasizes the notion of social and cultural distinctiveness based on tradition.75 It 
is acknowledged that both the ILO Convention No. 169 and the WCIP definitions ascertain the 
principle of ‘self-identification’ to be recognized as Indigenous peoples. UNDRIP did not provide 
any explicit definition of Indigenous peoples, fearing that a definition would result in harming the 
actual beneficiaries of the rights of the Declaration. Although the Declaration has no solid 
definition of Indigenous peoples, there are some defining components there. Paragraph 2 of the 
Annex of the UNDRIP states: “The General Assembly is affirming that indigenous peoples are 
equal to all other peoples while recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to consider 
themselves different, and to be respected as such.”  
Paragraph 18 and 19 say:  
“The General Assembly is convinced that the recognition of the rights of Indigenous 
peoples in this Declaration will enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the 
state and Indigenous peoples, based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human 
rights, non-discrimination and good faith.”  
“Encouraging states to comply with and effectively implement all their obligations as they 
apply to Indigenous peoples under international instruments, in particular, those related to 
human rights, in consultation and cooperation with the peoples concerned.”  
  
From the above definitions of Indigenous peoples under international law, I have identified the 
following common characteristics for ‘being Indigenous’: self-identification as Indigenous; 
historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies; a shared experience of 
colonialism and oppression; vulnerability in current society; occupation of or a strong link to 
specific territories; distinct social, economic and political systems; distinct language, culture, and 





maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and distinctive identities. In the following 
section, I examine if Adibasi communities of the Phulbari mining area qualify as Indigenous 
peoples under international law by relying on the above-mentioned features for testing their 
identity.  
 
4.4. Indigenous Peoples in Bangladesh and Politics of Recognition 
 
 
In the previous section, I have analyzed various definitions accepted in international law, but 
there are many countries, including Bangladesh, that are inclined to disregard those definitions; 
instead, they try to assimilate the communities into dominant groups and their cultures. Advocates 
argue that the state-enforced assimilation process ultimately leads to the non-recognition of 
Indigenous identity.76 According to the UN, Indigeneity does not depend on government 
recognition.77 I have taken Adibasi communities around the Phulbari Coal Project as the subject 
of my research, and as such, my analysis of the debate over recognition of Adibasis or Indigenous 
peoples is limited to the project area, not the whole Bangladesh. Though the study is limited to one 
location, there is a discussion of recognition politics of Adibasis in Bangladesh. 
  
4.4.1. Test of Indigeneity in Bangladesh 
 
In my research, I adopt Kingsbury’s ‘constructivist approach’ by engaging empirically with 
community members to determine how they identify themselves in society and what they think 
about the government’s non-recognition policy. Kingsbury, in his article “‘Indigenous Peoples’ in 
International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy”, describes the current 
 
76 Corntassel, supra note 53 at 86. 
77 FAO, supra note 4. 
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patterns in Asia as attempts are made to define Indigenous peoples.78 Kingsbury rejects the ‘strict’ 
historical test, which he terms a ‘positivist approach’ often taken by Western scholars, NGOs, and 
intergovernmental organizations.79 Hence, to avoid excluding ‘peoples’ in Asia and other regions 
from claiming Indigenous status, Kingsbury suggests a flexible ‘constructive approach’ with four 
essential elements: a) self-identification as a distinct ethnic group; b) historical experience of, or 
contingent vulnerability to, severe disruption, dislocation or exploitation; c) long connection with 
the region; and d) the wish to retain a distinct identity.80 Jeff Corntassel argues that each of 
Kingsbury’s four essential indicators has a reasonable basis for inclusion as Indigenous 
representatives stressed all of them as aspects of their distinct identity.81 Kingsbury argues that a 
constructivist approach makes a global concept of ‘Indigenous peoples’ possible while allowing 
functional specificity to meet diverse social circumstances and institutional requirements.82 
However, Kingsbury’s constructivist approach means meanings and understandings grow out of 
social encounters such as interactions, practices, ideas, and beliefs. As part of the approach, 
Kingsbury includes ‘non-dominance’, ‘close natural affinity’, ‘historical continuity’, ‘socio-
economic and socio-cultural differences’, ‘distinct characteristics such as language, race, etc.’, 
‘regarded as Indigenous by others’ as strong additional indicators in his definition.83 I apply these 
essential characteristics for being ‘Indigenous’ in the following sub-sections.   
 
4.4.1.1. Self-identification and Self-definition 
 
 
78 Kingsbury, supra note 66 at 420. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid. 
81 Corntassel, supra note 53.  
82 Kingsbury, supra note 66 at 421. 
83 Corntassel, supra note 53 at 87.   
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Most of the definitions put forward by international organizations and prominent scholars 
highlight the self-identification approach. Marcus Colchester points out that many marginalized 
communities around the world that are struggling for their identity and control of traditional lands 
and livelihoods have redefined themselves as Indigenous.84 However, people who consider 
themselves as ‘Indigenous peoples’ must be a self-defined class of people since international law 
already recognized this principle of self-identification as one of the essential criteria of being 
Indigenous. The significance of Martínez Cobo’s “‘self-identification’ as the most crucial 
component for identifying Indigenous peoples” was advocated by many UN member observers 
attended in the Working Group in 1996.85 Furthermore, the definition of the ILO Convention No. 
169 ascertains the principle of ‘self-identification’ to be recognized as Indigenous peoples. The 
Convention also introduced the concept of ‘self-recognition’ for protecting Indigenous peoples 
and provides ‘self-identification’ as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to whom 
the Convention applies.86 Again, Article 33 of the UNDRIP and Article 8 of the Draft Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 1994 vested the right of defining ‘Indigenous peoples’ only 
on Indigenous communities by emphasizing the importance of ‘self-identification’. Article 33 
states:  
“1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in 
accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not impair the right of Indigenous 
individuals to obtain citizenship of the states in which they live.  
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to select the 
membership of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures.” 
 
 
84 Colchester, supra note 45.  
85 ECOSOC, supra note 38.  
86 Kingsbury, supra note 66 at 440. 
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Article 8 of the Draft Declaration reads, “Indigenous peoples have a collective and individual 
right to maintain and develop their distinct identities and characteristics, including the right to 
identify themselves as Indigenous and to be recognized as such”. Self-identification or self-
recognition is a criterion for being Indigenous that prevents states from putting forward a claim of 
not having Indigenous peoples in a territory by enacting law or policy.87 Corntassel notes that self-
identification policies for Indigenous nations have increasingly become accepted as international 
legal practice. Despite the accepted practice of unlimited ‘self-identification’ for Indigenous 
peoples in global settings, states ‘accommodating’ Indigenous peoples within their borders have 
generally contested such an open policy.88 Therefore, peoples who consider themselves as 
‘Indigenous peoples’ must be a self-defined class of peoples since international law already 
recognizes this principle of self-identification as one of the essential characteristics of being 
‘Indigenous’.  
Members of Adibasi communities of the proposed Phulbari mining area in Bangladesh identify 
themselves as Adibasi. While I was interviewing a Santal farmer, I have observed a resilient 
attitude towards the debate about identifying his community. He was saying, “I identify myself as 
an Adibasi from a Santal community. I find no distinction between Santals and Adibasis. If you 
call me or identify me as a Santal, you have to recognize me as an Adibasi as well.”89 Ram Soren 
is an Adibasi leader from the Santal community who was also involved in the Phulbari Khoni 
Andolon. He told me that it does not matter to Adibasis whether the government recognizes them 
as Adibasi or not because the government has no authority to define or identify them. He contended 
that it is enough if someone regards himself as an Adibasi. He questioned: “Why should the 
 
87 Macklem, supra note 60 at 196.   
88 Ibid. at 75.  
89 Interview with D. Hansda, Lakshipur, Phulbari, March 07, 2016. 
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government identify whether any community or group is Indigenous or Adibasi or Bangalee?” He 
later added pointing at me:  
“I cannot call you a Santal, because you are not a Santal. You are a Bangalee, which is 
your identity, and you would not accept anything other than Bangalee identity. Nobody 
would accept this. You only can call me whatever I decide to be called. Only I have the 
right to define and identify myself. I am a Santal according to ethnicity, as like other ethnic 
communities such as the Oraon, Munda, Mahili, Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Bengalee, 
etc.”90 
 
Rob Soren, the president of a national Adibasi NGO and a key activist of the Phulbari Khoni 
Andolon, claimed during the interview that ethnic groups in North-west of Bangladesh (where the 
mining area is located) are always known and called as Adibasi. Not only Adibasis themselves but 
also local Bangalees and local government bodies use the term ‘Adibasi’.91 Some of the 
communities are also called ‘Guna’ which is never scheduled in the government documents. Mr. 
Soren added that he has been called and recognized locally as a Santal and an Adibasi since he 
was born.92 An elderly Santal woman reasoned that the government has no power and right to 
identify whether the communities are humans or animals. Since they identify themselves as 
Adibasis, they are Adibasi.93 Therefore, throughout my interviews, I heard the view that all ethnic 
and linguistic communities should be recognized in accordance with their wishes. I find their claim 
on this criterion is strong.  
 
4.4.1.2. Regarded as Indigenous by Others 
 
 
Indigenous peoples require themselves not only be recognized as self-determining agents, but 
 
90 Interview with Ram Soren, Phulbari Bazaar, March 11, 2016. 
91 The local people disregard government-imposed term upojati or khudro nrigoshthi or tribes. 
92 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016. 
93 Interview with N. Mardi, Lakshipur, Phulbari, March 07, 2016. 
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they should also be recognized by another self-conscious group.94 Therefore, the 
institutionalization of a liberal regime of reciprocal recognition would enable Indigenous peoples 
to realize their status as distinct and self-determining actors.95 The UN has pointed out that the 
self-identification feature alone cannot contribute to building a specific group for becoming 
‘Indigenous peoples’, they should have close ties to their lands, with culture and languages distinct 
from the dominant groups, and be regarded as Indigenous by other communities.96 The World 
Bank stipulates that the surrounding community should also confirm that the communities who 
are claiming to be ‘Indigenous’ are maintaining distinctiveness and are dominated by other 
groups.97 During my stay in the township of Phulbari and Birampur sub-districts, I talked, 
discussed, and interviewed with Bangalee activists, local government representatives, farmers, and 
teachers about mining, resistance, and Adibasi issues. Local Bangalees’ sense of identifying the 
communities as ‘he or she is from an Adibasi village or hamlet’. Bangalees call the self-recognized 
ethnic communities in the mining area ‘Adibasi’, though some people call pointedly as the Santal, 
Munda/Pahan, Mahili, and Karmakar. Though the term ‘small ethnic minority’ is being imposed 
on the self-identified Adibasi communities by the government, nobody in the area uses or refers 
them as a ‘small ethnic minority’ or ‘upojati’ or ‘tribes’.98  
R. Begum, a Bangalee woman whose family settled in an Adibasi hamlet, contended that she 
calls the ethnic communities ‘Adibasi’ because they are Adibasi in nature. She also claimed, “I 
call them Adibasi because they love to be called Adibasi and, I respect their self-recognition and 
identification.”99 Her argument explores that all people have their own identity, and they should 
 
94 Glen S. Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks. Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014) at 28. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid. 
98 Interview with K. Kisku., Phulbari, March 07, 2016. 
99 Interview with R. Begum, Dhontola Hamlet, Birampur, March 3, 2016. 
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be regarded as such. She questioned, “if anyone calls me Adibasi, I feel insulted because I am not 
an Adibasi. Why should someone be called or identified what he/she is not?”100 She added that 
Adibasis also feel insulted if they are called otherwise. Having a close attachment to the people, 
she found that Adibasis are completely different from Bangalees regarding their lifestyle, 
traditional rituals, customs, governance and belief systems. As R. Begum is living in an Adibasi 
hamlet and she understands that Adibasis have their Manjhi Parishad, she respects their customary 
system and follows their traditional governing policies. She finally connected and said, “that does 
not mean I have become an Adibasi. Nobody can change his or her ethnicity; it has to be earned 
through birth and practice. Once you are a Bangalee, you are always a Bangalee, and once you are 
an Adibasi, you are always an Adibasi unless you do not want to be regarded so.”101   
B. Roy, another Bangalee farmer and a rickshaw puller who was shot and severely injured 
during the Phulbari Khoni Andolonon 26th August 2016, rejected the government’s position and 
stated that the government has to recognize the communities according to their demand and has to 
take initiatives to stop persecuting them.102 I also observed that one Adibasi community (such as 
Santal) recognizes and identifies another Adibasi community (Robidas) through their long-
standing understanding of the lifestyle. S. Baske, a Santal man who was also shot in his leg and 
waist during the Phulbari Khoni Andolon and had to stay in the hospital for few months with 
injury, talked about Robidas103 community who identify themselves as Adibasi. According to him, 
Robidas are marginalized and discriminated in the society, have their own language and distinct 
culture, but are not recognized even as ‘small ethnic minority’ by the government and by the 
 
100 Interview with R. Begum, Dhontola Hamlet, Birampur, March 3, 2016. 
101 Interview with R. Begum, Dhontola Hamlet, Birampur, March 3, 2016. 
102 Interview with B. Roy, Sujapur, Phulbari, March 13, 2016. 
103 Robidas (muchi in Bangla) is a backward section of people who repair shoes. They travel around villages to find 
dead animals and get their skin and collect them. They process the skin and make shoes and repair shoes using the 
shoes the collect. They continue with their profession for generations and single themselves out of the dominant 
Bangalees. They speak in their language and follow their own lifestyle, traditions and customs.   
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company.104 He said, “among 23 households of Adibasis in my hamlet, ten households are from 
Robidas community. I find Robidas is also an Adibasi.”105  
Thus, I find that being ‘recognized by others’ is an important criterion, which can be read with 
self-recognition or identification. Accordingly, Bangalee respondents of the Phulbari mining area 
were asked: “what do they think about the people who are identifying themselves as Adibasi but 
not regarded as Adibasi by the government?” Most of the respondents, regardless of their race, 
ethnicity, gender, age, literacy, occupation, claimed that they are Indigenous peoples, and they 
must be called either ‘Adibasi’ or ‘Indigenous peoples’ because the people want to be called so.   
 
4.4.1.3. Historical Continuity  
 
 
Many scholars favor the ‘historical continuity’ criterion arguing that historical continuation is 
enough for being ‘Indigenous’. Macklem claims that Indigenous peoples in international law are 
communities who maintained historical continuity in occupied and governed territories before 
colonization.106 Benedict Kingsbury contests Cobo’s working definition of Indigenous peoples and 
argues that by requiring “‘historical continuity’ with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that 
developed on their territories”, the definition takes potentially a limited and controversial view of 
Indigenous peoples.107 Kingsbury observes that this historical continuity may consist of the 
continuation of reaching into the present.108 Macklem supports this position of Indigenous peoples 
in international law and argues that they are the people who maintained ‘historical continuity’ in 
occupied and governed territories prior to colonization.109 
 
104 The company has recognized Santal, Munda and Mahili as Indigenous in their official document.  
105 Interview with S. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 06, 2016. 
106 Macklem, supra note 60. 
107 Kingsbury, supra note 66 at 420.  
108 Ibid. at 422. 
109 Macklem, supra note 60. 
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The World Bank takes a criteria-based approach for Asian countries by adding ‘historical 
continuity’ and ‘colonialism’ because some Asian countries such as India, Bangladesh, and 
Myanmar have argued that Indigenous peoples are descendants of the original inhabitants who 
have suffered from conquest or invasion from outside.110 The principle of “being conquered and 
being dominated by another group is pre-condition for Indigenous status”111 implies that European 
conquest and military invasion over Indigenous nations are necessary,112 which I find is 
problematic. Because not all Indigenous groups were conquered by European invaders through 
military powers, nor they establish non-dominant sections in society.113   
Designating the notion of Indigenous peoples as ‘the people who came first’, the Indian 
representatives have argued that it is impossible to determine who came first because of mass 
migration, preoccupation, and differentiation.114 It is common in the Indian sub-continent, 
especially in undivided Bengal, where many people of diverse ethnicities have traveled from other 
parts of India and settled down in different places to work as borga chashi (sharecroppers)115 and 
agricultural laborers.116 All Adibasi communities of my research area have a similar historical and 
cultural background and belong to the earliest inhabitants of the Indian sub-continent.117 They are 
believed to have moved from Jharkhand, Nagpur and other parts of current India to their new 
places (many forest areas of current Bangladesh) during the conquering time by British East India 
 
110 Ibid.   
111 Ted Gurr from Minority At Risk (MAR) project defines Indigenous peoples as: “Conquered descendants of 
earlier inhabitants of a region who live mainly in conformity with traditional social, economic, and cultural 
customs that are sharply distinct from those of dominant groups…Indigenous peoples who had durable states of 
their own prior to conquest, such as Tibetans, or who have given sustained support to modern movements aimed at 
establishing their own state, such as the Kurds, are classified as ethnonationalists, not indigenous peoples.  
Also See, Corntassel, supra note 53 at 79. 
112 Altamirano-Jiménez, supra note 5 at 22.  
113 Alfred and Corntassel, supra note 15.  
114 Kingsbury, supra note 66 at 434 & 435. 
115 Most of the Adibasis in the mining area are landless borga chashi. They cultivate three-season crops throughout 
the year.  
116 Abul Barkat et. Al., Life and Land of Adibashis, (Dhaka: Pathak Shamabesh, 2009) at 244. 
117 Ibid.  
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Company fearing to be captured and tortured.118 There is another compelling claim of settling 
Adibasis in the Phulbari mining area. Sidhu Murmu and Kanhu Murmu were the Santal rebellions, 
who led fighting for liberating Adibasis and their rights from British colonial authority and their 
local agents (upper caste Zamindars) in 1885.119 The British East India Company rulers and their 
agents had been torturing, persecuting, and marginalizing Adibasis in the name of production and 
development. The violence spread all over Adibasi communities, and they became refugees by 
traveling from one place to another place as they were displaced. They settled in different parts of 
the Indian sub-continent. Many of them settled in the mining area.120  
Adibasi communities in the Phulbari mining area are distinct in their way of life, cultures, and 
languages from dominant Bangalee Muslim and Hindu populations, though they have coexisted 
with them for a long time. Mezbah Kamal, a Bangladesh historian, argues that since the period of 
Mughal in the 15th century, the boundaries of the region had been altered various times and became 
part of at least three countries. Since the whole region was a part of the Indian sub-continent until 
1947, people could migrate from one place to another place, and they could settle anywhere they 
wanted.121 Therefore, it cannot be said that “you migrated from India or Pakistan and as such you 
are not an Adibasi or Indigenous”. After becoming an independent country in 1971, Bangladesh 
has not experienced much migration into its territory.122 However, the ethnic groups who are 
claiming themselves as Adibasi in Bangladesh have lived in the region since before the 





121 Mesbah Kamal, “Introduction” eds Mesbah Kamal, Jahidul Islam and Sugata Chakma, Adibasi Communities 
Bangladesh Asiatic Society, Dhaka: 2007, at xiii  




Therefore, the government’s position that  ‘all people of the country are Indigenous’ or ‘there 
are no Indigenous peoples in Bangladesh’ is invalid in the sense of ‘historical continuity’.124 With 
respect to the notion of Indigenous peoples as the ‘people who came first’, I support the argument 
made by the Indian representatives in an international forum that it is impossible to determine ‘who 
came first’. Accordingly, the concept of ‘who came first’ or ‘historical continuity’ cannot be 
applied in the Indian sub-continent context because of the continuous migration, absorption, and 
differentiation of groups in the following centuries of colonization.125 Therefore, the question of 
‘who came first’ is illogical in this context.126 Following Xaxa, there is no need to make distinction 
between settlement in the country as a whole and settlement within its parts or regions.127 The 
Santals and other Adibasi groups may have settled in some territory where they live now later than 
the Bangalee, but it cannot be said that their settlement in undivided Bengal is prior to that of the 
groups.128 Therefore, to claim Indigenous status on this ground, a group can say they are the first 
settlers of the area they live now from the time immemorial.  Again, if we take the ‘historical 
continuity’ criterion in Bangladesh's perspective, Adibasis pass the test of ‘Indigeneity’ as well. 
Therefore, in my analysis, Adibasis of undivided Bengal are to be treated as Indigenous peoples 
of independent Bangladesh.  
 
4.4.1.4. A Long Connection with Regions and Kinship Networks 
 
 
Indigenous peoples are often demanding recognition as Indigenous peoples based on their long 
connection with regions. They also wish to retain a distinct identity through practicing their 
 
124 UNDESA, supra note 14 at 6.  
125 Kingsbury, supra note 66 at 434 & 435.  
126 Virginius Xaxa, “Tribes as Indigenous People of India.” (1999) Economic and political weekly, at 3592.  
127 Ibid.  
128 Ibid. at 3592.  
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traditions, cultures, and strong ties with lands.129 The interconnected factors of the relationship to 
the land, language, and cultural practices appear to have some promises for discussing the 
adaptability and resurgence of Indigenous communities.130 Wiessner suggests adding Indigenous 
peoples’ ‘strong ties’ to their ancestral lands, whether they can reside in these territories or not.131 
The self-identification and historical continuation criteria are not enough for a particular group to 
establish an ‘Indigenous’ identity; they need close ties 
to their lands, with identities and languages distinct 
from the dominant groups.132 Considering the 
international context, James Anaya identifies 
‘Indigenous peoples’ as distinct communities with 
extensive kinship networks that clearly distinguish 
them from ‘minority groups’ by highlighting the 
continued colonial domination of homelands as well as 
the ancestral roots of the ‘pre-invasion inhabitants’.133 
Their extensive kinship networks and continually 
devising cultural traditions also form an Indigenous 
identity. Moreover, multi-functionality of kinship 
bonds governs Adibasi society and build their social relations.134 Santals and other Adibasi 
communities had been living in the mining area before the victims of displacement arrived there. 
 
129 UNDESA, supra note 14 at 6.  
130 Alfred and Corntassel, supra note 15 at 606-609. 
131 Wiessner, supra note 39 at 112  
132 Ibid.  
133 James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
134 Virginius Xaxa, “Transformation of Tribes in India: Terms of Discourse.” (1999) Economic and Political 
Weekly.  
 
Figure 20: Sal forest near Adibasi hamlets  




They could have settled comfortably in the region because of their kinship networks.135 Kinship is 
the main basis of family organization.136 Once an Adibasi group settled in one place, other relatives 
of that group followed that group. They started clearing the jungle for houses and carried their 
livelihoods by hunting, gathering wild foods from the forest, and working as agricultural 
laborers.137 However, they now became victims of marginalization and deprivation. A Santal 
farmer was recalling his childhood memories: “the area was full of forest, and now you can barely 
see the forest. Many Bangalees migrated here lately from different places, cut trees for settling and 
created cultivated lands. Now it has become a crowded area with agricultural lands.” He added, 
“If you see any community live close to a forest and if they depend their livelihood on it, you will 
understand that they are Indigenous peoples.”138  
D. Baske, an elderly Santal woman in her 80s, stated that Adibasis have a long connection with 
forests because their livelihood depends on forests where they hunt animals, gather honey, wild 
fruits, and flowers. They celebrate ‘hunting and gathering day’ every year as part of their continued 
customs, which they call Sohrai.  In Santal tradition, Sohrai means ‘throw of a lance’.139  Their 
religious beliefs, rituals, and sacred histories also are based on forest dwellings, and they are called 
‘forest dwellers’, and ‘hunters and gatherers’. Indigenous peoples have a stable relationship with 
the forest; only they understand managing and maintaining the ecological value of forests. D.  
Baske contended that when Bangalees started moving in this place, they settled in forest and 
 
135 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
136 Satadal Dasgupta, Caste, Kinship, and Community: Social System of a Bengal Caste. (Orient Blackswan, 1993). 
137 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
138 Interview with B. Tudu, Letason Hamlet, Birampur, February 29, 2016.  
139 There is an oral history of Sohrai among Santals and they believe that Sohrai was a person who tried to abduct a 
girl he loved of a rich family and was killed by the girl’s family with lance. As the date of sohrai is close to 25th 
December, converted Christians celebrate both festivals at the same time. During the Sohrai, Santals celebrate with 
various activities such as song, dance, making traditional foods, puja, drinking haria, games with cattle, sakrat 
(hunting animals, birds, and fishes). Santals hunt rats and eat during the Sohrai.  
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agricultural Khas (demesne) lands140, they began cutting forests, and they acquired colossal forest 
lands afterward. Bangalee refugees do not understand the ecological and biodiversity of the forest 
inhabitants.141 Though their livelihoods mostly depend on agricultural products and activities, 
Adibasis continued their customary traditions of hunting and gathering. Therefore, in D. Baske’s 
view, Adibasis created a sincere relationship with forests.  
Moreover, Adibasis practice distinct rituals that are entirely different from Bangalees, and they 
continue what their ancestors used to follow. Ram Soren described Santals’ rituals of welcoming 
a newborn into the family. When a child is born, the mother and the newborn both are bathed with 
neem leaves. The child is welcomed in the world by boiling neem leaves and cooking traditional 
dessert. Adibasis believe that neem leaves are beneficial for human health, and they use that for 
their traditional medicinal purposes. Though most Santals are not formally educated, they have a 
distinct system of naming, which cannot be seen in any other community in Bangladesh. Ram 
Soren, a local Santal leader, stated that his name was taken after his paternal grandfather’s name. 
He added, “when I was born, I got my grandfather’s secret name with the formal ritual ceremony. 
My father got his name in the same way; my sons got their names similarly.” Cheroben described 
the naming rituals in more detail. He has two sons and two daughters. His elder son got his secret 
name from his paternal grandfather (Cherobin’s father), his second son got from his maternal 
grandfather. If he would have a third son, he would take his paternal grandfather’s younger 
brother’s name. Similarly, his first daughter got from her paternal grandmother’s secret name, and 
 
140 Khas land means government owned fallow land, where nobody has property rights. Alline Herrara describes 
more on khas lands: In Bangladesh, the process of redistributing state‐owned land, commonly named as khas land, 
to landless people which was started in the 1980s. See more: Aline Herrera, “Access to khas land in Bangladesh: 
Discussion on the opportunities and challenges for landless people.” (2016). The problem had started after 1947 
when many Adibasis had moved to India due to religious riots (Hindu and Muslim riots) leaving their lands behind. 
The lands of the drifted people became Khas and later declared as an enemy or vested property. Local powerful 
Bangalees started possessing Adibasi lands as well as those khas lands because Adibasis have little knowledge about 
the process of transfer of property. 
141 Interview with D. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 09, 2016. 
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his second daughter got her maternal grandmother’s secret name. Through this traditional process, 
these names would never be lost, and the tradition will be kept alive for generations. This is one 
of the customs through which Santals maintain their kinship networks. 
4.4.1.5. Historical Experience and Vulnerability  
 
 
Erica-Irene Daes, the UN Chairperson-Rapporteur on the Concept of Indigenous, defines 
‘Indigenous peoples’ as “the descendants of the original inhabitants of conquered territories 
possessing a minority culture and recognizing themselves as such”.142 Wiessner contemplates 
Daes’s suggested factors of voluntary distinctiveness, self-identification, and recognition, as well 
as the experience of oppression as a reasonable functional definition.143 Kingsbury’s ‘historical 
experience of vulnerability, severe disruption, dislocation, oppression or exploitation’ of self-
identified distinct communities who form non-dominant classes in the society is common 
everywhere in the world. Santals, Mundas, and other Adibasis from plain lands always live in the 
Northern part of Bangladesh and are being persecuted and marginalized from the very beginning 
of the civilization, and it got more intense as time passed.144 Adibasi people in Bangladesh form 
the non-dominant sectors of society as against the majority Bangalees.145 Their historical situation 
can be labeled as politically powerless, legally unprotected, economically inferior, numerically 
inferior, and victims of violence.146 Their present psychological states also support the ‘powerless’ 
class in every aspect of society. For example, when I was talking to Cherobin about the 
marginalization of Adibasis, he told me that though Adibasis are citizens, they cannot become a 
 
142 Erica-Irene Daes, “Standard Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous 
People: The Concept of ‘Indigenous Peoples’” (1996) The Working Paper. Online:  
<https://undocs.org/E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2   
143 Wiessner supra note 39 at 115.  
144 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016.  




‘Prime Minister’ of the country147, but the Bangladesh Constitution has no racial, ethnic, religious 
and gender-based exclusionary provision.148 Article 28(4) of the Constitution states: “Nothing in 
this article shall prevent the nation-state from making special provisions in favor of women or 
children or for the advancement of any backward section of citizens.” Any citizen who is qualified 
for the election to become a member of the parliament (MP) can also become the Prime Minister 
of Bangladesh with the support of the members of the parliament.149 Cherobin feels that though 
Adibasis are Bangladeshi citizens, they are not actual citizens. They would never be entitled to get 
similar opportunities or benefits as Bangalees get, although the Bangladesh Constitution 
guarantees equality for everyone.150 As a member of a marginalized and non-dominant group of 
the country, his experience was never good dealing with Bangalees and government officials. His 
sense of the above state of mind is for their long history of marginalization, deprivation, and 
discrimination. He thinks the situation would never be better because Bangladesh is a Muslim and 
Bangalee majority country where they dominate everything.151   
S. Baske was worried about losing his land to powerful local Bangalees. His grandfather’s 
property was grabbed by a Bangalee neighbor by making a forged deed after his death. One of his 
Santal neighbors lost substantial agricultural lands recently in the same way.152 This trend is 
happening everywhere in Bangladesh among Adibasis.153 D. Baske claimed that Santals and 
Mundas were owners of lands, but now most of the lands of the area are owned by Bangalees, 
 
147 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016.  
148 Article 28 of the Constitution states: (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. (2) Women shall have equal rights with men in all spheres of the State and 
of public life. (3) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth be subjected to any 
disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to access to any place of public entertainment or resort, or 
admission to any educational institution. 
149 Article 66 and 56(3) of the Constitution of Bangladesh.  
150 Article 27 states: All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law. 
151 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
152 Interview with S. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 06, 2016. 
153 Barkat et. al., supra note 116. 
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which they acquired through deception.154 In Bangladeshi land law, a Santal’s or any Adibasi’s 
land cannot be transferred or sold to a Bangalee. Adibasi authority and government administrative 
body must endorse the document, and then only it can be possible to sell to a Bangalee,155 which 
was not followed in this case. Most of the Adibasis are not formally educated and do not understand 
the land-related laws, and many Bangalees, mainly those who migrated later, take this chance to 
occupy. Few of my Adibasi respondents confirmed that the relationship between Adibasi and local 
Bangalees are good except bohiragoto. They do not want to understand the traditional life of 
Adibasi and their culture. Furthermore, there are several incidents where refugees dispossessed 
Adibasi people from their lands by creating false ownership documents.156 This is how Adibasi 
lands are grabbed by powerful local Bangalees.  
Some of the Adibasi and non-Adibasi respondents of my research also confirmed that 
Bangalees are buying and alienating Adibasi lands through unlawful means. There were multiple 
incidents that happened in this area where clever Bangalees deceived and tempted Adibasis and 
offered more price than existing land prices. As they are unaware of land laws and rights, Adibasis 
agreed to sell their lands to those Bangalee land grabbers. Adibasis get the agreed prices, but the 
size of properties being sold are written wrong by Bangalees. For example, instead of writing one 
bigha, they write one-acre157 in the registered land deed. Adibasis understand the trick during the 
transfer of the ownership, but by that time, they lose vast properties. Adibasis demand that the 
government should establish a separate land commission to deal with the situation. K. Kisku, who 
works for an NGO that deals with Adibasi matters in the area, confirmed that he had seen several 
 
154 Interview with D. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 09, 2016. 
155 Section 97(7) of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 provides: “Any transfer made by an 
aboriginal raiyat in contravention of the provisions of this section shall be void.” 
156 Interview with S. Mardi, Sonajuri Hamlet, Birampur, March 06, 2016. 




instances where Adibasi lands were grabbed illegally by local Bangalees through deception. To 
remedy the situation, Adibasis need a separate land commission so that they can return their lost 
territories, which were grabbed by Bangalees.158  
S. Baske pointed out that Adibasis feel very upset and marginalized because they do not get 
proper justice from the government administration. Corruption in local administration and courts 
still exist. People who tend to grab property illegally, they are wealthy and able to bribe officers 
who deal with registration and transfer of lands. Most of the Adibasis became poor by losing their 
lands through illegal processes, and now they are bound to work as day laborers. Adibasis are so 
frustrated that they stopped going to the court because they do not get justice. Judges and 
government officials help those Bangalees who grab Adibasi lands illegally through corruption.159 
Adibasi communities feel so marginalized due to these ongoing incidents that they think that their 
all land will be lost eventually.  
A recent incident in Bangladesh supports ‘vulnerability’, ‘oppression,’ and ‘exploitation’ 
criterion of Adibasi communities. When I was conducting interviews with Adibasis in my field 
area, at least two of the respondents informed me of their concern about the situation in Gaibanda, 
another northern district of Bangladesh, where Santals are living for ages. My respondents 
contended that the government would displace Adibasis from their households and agricultural 
lands of the sugarcane farming area because they are powerless and discriminated which turned 
into reality in a few months. I have seen the news and a video on social media on November 6, 
2016. By that time, I had already returned to Canada. Several media reported that the incident 
happened after an eviction drive conducted by a sugar mill management in Gaibandha. The clash 
erupted when the Santal people prevented them, police opened fire and killed three Santal men 
 
158 Interview with K. Kisku., Phulbari, March 07, 2016. 
159 Interview with S. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 06, 2016. 
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and injured many others. A video became viral on social media that shows a platoon of armed 
police march towards an abandoned Santal village and set fire on the houses of the Santal people. 
Consequently, the Santals were evicted from their ancestral lands and became refugees.  
The issue arose when the residents were notified by the government administration (sugar mill 
management) to leave their houses saying that they are living in government land and have to leave 
the place. The government had acquired the area from the Santals in 1962 for sugarcane cultivation 
for the Rangpur Sugar Mill. There was a provision in the deed that the land would be returned to 
its original owners if the mill did not in operation. However, it is evident that the eviction notice 
was served to Santals for the interest of influential people as the mill authority started leasing the 
area to influential local leaders and rich people for the past years.160 Local rich people are 
cultivating paddy, potato, mustard, and other agro-products in leased lands. After hearing the 
persecution of Santal people, an honorable judge of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh concluded 
that the sugar mill management had no right to lease out the acquired land.161 Since the mill was 
not in operation, Santals living in the area was legal. Santals in the area feared getting arrested. 
Consequently, they cannot go to their house, cannot go to the temple which has been destroyed. 
Children cannot go to school as the school was destroyed too. Though the government offered to 
rehabilitate them, their demand is to make sure that their lands and households are returned to 
them. Adibasi communities are not satisfied with the government and the highest court’s statement 
because of the long-standing injustice they have been experiencing.162 
4.4.1.6. Establishing Non-dominance in the Society 
 
 
160 An interview based report titled “Attacks on the Santal Community: Violence Spurred by Greed for Land” 
published on November 24, 2016 in The Daily Star. See online:  <https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/the-big-
picture/violence-spurred-greed-land-1319371>  
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid.  
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Many Indigenous groups around the world are persecuted and discriminated against due to their 
unbending mindset of not being assimilated with dominant groups, and consequently, they are 
often keeping themselves isolated. One of the essential features of Indigeneity, as stated in the 
definition under international law, is establishing non-dominance in society. Virginius Xaxa argues 
that the aspects of marginalization are built into the definition of Indigenous peoples. The use of 
the term Adibasi to mean different ethnic or tribal groups other than dominant people in Indian 
society have some validity in the sense of marginalization.163 It is argued that only those people 
who have been subjected to domination, subjugation and assimilation with dominant groups have 
come to constitute the characteristics of the Indigenous peoples. Nonetheless, the use of the term 
Adibasi or Indigenous people to designate certain category of people and not the other category 
clearly reveals that the aspect of margination works to identify Indigenous peoples.164 
Adibasi communities in the Phulbari mining area have formed a non-dominant section of 
people which I observed during my field activities. I had visited at least fourteen Adibasi hamlets 
during my field activities and observed that local Adibasis are dominated by Bangalees. Though 
Adibasis are the majority in the possible affected mining area, they segregate in the whole area 
and do not have a mechanism to establish their dominance. I  observed a local government election 
(Union Council election), which was held during my stay in field area. My landlady165 was running 
for reserved Woman Member seat in the election. While campaigning for her, I got a chance to 
visit some surrounding Adibasi hamlets. In most cases, my landlady was telling people that 
Adibasis are dominated by Bangalees in Adibasi areas everywhere, which should be changed. In 
Khanpur Union, most of the members including the Chairman of the Council are Bangalee, 
 
163 Xaxa, supra note 120 at 3591.  
164 Ibid. at 3590 
165 She is also my key informant’s wife and my research assistant’s mother.  
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although Adibasi population constitutes around fifty percent of the total population of the Union.166 
There was only one Adibasi competitor for the Chairman position, and he achieved a few votes. 
So, Adibasis did not vote for him, they voted and elected a Bangalee as their local government 
chairman, who was also elected in the previous tenure.  
A Santal leader claimed that the quota system for the ‘backward section of people’ in public 
jobs167 is not maintained accurately. Even if it is maintained, the opportunity is not distributed 
equally among all Adibasi groups. Some Adibasi groups are getting more privileges than other 
groups.168 He also said: “We are marginalized among marginalized. I saw many graduates in our 
community. Getting no suitable job, they are working in the garments industry with low wages. 
Since they have nobody in the job fields, they would not get a job. Therefore, our people are 
discouraged from going for higher study.”169 A Santal elderly woman was also explaining her 
experience: “There was a government financial aid sanctioned in my name, but that financial help 
had never reached to me”.170 She contended that the aid had gone to a Bangalee Union Council 
member, but nobody came forward to talk about this injustice. She thinks that she had been 
discriminated against because of her poverty, gender, race, and ethnicity as a Santal. She also 
claimed that if she was a Bangalee, it might not happen to her.171  
Cherobin Hembrom expressed his frustration by stating that majority and dominant Bangalees 
want to dispossess and displace powerless Adibasis by alienating their lands. Adibasis, in plain 
lands and hill areas, everywhere are being oppressed by Bangalees and as a whole by the 
 
166 Interview with Y. A, Birampur, April 04, 2016. 
167 There is a quota system in government services that 5% of the appointment would be made from ‘ethnic 
minority’. 
168 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016. 
169 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016. 
170 Interview with D. Mardi, Ratanpur village, Birampur, March 04, 2016. 
171 Interview with D. Mardi, Ratanpur village, Birampur, March 04, 2016. 
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government.172 Cherobin pointed out that some people from the dominant Bangalee community 
have already started to insist that ‘Adibasis are refugees’. Through social media, they are 
campaigning that Adibasis came from another country and they should be swept away from 
Bangladesh which I observed in several occasions. Many people campaign that ‘there must not be 
other religions than Islam in Bangladesh. People from other religions must leave the country.’173 
Cherobin also mentioned, “if Adibasis are not being educated, they would be more backward and 
would not be able to economically, socially, politically and culturally develop themselves”. He 
claimed that if this continues, Adibasis and other marginalized groups will have to leave their 
ancestral and motherland.174  
In some places, especially in Bangalee populated areas, Adibasis are not allowed in restaurants. 
Some local Bangalees, especially refugees, hate Adibasis due to their traditional lifestyle. They 
think that Adibasis are dirty because they eat some wild animals which are forbidden to 
Muslims.175 He shared his experience of a similar incident that he went through at his young age. 
He protested and had a heated verbal fight with the owner of a restaurant, but the propensity still 
exists. Jovan Baske was sharing a similar experience he had faced in a restaurant in the nearby 
bazaar when he and his teammates went to play football. S. Baske said, “there are some Bangalees 
who still hate Adibasis. For example, if I am invited to a Bangalee family, they make separate food 
and serve them with separate plates, which we find very offensive.”176 From the above 
circumstances, it is clear that Adibasis occupy a position of non-dominance in their societies and 
the country.    
 
172 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
173 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
174 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
175 Interview with W. Mardi, Sonajuri, Birampur, March 16, 2016. 
176 Interview with S. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 06, 2016. 
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4.4.1.7. Socio-economic and Cultural Differences 
 
Socio-economic and cultural differences are one of the essential criteria for being Indigenous.177 I 
find Indigenous peoples are distinct in a geographical territory regarding socio-economic and 
socio-cultural contexts. They need to maintain their traditional cultural practice and socio-
economic activities in their traditional way. Indigenous peoples can be singled out through their 
economic events, festivals, rituals, expressions, folklore, and other cultural events. Adibasi 
communities in the Phulbari mining area are distinct from other ethnic groups considering their 
socio-cultural differences. S. Baske contends that their cultures such as traditional dances, songs, 
histories, arts, crafts, musical instruments, and customary governance, are entirely different from 
the Bangladeshi majority Bangalee community.178 He also added that Adibasis observe festivals 
and rituals following their ancestors’ traditions. Adibasi culture and historical presence are 
portrayed in their artworks on walls in their homes. Most of the Adibasi families I observed during 
my fieldwork have mud houses, and they display their artwork on the walls. Moreover, most 
Adibasi communities play musical instruments that they make themselves.179 When I met H. Pahan 
for an interview, he was crafting a traditional hunting arrow using bamboo and wood in his yard. 
Clinton Hembrom, my research assistant and guide, went towards him and started talking to him 
in Sadri180 language. Although Clinton is a Santal boy, he can speak in other local languages. He 
introduced me to H. Pahan. I was overwhelmed by his hospitality. He went inside and got a couple 
of chairs for us and offered food. I observed his small house which is built of mud. Before starting 
the interview, I requested him to let me go inside the house. I saw some musical instruments such 
as traditional drums and drifts, flutes, traditional dresses such as dhoti (loincloth), and some 
 
177 Sanders, supra note 36 at 10. 
178 Interview with S. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 06, 2016. 
179 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
180 Munda, Mahili, Oraon and some other ethnic minorities speak in Sadri language.  
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traditionally made hunting tools inside the house. The Santal people use two types of drums while 
playing music in their festivals and rituals, such as Tamak and Tumdah.181  Tiriao (the flute) is 
considered the most important Santal traditional instrument. The Santal dance and music 
traditionally revolved around Santal religious celebrations.182 Their music and dance both retain 
connections to conventional ceremonies. The names of many Santal tunes and lyrics are derived 
from the traditional rituals and sacred histories. For example, Sohrai tunes were those sung at the 
Sohrai festival.183  
Most of the Adibasi Parban (festivals) are associated with the traditional agricultural activities 
which fall within their agricultural cycle, i.e., from sowing to harvesting. N. Pahan, another Munda 
farmer, described Munda rituals and festivals. The Munda community celebrates Ashari Puja 
(worship of planting crops), Nobanno Utsab (celebration of harvesting new paddies), Karam Puja 
(worship of karam/karma Lord/God), Poush Parban (festival of making cake with new paddies 
that includes hunting and gathering), Fagua Puja (celebrate with flowers), Chaitali or Shahrol 
Puja (observed with new shaal trees). The Santal have some festivals such as Sohrai Parban (also 
known as Bandana), Baha Parban, Dalpuja Parban, etc. that are entirely different from the 
celebrations of Bangalees and other ethnic communities in surrounding areas.184 Cherobin 
Hembram stated that Santals also have Nobanno Utsab what they call irgondli (celebrate with new 
paddies, traditional alcohol, and worship). In celebrating Sohrai, Yog Manjhi (communication 
member of a Manjhi Parishad) takes the responsibility to organize. Baha is observed during the 
blooming of Sal tree flowers. Santal women celebrate the Baha with traditional dances and water 
 
181 Steven L. Danver, Native peoples of the world: an Encylopedia of groups, cultures and contemporary issues. 
(Routledge, 2015) at 560. 
182 Ibid.  
183 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
184 Barkat et. al., supra note 116.  
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throwing among family members. Holi (Adibasis regard it as the celebration of love) is also 
commemorated together with Baha festival, and Santals drink their traditional haria185. Santals 
also celebrate starting of cultivating and sowing seeds that they call Ero. Cherobin was discussing 
Santal’s traditional way of making haria. He said that haria is used in Sanatan Santals’ marriage 
and other festivals and rituals sacredly, but Christian Santals do not use haria as their sacred 
anymore.186  
S. Mardi, a Santal farmer who had been converted to Christianity at his young age, stated that 
they have two main religious festivals, such as Christmas and Easter Friday. People who converted 
to Christianity celebrate these two religious festivals by combining them with Adibasi customs, 
traditions and rituals. They also celebrate the English New Year’s Eve at the Church. Kali is 
followed by most of Sanatan Santals.  
 
A Santal oral story ‘Pinchu Haram and Pinchu Buri’ by Cherobin Hembrom  
                                                                                           
Pinchu Haram and Pinchu Buri187 are the first man and women in the Santals 
religious belief system. Satan entered their personal affairs and started provoking them 
to make haria (an alcohol/liquor), instructed them how to make it, and requested them 
to drink it to feel better. They were convinced and drank it. After drinking haria, they 
became drunk and could not recognize each other. They started making love with each 
other. They continued the activities after drinking haria and discovered that Pinchu Buri 
got pregnant and had a baby. However, before drinking haria, they did not know how to 
do sex and had babies. This is how haria was introduced to Santal traditions and used in 
weddings, festivals and other rituals.  
Pinchu Haram and Pinchu Buri had seven sons and seven daughters. As they grew 
up Pinchu Haram and Pinchu Buri became worried about the marriage of their children. 
One day, the sons went for hunting, and the daughters went for gathering wild vegetables 
and fruits for dinner to a forest. When the sons were returning from hunting deer, they 
saw some women were dancing under a banyan tree but could not recognize them as they 
saw them from a distance. The sons started singing ‘who are those fawn’ by indicating 
those women. They were concentrated on music and dancing and were drinking haria. 
Some of the drunken sons went to the forest for hunting again. Then the elder son started 
 
185 Haria is a homemade alcohol with rice and honey, which is the oldest tradition of Adibasis. This is also called 
rice beer.  
186 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
187 Similar story of Adam and Eve in the Bible or Adom and Hawa in the Quran.  
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making love with the elder daughter, a younger son with a younger daughter, and three 
couples got married after. Other sons and daughters were left unmarried. Pinchu Haram 
and Pinchu Buri ordered and made a rule that marriage among siblings is prohibited. The 
parents were worried about other children and found a solution to the problem. They 
formed 12 clans such as Baske, Besra, Hansda, Hembram, Kisku, Mardi, Murmu, Soren, 
Tudu, Chonde, Gondwar, Paanwariya. There are 164 sub-clans that exist among Santals. 
Since then, the same clan/ inter-clan marriage is prohibited among Santals. Someone 
from one clan has to marry from another clan. Also, a Santal cannot marry outside of 
Santals clans.              
 
 
The local Union Council chairman told me that he had chances to see Adibasi festivals and 
rituals closely due to his responsibilities. According to him, Adibasis celebrate their ceremonies 
and celebrations in their distinct style which are entirely different from dominant Bangalees. They 
make haria and drink during their festivals. This is their ancient tradition, and local Muslim 
Bangalees do not complain much and respect Adibasi traditions and customs, although alcohol is 
prohibited in Islam.188  
4.4.1.8. Distinct Characteristics such as Language, Race, Sacred Oral Story, Religious 
Functionality   
 
Kingsbury and the World Bank identify that the surrounding community should also recognize 
that the communities who are claiming to be Indigenous are maintaining distinctiveness and are 
non-dominant in relation to other groups. Most of the Bangalee respondents of my research area 
call the communities ‘Adibasi’ and recognize their distinct cultures, their different languages, 
backwardness, their long connection with the traditional knowledge of cultivation and hunting 
methods. Ethnic groups in Bangladesh who are claiming to be identified as Adibasi or Indigenous 
continue to struggle for their rights and identity bearing in mind the international law context. 
Though Adibasis in my research area have been living in miserable economic and social 
 
188 Interview with Y.A, Birampur, April 04, 2016. 
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conditions, and are subjected to multiple sources of discrimination and exploitation, they retain 
their traditions such as myths, belief system, languages, rituals, and other cultural practices which 
they inherited from their ancestors. The overall situation of Bangladeshi Adibasi communities is 
acutely disadvantaged compared to the rest of the country.189 
Religious functionality is inseparably linked to Indigenous peoples’ distinct language and dialects, 
their unique Indigenous expressions, sacred oral history, and myths, which can be traced in their 
ceremonial festivities.190  The Adibasi groups in Indian sub-continent, especially in India and 
Bangladesh, speak a variety of dialects belonging presumably to two main linguistic families, such 
as, the Dravidian and the Austric.191 According to Prathama Banerjee, Adivasis such as the Santals 
had been clearly asserting cultural, political, social and linguistic differences. When they were 
resisting about their right to land ownership or when they clashed with Bangalees in Santal 
Parganas, they were writing the language in their own script. Again, they resisted the competing 
conversion efforts by both Hindu and Christian organizations by continuing with their own 
worship and cultural practices.192 Prathama Bannerjee asserts, “Santal wall-paintings suggest the 
European contemporary abstract art movement, and Santal oral stories suggested a surrealist 
perspective. The primitiveness of Adibasis associated with every single abstract shape gleaned 
from nature, leading to an infinite reproduction of meanings through the unitary sign.”193 
One of my Santal respondents stated that they are a distinct ethnic group and have been 
maintaining different cultural, religious, linguistic features than dominant Bangalees and other 
 
189 Raja Devasish Roy, The ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations, 1957 and the Laws of 
Bangladesh: A Comparative Review, Project to Promote the ILO Policy on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and the 
ILO Office, Dhaka, Bangladesh, July, 2009. at 1. 
190 Ibid. at 92. 
191 Xaxa, supra note 120 at 3589.  
192 Prathama Banerjee, “Culture/Politics: The irresoluble double-bind of the Indian Adivasi.” (2006) 33.1 Indian 
Historical Review, at 113. 
193 Ibid.  
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ethnic communities of Bangladesh. Santals also follow their diverse societal values and ethics 
which make them distinct from others.194 G. Karmakar mentioned that the Karmakar people do 
not convert their religions and they observe their ancestor's religion to date.195 Traditional religious 
beliefs of Adibasis have been significantly altered as a result of the influence of Hinduism and 
Christian missionaries.196 Cherobin Hembrom told me that many Santals had changed their 
religion, but it did not affect their ancestor's way of observing festivals and rituals, but the 
worshiping system is run at the Church.197 Therefore, Santals are divided into mainly two religions, 
such as people who converted to Christianity and people who are following their ancient religious 
beliefs (Sanatan Dharma). Inter-religion marriage became prohibited (a Christian Santal cannot 
marry a Sanatan Santal), which is a new trend among this community. However, the prohibition 
of the same clan marriage in the Santal community is ancient. For example, Santals have twelve 
clans, a Hembram titled man or woman cannot get married to another Hembram titled man/woman. 
He/she has to marry anyone from other Santal clans. Additionally, a Santal man or woman cannot 
marry outside of the Santal community. If anyone does not follow the tradition, he/she will be 
restricted in societal functionality.198 Notwithstanding having the religious barrier, I observed that 
unlike Bangalees of Hindu religion, Adibasi communities in the mining area are devoid of any 
caste system and there is no discrimination by birth among them.  
In Santals’ wedding, the groom first chooses a bride, and then a date is set for the formal 
wedding. There is a ritual of fixing twelve Bangladeshi taka dowry, which is given to the bride. 
The twelve-taka tradition is carried through their twelve clans with separate titles (surname) in 
 
194 Interview with T. Murmu, Dhakundah, Birampur, March 02, 2016. 
195 Interview with G. Karmakar, Dhontola, Birampur, March 10, 2016. 
196 Kamal, supra note 121. 
197 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
198 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
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Santal culture. Adibasis have traditions of turmeric session before marriage.199 S. Baske, who is 
still a Sanatan, added that their marriage system is also different. Although Christian Santals have 
no divorce system, there is an unusual custom of divorce among Sanatan Santals than other 
communities, which is observed under mango trees, they call it Marwa (a hut is created with mango 
leaves). There are some rituals that are observed following ancient traditions.200 In this traditional 
ritual, Santal women dance, men, hold bows and arrows with their hands, and a sword is kept in a 
hole.201  
Adibasis had kept their ancestors’ customs 
and traditions. Though Bangalee Hindus and 
Sanatan religious Adibasis have similar kind of 
worships, Adibasis have distinct systems of 
observing.202 Adibasis also have different 
customs of observing rituals of a deceased person, 
which is entirely different from Hindus and other 
Bangalees. When an Adibasi dies, the Mandal of 
a hamlet must take the responsibilities and 
arrange the funeral rites. The Sanatan Santals 
arrange Shraddha (obsequies) after a lapse of 
 
199 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
200 Interview with S. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 06, 2016. 
201 There is an oral history which is believed by all Santals that a bride was saved by her brother from a tiger when 
she was in the jungle drinking fountain water. The story is told through dance, holding the sword in brother’s hand, 
pouring water from an ewer by pushing with leg. 
202 Adibasis (especially Santal and Munda people) are primarily animistic nature worshipers. Most of their deities 
are similar to Hindus, but they do not worship any idols like Hindus. The chief of the Gods of Adibasis is Sing 
Bonga (the God of the sun), next is Marang Budu (the God of mountain), and Abe Bonga (house-deity). Their belief 
is that soul is immortal, and supernatural soul determines the goods and bads on earth.  
Aslo see: Barkat, supra note 116 at 244.      




eight days following the death. In Shraddha, traditional food with haria is served. The Christian 
Santals arrange prayer sessions within one to two years following the death.203  
Adibasi communities in the mining region speak in their languages, although many of them 
can also speak and understand Bangla language. Cherobin claimed that Santal people have a 
distinct language with unique alphabets named Ol Chiki,204 which they speak among the 
community members.205 When I have been taking interviews with Adibasis, my RA used to talk 
to them first in Adibasi languages and made them comfortable to participate in my research. 
Moreover, there were few instances, the respondent I chose to talk, could not speak in Bangla 
language. The Santal people speak Santali language among their community members, but most 
of the Santal people cannot read and write correctly in their distinct language. The Munda people 
speak in Nagri language. They also speak in Sadri language which is a mixed language spoken by 
some Adibasis such as Munda, Oraon, Mal Pahari people.206 J. Baske was remembering his 
childhood and told me that he learned the Santali language in his school. He recalled a book named 
Horhopon through which he learned the Santali alphabets and ancient Santal history. In Santali 
language, horhopon means ‘sons of mankind’ and they call themselves horhopon.207 Through this 
book, Santals can learn and know about their roots, their customs, and oral histories.208 J. Baske 
cannot write his language but can understand what is written in a book or a document. Like J. 
Baske, most of the Santals and other Adibasi communities can speak in their languages, but they 
 
203 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
204 The Ol Chiki script, is an Indic script which was introduced by Raghunath Murmu in 1925 for the Santali 
language. Before that Santali language had been written in latin script. According to Manmatha Kundu, since Santali 
language is not an Indo-Aryan language and there were shortage of Indic scripts for all of Santali’s phonemes, it 
made the pronunciation difficult. See more: Manmatha Kundu, Tribal Education, New Perspectives (Gyan 
Publishing House, 1994).  
205 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
206 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016 
207 George E. Somers, The Dynamics of Santals Traditions in a Peasant Society (Abhinav Publications, 1985).   
208 Interview with J. Baske, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, March 05, 2016. 
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cannot read and write. Jovan told me that the mission schools in the Adibasi area do not introduce 
anything in the Santali language.  
All courses in the elementary schools to a higher level in the Adibasi area are taught only in 
Bangla and English languages, although the government is trying to introduce six more Adibasi 
languages such as Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Garo, Santali and Sadri languages. If the plan is 
implemented, children from six Adibasi communities can have chances to practice their words in 
school. Jovan was contending that their distinct culture, heritage, and identity would be lost if their 
words are lost. Adibasi NGO worker K. Kisku was telling me that his NGO is trying to introduce 
Adibasi languages at the community-level so that Adibasi people can learn. He added that his NGO 
had established few schools in different Santal hamlets where Santali language in Roman scripts 
is taught. He also added that the NGO and local Adibasi leaders are negotiating with the 
government policymakers to improve the situation.209  
Tattoos on body parts are Santal’s one of the oldest traditions in which people continue, though 
the predisposition of making tattoos among converted Christian Santals is decreasing day by day. 
There is a sacred oral history behind the art of making tattoos. Santals believe that if they do not 
draw tattoos in body parts, snakes will attack them after death, and they cannot go to heaven.210 
Santals have different tattoos for different parts of the body for different life stages. Santal men 
scratch tattoos on their forearms and wrists, and women scratch on their necks and wrists as their 
jewelry. Again, the number of these tattoos is always odd numbers because, in Santal cosmology, 
odd signifies ‘life’ and even signifies ‘death’.211 Munda people continue inscribing three vertical 
lines on their foreheads to mean their victory over Mughals.212   
 
209 Interview with K. Kisku., Phulbari, March 07, 2016. 
210 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
211 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
212 Barkat, supra note 116. 
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There is a story of the Jado (deceiver) among Adibasi communities, which still exists in 
society. Whenever a person dies in a hamlet, the Jado goes to that family and make them believe 
that he knows some secret story about that deceased person. In most cases, he tells with curiosity 
that he (deceased) was crying to him in his dream. He offers people to see his paintings with a 
story that he painted before in papers or cloths. Then he shows a series of paintings where the 
deceased person has been suffering in hell. He then asks for various sacred belongings to collect 
so that he can heal his suffering. As the holy belongings are not found quickly, the family members 
of the deceased must buy them from the Jado.213  
There is another sacred story that continued through generations in Santal communities. Daini 
and Dakin214 are seen as evil and wicked souls that transfer to people. The kabiraj215 usually goes 
to a family, reads mantras216 and uses bustle, and later says that a Daini exists in a family staying 
with someone he identifies who can harm all family members. The news is spread to all the family 
members and hamlets. Later, people start blaming that person for any accident that happens in the 
hamlet. Cherobin Hembrom is a specialized doctor on leprosy who has an experience of observing 
Daini and Dakin. He went to a shalish (hamlet court) at a local Union council. The chairman of 
the council requested Cherobin to look after the matter as he is a Bangalee and did not want to 
interfere with Adibasi affairs. As he is a modern doctor, he does not believe in Daini and Dakin. 
He interfered with the issue and asked people not to follow which ultimately affected his family 
matters.217 I observe that Adibasis are much inclined to believe their sacred story and kinship 
networks, which affect their traditional way of life.   
 
213 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
214 Daini means witch and Dakin means wizard.  
215 Kabiraj is an occupational title found in persons of India or Indian origin. In old days the people practicing 
Ayurveda in India were also called Kabi (Vaidhya). 
216 Mantra is believed to have a special spiritual power.  
217 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
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4.4.2. Cease to be Indigenous?  
 
According to the World Bank’s Operational Policy 4.10, Indigenous peoples cease to hold 
Indigenous status or identity by leaving their communities and entering an urban area.218 In this 
regard, Jeff Corntassel argues that the realities of Indigenous refugees caused by war or state 
policies of resettlement would harm their identity as ‘Indigenous’ through the policy established 
by the World Bank.219 Considering the example of the CHT, the author asks whether Adibasi 
communities who were displaced by the state-induced Bangalee settlement in the region would be 
regarded as Indigenous or not under the World Bank definition despite their illegal removal from 
the area.220 Corntassel also argues that if a group even pursues statehood, as Adibasi communities 
in the CHT in Bangladesh, or Mohawk Nations in Canada and US have shown their intention 
various times in their history, they would cease to be Indigenous in this conceptualization.221 So, 
if any Indigenous community or all groups in a geographical location pursue statehood and form 
a state, they would lose their Indigeneity.      
In India, it can be effortlessly argued that some Scheduled tribes ceased to be Indigenous, and 
have become castes or something else, and this has happened extensively elsewhere as well.222 
Although self-identified Indigenous peoples of India are recognized in the Constitution as 
‘Scheduled Tribes’, ‘Scheduled Castes’, and ‘Other Backward Castes’, their claims have never 
been established as ‘Indigenous peoples’ or ‘Adibasis’. A similar situation can be seen in 
Bangladesh, where self-identified Indigenous peoples are called and named ‘small ethnic groups’ 
or ‘tribes’. In Russia, under new law ‘Indigenous peoples’ are treated as only those ethnic groups 
 
218 The World Bank, Operational Policy 4.10. Online: 
https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/090224b0822f89d5.pdf  
219 Corntassel, supra note 53 at 87. 
220 Ibid. at 87-88. 
221 Ibid. at 80.   
222 Beteille, supra note 10.  
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living in the territories of their ancestors, enjoying a traditional lifestyle, and whose populations 
remain under 50,000, are known as ‘small’, ‘numerically small peoples’, or ‘small-numbered 
peoples’.223  
Most of the Adibasi communities, especially the Santal people, in my research area, are leaving 
their ancestral religions and converting to Christianity.224 Not all but most of them left their 
ancestral Sanatan Dharma and began practicing new religion by assimilating with their old 
religious deities and rituals.225 Christian Adibasis in the area do not stop practicing their traditional 
festivals, but they practice them under the supervision of the ‘Father’ (priest) of the Church during 
Easter, Christmas, and the English New Year.226 Due to the conversion of religion, the Church is 
involved in Adibasi festivals. K. Kisku was telling me that the government is helping poor Adibasis 
for celebrating Christmas, although Sanatan Adibasis are not receiving any financial help from the 
government227.    
Moreover, they follow their distinct customary laws and traditions regarding ‘panchayet 
shalish’ (hamlet court) system, inheritance, marriages, born and naming, oral history. Though most 
Adibasis still make and drink traditional haria in every occasion and trying to be distinct from 
Bangalee communities228, I observe that many Adibasis are leading towards accommodating the 
Bangalee way of life and their new religious cultures into Adibasi cultures. The former Chairman 
of the Phulbari sub-district, who was one of the central leaders of the Phulbari Khoni Andolon, 
was telling me with frustration: 
 
223 Popova-Gosart, supra note 9 at 100. 
224 Cherobin Hembrom confirmed that Santals are being converted into Christianity, some of them also converted 
into Islam too. The Dhanjuri Church was established in 1906.  
225 Interview with S. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 06, 2016. 
226 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
227 Interview with D. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 09, 2016. 
228 Cherobin told me that converted Christians are not using and drinking haria as their sacred deity any more.  
193 
 
“Adibasis themselves do not want to be ‘Adibasi’ because they are so marginalized that 
they cannot protest publicly. Moreover, they are losing their distinctiveness by the 
influence of the Church and NGOs. Their main identity was their culture, their livelihood, 
dress, languages, festivals, rituals, etc., but due to converting into Christianity, they now 
have to follow the Church’s rule and the Father’s order. Churches and NGOs are polluting 
their distinctiveness by engaging them into different religious functionalities and detaching 
them from Santal’s customs and traditions.” 229  
 
He observed that one of his friends who has a close relationship with Christian missions, he 
started introducing himself as a Christian, not an Adibasi. They must struggle to keep their identity 
safe from the polluting influence of the dominant culture in society.230 There was a case found in 
the Birampur Land Revenue Office where a man named Kanai Nunua was claiming himself as a 
Santal man and was trying to buy and register a piece of land from another Santal man. When the 
land officer informed a Mandal to confirm that if this man is a Santal or not. The Mandal reported 
the officer that ‘Nunua’ is neither a Santal clan (title) nor any of the Adibasi clans in Bangladesh. 
Therefore, Kanai Nunua cannot be an Adibasi. Later it was proved that he was a Bangalee man 
who tried to forge the land deed.231  
Furthermore, considering the current debate of the existence of Adibasi in pre-colonial settings 
in Bangladesh, I argue that the Indigeneity of people would not be suspended if any community is 
forced to leave their ancestral place and resettle involuntarily in another location of the same 
geographical area. However, the question arises whether those communities be still considered as 
Indigenous to a region or country if they are migrated from another area that was not colonized or 
occupied by colonial rulers? Giving the above instance, are they going to lose their ‘Indigenous’ 
or ‘Adibasi’ identity? What about not speaking their distinct languages or becoming economically 
 
229 Interview with A.I.B., Phulbari Bazaar, March 14, 2016. 
230 Interview with A.I.B., Phulbari Bazaar, March 14, 2016. 
231 Interview with P. Murmu, Boro Bukshi, Birampur, Dinajpur, March 3, 2016. 
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stable and educated? Alternatively, can we say, once an Indigenous is always an Indigenous, no 
matter what happens after? What about the self-expressed identity of people who are native 
speakers of an Indigenous language, do live in a community with rituals and social institutions 
different from that of the cosmopolitan culture, and continue to adopt markers of ethnicity such as 
hairstyles and clothing and who nevertheless do not identify as Indigenous? 232 
4.4.3. Recognition Politics in Bangladesh 
 
At the international level, Bangladesh has ratified the ILO Convention No. 107 on 22 July 
1972, which is now closed for further ratification but remains valid for those countries that have 
ratified it but have not ratified the ILO Convention No. 169. Since Bangladesh has not ratified 
Convention No. 169, the government has obligations to adopt provisions for Indigenous and Tribal 
populations under the Convention no. 107. Bangladesh became a party to the International 
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination in June 1979. Bangladesh is one of the 
eleven countries that abstained from voting when the UNDRIP was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 2007, reasoning that there are no ‘Indigenous peoples’ in Bangladesh, and ‘therefore, 
Bangladesh has no responsibility to implement its international law obligation’.233 Nevertheless, 
Bangladesh has promised several times to work together with Indigenous peoples for the 
implementation of the UNDRIP.234 As Bangladesh is a member state of the UN, the country is an 
automatic party of the UDHR and the UN charter. In this regard, Bangladesh is obliged by the 
UN’s mandates. The Bangladesh government has ratified the ICESCR on 5 October 1998 and the 
 
232 Andrew Canessa, “Who is indigenous? Self-identification, indigeneity, and claims to justice in contemporary 
Bolivia.” (2007) Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development , at 209. 
233 Binota Moy Dhamai and Pallab Chakma, “Bangladesh” in The Indigenous World-2015, (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 
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ICCPR in 2000 but did not sign optional protocols of both covenants. The covenants have provided 
declarations and reservations upon ratification, accession, or succession for each of the 
countries.235 The ICESCR has delivered the obligation for the Bangladesh government to 
implement at the country level. Article 1 under the ‘Declarations’ states: “It is the understanding 
of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh that the words “the right of self-
determination of Peoples” appearing in this article apply in the historical context of colonial rule, 
administration, foreign domination, occupation, and similar situations.” The Declarations also 
state that the government has to “implement the said provisions in a progressive manner, in keeping 
with the existing economic conditions and the development plans of the country”, and the 
government has to adopt the Covenant’s provision in the Constitution and the relevant legislation 
of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh government has made reservations on specific provisions236 which 
Germany and the Netherlands strongly opposed.237 The ICCPR also provides some directions 
towards Bangladesh to implement its guiding principles. 
As part of international law obligation and to end the debate on Indigenous or Adibasi identity 
and recognition of Indigenous peoples in Bangladesh, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs formed a 
committee in 2009 to identify the ethnic groups in Bangladesh.238 Executive heads of all districts, 
who were asked to make a list of Indigenous groups, sent a list of 228 community names collected 
from the whole country to the Ministry. After carefully examining the list (excluding 27 
Indigenous communities that are listed in the 2010 SEGCI Act) and visiting some places to identify 
the ethnic groups, the committee by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs finally decided to include a 
 
235 UN Treaties. Online: <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec>  
236 Article, 1,2, 3, 7, 8, 10 and 13 of the said Covenant.  
237 See here in number 18. <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&clang=_en#18>  
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total of 50 Indigenous groups on the list.239 However, Indigenous organizations and activists are 
not satisfied with the initiatives taken by the Ministry, which they believe are ill-motivated and 
attempt to deny Indigenous people real recognition.240 In 2013, the Bangladesh government pre-
empted a legislative proposal entitled “Bangladesh Adibasi Rights Bill” that had been submitted 
by the Caucus, aimed at ensuring the recognition of Adibasis as ‘Indigenous peoples’ or ‘Adibasi’ 
and protecting their rights.241 However, the bill was never tabled by the government in the 
Parliament, arguing that if the bill was presented as a private bill, “the recognition of the ethnic 
minorities as Adibasi” would be a political issue, which the government wants to avoid.242  
N. Mardi, a Santal woman from an Adibasi hamlet of the mining area, claimed that the 
government is trying to disregard the existence of Adibasi in Bangladesh. Moreover, the 
government is assimilating Adibasi communities into Bangalee cultures so that Adibasis forget 
their traditional practices.243  Again, their culture, language, spiritual belief, customs, festivals, 
everything is different from dominant Bangalees. Adibasi communities of the mining area are 
diverse; for example, their physical appearance is different, they speak in distinct languages, they 
wear their traditional dresses, celebrate traditional rituals, make and drink haria, their men and 
women work in the field, they hunt animals and gather foods from the forest. I observe that all 
characteristics of Indigenous peoples in internationally accepted definitions are also found in 
Adibasi communities in my research area. 
N. Mardi protested the government’s position and demanded the government to recognize all 
self-identified Adibasi communities as the universally accepted term ‘Indigenous peoples’ or the 
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locally accepted term ‘Adibasi’ so that the rights of marginalized communities of the country are 
protected.244 Another Santal elderly woman strongly opposed the government’s forced term ‘small 
ethnic minority’ and ‘tribes’, because it will not guarantee any rights embodied in international 
law. She contended that most of Adibasis are not aware of the rights.245 Adibasi leader Rob Soren 
rejected the term ‘small ethnic minority’ which, according to him, is an assault on all Adibasis of 
Bangladesh. Adibasis feel dissatisfaction with the imposition of this term on them. He added that 
he would be happy to be known as a ‘Santal’ and as an ‘Adibasi/Indigenous’, but not as an 
‘upojati’, a ‘tribes’ nor as a ‘small ethnic minority’. He claimed that if there is a ‘small’, there 
should be a ‘large’. Adibasis are proud of their ancient history, and they would not tolerate being 
identified as other than Adibasi or Indigenous peoples.246 B. Murmu expressed his anger in the 
following words: “A huge number of dominant Bangalees think that ‘Santal’ is the name of an 
animal. They do not consider the Santal and other Adibasi communities as human beings. They do 
not want to understand that the Santal is one of the earliest ethnic communities in the region.”247 
T. Murmu, a school teacher from the Santal community, told: 
“We want recognition as Adibasi. There are different ethnic groups living in this area. I am 
a Santal; nobody can denounce my identity. Now the question is- if Santals are Adibasi or 
not. Identity should emerge from ethnicity, not religion. I have no problem if the 
government wants to recognize me as a Santal. Besides Santals, I want all other 
communities to be recognized as such.”248  
 
Adibasis in Bangladesh are claiming that since they have clear distinctiveness regarding 
linguistic, cultural, and socio-political means and they identify themselves as ‘Indigenous’, they 
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245 Interview with D. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 09, 2016. 
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demand a separate status in the constitution as ‘Adibasi’.249 Adibasi farmer P. Murmu claimed that 
the term ‘Adibasi’ can still be found in many government official documents. He contended that 
governments are never in favor of marginalized Adibasi people; dominant Bangalees are getting 
all benefits and opportunities. Muslims and Hindus of the area get financial help during their 
religious festivals, but Adibasis are given very little importance.250 Political leaders tempted 
Adibasis with various mandates during the election times, and after getting elected, they forget 
everything they promised. K. Kisku claimed: 
“We organized seminars, assembly, workshops demanding to incorporate Adibasi 
recognition in the Constitution. When the government called Adibasis as ‘small ethnic 
minority’, they felt assaulted and marginalized. Many Adibasis fought in 1971 for the 
independence of the country. However, the government is still confused about their 
position, which is unfortunate.”251 
 
Adibasis who are aware of their rights and recognition are concerned about the role of the 
Adibasi leaders to push the government for their recognition. Cherobin Hembram blamed Adibasi 
leaders and organizations who supposed to help Adibasi; instead, they are harming the rights of 
Adibasi communities since they have no courage to go against the government's decision but agree 
with them in exchange of their personal benefits. He claimed that there are four Adibasi members 
in the Parliament, but they never protested when the bill (he meant amendment of the Constitution) 
was tabled and passed. They could have walked out or could have said to the government, “suspend 
me, but recognize Indigenous people by inserting clear provisions in the constitution”. Moreover, 
Adibasi leaders are blamed for the recent language debate.252 The government pre-empted to 
 
249 Sanchay Chakma, “The Legal Rights Situation of the Indigenous Peoples in Bangladesh: Juridical Rights and the 
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introduce six Adibasi languages in the schools of Adibasi regions. Yet, the project is suspended 
for the Santali language; other languages would be implemented soon. Santal leaders are divided 
into two groups, some leaders are supporting writing in Roman alphabets, and some are supporting 
Ol Chiki. There is also another group that wants to write Santali language in the Bangla alphabets. 
They argue that it would be easier to learn.253 Rob Soren was telling me that people who converted 
Christianity want Roman alphabets because the church and priests wish to it in that way. The 
supporters of Roman alphabets argue that Santals have never written alphabets, and then it was 
scripted in Roman alphabets through which everything can be pronounced easily. When Ol Chiki 
was introduced in the 1920s, which is close to Sanskrit scripts, Santals became happy. Soon, they 
understood that there are many words that cannot be pronounced with Ol Chiki. If Santali language 
is written with the Bangla alphabets, the language would be lost forever.254 My observation is that 
the debate is helping the state to misrecognize the community.  
4.4.3.1. Only Bangalees are “People” in Bangladesh?  
 
Despite strong demands from Indigenous peoples to be recognized as ‘Adibasi’, “all ‘people’ 
shall be regarded as Bangalees as a nation”255 provision was inserted in the Constitution through 
the 16th Amendment in September 2014 which was done to revive the spirit of the First 
Constitution.256 By incorporating this clause, the government intended to include them as dominant 
Bangalees, which is a threat to further self-determination of Adibasi or Indigenous peoples in 
 
253 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
254 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016 
255 Article 6(2) of the current Constitution reads as follows: “the peoples of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangalees 
as a nation, and the citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangladeshis”. 
256 The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh was adopted on the 4th November of 1972 after the 
victory of independent country on 16th December 1971. To date the Bangladesh Constitution has been amended 
sixteen times. The phrase “citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangalees” provision was inserted in the First 
Constitution adopted in 1972. This above-mentioned phrase regarding nationality was removed and inserted a new 
phrase “citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangladeshis” by the Fifth Amendment in 1979.  
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Bangladesh. The insertion of the above clause in the Constitution ensured the political and cultural 
dominance of Bangalees within the state.257 The supremacy of ‘Bangalee’ nationality over all 
ethnic groups of Bangladesh is a disavowal of cultural distinctiveness.258 Although the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh in a recent (July 2017) judgment stated that the 16th Amendment is invalid, 
as such, the provisions it inserted in the Constitution would be invalid as well.259 Therefore, the 
assimilation process would not be stopped.   
Manabendra Narayan Larma (also known as MN Larma) was an Adibasi leader from the 
Chakma community. He was the only legislature member of Bangladesh’s inaugural parliament 
from the CHT. When ‘all people of Bangladesh shall be regarded as Bangalee’ provision was 
inserted in the draft Constitution in 1972, he protested.260 Larma stated in the parliament:  
“Under no definition or logic can a Chakma be a Bangalee or a Bangalee be a Chakma. A 
Bangalee living in Pakistan cannot become or be called a Punjabi, Pathan, or Sindhi, and 
any of them living in Bangladesh cannot be called a Bangalee. As citizens of Bangladesh, 
we are all Bangladeshis, but we also have a separate ethnic identity, which, unfortunately, 
the Awami League (the then ruling party) leaders do not want to understand.”261   
 
Most of my respondents identified and called themselves ‘Adibasis’, not ‘Bangalees’.  They 
have similar frustrating feelings about what MN Larma expressed 48 years ago regarding the non-
recognition of Adibasi peoples in Bangladesh. When I asked a Santal leader: “Will you feel 
comfortable to be known as a Bangalee?” He replied:  
 
257 Dr. Amena Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh (Dhaka: 
University Press Ltd., 1997) at 92.  
258 Saleem Samad, “State of Minorities in Bangladesh: From Secular to Islamic Hegemony.” (1998) Country Paper 
presented at ‘Regional Consultation on Minority Rights in South Asia. 
259 Dhaka Tribune, “16th Amendment scrapped, parliament loses power to impeach SC judges” (July 3rd, 2017). 
Online: <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/court/2017/07/03/sc-16th-constitutional-amendment-illegal/  
260 Bushra Hasina Chowdhury, “Building Lasting Peace: Issues of the Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Accord.” ACDIS Occasional Paper (2002). 
261 Stephen May, Tariq Modood, and Judith Squires, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Minority Rights. (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) at 136-137. 
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“I am not a Bangalee. We two (pointing at me) have dissimilarities in many senses. I am 
proud to be a Bangladeshi, but I am not a Bangalee. Bangla is not my mother tongue. I 
have my own language and ethnicity. Again, according to the Constitution, I am not a 
‘people’. Then who I am? I have no existence in the country. All Adibasis rejected to be 
‘Bangalees’.”262  
 
Therefore, the Constitution extends a guarantee for Bangalees only. In the name of the 
majoritarian rule, Adibasis have been marginalized politically, economically as well as 
culturally.263 Adibasis feel that they have no power to protest and convey their messages to the 
government as they are marginalized, and nobody hears their demands.264 A Santal elderly woman 
stated: 
“I heard the government is trying to tag us as Bangalee, but we call ourselves Adibasi 
Munda. This is not only us, local Bangalees and other local ethnic communities also call 
us ‘Adibasi’ in general. We are Adibasi because we are a distinct community, follow our 
diverse societal values and ethics, we have our different language, culture, and religious 
beliefs. Though we are living here time immemorial, we are marginalized in the country 
and about to be displaced.”265 
 
A Munda farmer who lives in the close vicinity of the mining area, started by introducing 
himself as “I am a Munda as ‘people’ and Pahan266 is our clan title. I am an Adibasi, I am also a 
citizen of Bangladesh, but I am no way a Bangalee.”267 Cherobin Hembrom told me with sheer 
frustration that the government and policy-makers want to remove the term ‘Adibasi’ and 
‘Indigenous’. Their intention is to make all Adibasis either ‘Bangalee’ or stateless ‘refugees’, as 
 
262 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016. 
263 Mohsin, supra note 257 at 103. 
264 Interview with D. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 09, 2016. 
265 Interview with D. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 09, 2016. 
266 Pahan is the religious head of the Munda people and acts as a representative of the villagers. However, all Munda 
people use ‘Pahan’ as their surnames. Many Bangladeshi scholars have identified Munda people as Pahan people. 
Pahan titled people I have interviewed, told me that they are Munda people, not Pahan people. Pahan is one of their 
clans.  
267 Interview with H. Pahan, Koromtoli Hamlet, Birampur, February 29, 2016. 
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like Rohingya268. According to him, this is one kind of genocide. He said that he is against 
eliminating the term ‘Adibasi’ or ‘Indigenous peoples’ from Bangladesh. I saw tears in his eyes 
when he was telling me that there will be no existence of Adibasis, not even the imposed term 
‘small ethnic minority’ or ‘tribes’ in Bangladesh. As I mentioned earlier, Adibasis may speak in 
Bangla, but it is only for their survival because if they want to survive in society, they must deal 
with Bangalee people. Nonetheless, Adibasis are not Bangalees at all. They are Bangladeshi as 
citizens, but can never be Bangalees. In Bangladesh, there are around 45 ethnic communities, 
including Bangalee. There should not be any ‘sub-nation’ or ‘upojati’ or any type of class division 
in a country. Protesting the government’s position, Cherobin stated: “if we are kkhudro nrigosthi 
(small ethnic group), then Bangalees are brihot nrigoshthi (large ethnic group).”269 He then asked 
by pointing at me, “if we call you ‘large ethnic group’, will you accept it? If you feel insulted or 
dishonored, please stop using the ‘small ethnic group/minority’ term to mean us. We feel affronted 
too if you call me by that name.”270 
Ram Soren was telling me that the non-recognition of Adibasi is unfortunate through which 
Adibasis would be more marginalized and persecuted. As citizens of the country, Adibasis have 
similar rights as Bangalees have, which has been guaranteed by the Constitution under Article 
27.271 The cultures Adibasis abide by, the customs they follow, the festivals they celebrate, the 
language they speak, all are distinct and unique. When an Adibasi newborn comes to the Mother 
Earth, he/she starts accommodating himself/herself into an Adibasi traditional belief system. 
 
268 According to Human rights watch, “The Rohingya have faced decades of discrimination and repression under 
successive Burmese governments. Effectively denied citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Law, they are one of 
the largest stateless populations in the world. Restrictions on movement and lack of access to basic health care have 
led to dire humanitarian conditions for those displaced by earlier waves of violence in 2012 and 2016.” 
269 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
270 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
271 Interview with Ram Soren, Phulbari Bazaar, March 11, 2016. 
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Then how should they be regarded as Bangalees? Ram claimed, “I am a Santal, an Adibasi, not a 
Bangalee, but a Bangladeshi citizen.”272 
4.4.3.2. Implied Recognition? 
 
 
As part of the government’s plan to remove the term ‘Indigenous’ or ‘Adibasi’ from all the 
laws, policies, documents and publications of the Bangladesh government, and to establish the 
government’s claim of not having Adibasis in the country, several legislative amendments have 
been passed by the government without consulting Indigenous peoples whose interests will be 
directly affected.273 However, in Bangladeshi law, various provisions specifically use ‘Adibasi’ to 
mean Indigenous peoples. The SEGCI Act 2010 uses the term ‘Khudro Nrigoshthi’ (small ethnic 
minority) referring to Adibasi or Indigenous peoples. However, when explaining the meaning of 
the term ‘Khudro Nrigoshthi’ in the definition section, the legislation uses the term ‘Adibasi’.274 
Although the Bangladesh government is not directly using ‘Indigenous’ in their official 
documents, they use ‘tribes’, ‘minor races, ‘ethnic sects and communities’ in the Constitution, and 
other legal instruments are using ‘small ethnic minority’, ‘tribal peoples’, ‘aboriginal’, ‘hillman’, 
‘Adibasi’, etc. Adibasis have argued that the state has impliedly recognized Adibasi or Indigenous 
peoples in the country since the provisions of various legislations support their existence and their 
distinctiveness. For example, the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act 1950 uses the term 
‘Aboriginal Castes’ and ‘Tribes’; and states that “an Aboriginal cannot sell or transfer his/her land 
 
272 Interview with Ram Soren, Phulbari Bazaar, March 11, 2016. 
273 Binota Moy Dhamai and Sanjib Drong, “Bangladesh” in The Indigenous World-2012, (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 
2012) at 337.  
274 Article 2 of the SEGCI Act.   
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to a dominant Bangalee without the prior permission of state-endorsed authority”.275  The CHT 
Regulation-1900 uses the term ‘Hillman’ to mean distinct ethnic people live in the CHT.  
4.4.3.3. Why does the Bangladesh Government not Recognize Indigenous Peoples?  
 
 
The rights of Indigenous peoples embedded in international law would enable the communities 
to fight for self-determination and some other rights, such as participate in the decision-making 
process and access to natural resources. A local Bangalee leftist activist and a Santal young boy 
both have similar tones regarding ‘reasons for not recognizing Indigenous peoples by the 
Bangladesh government’. They think that if Adibasis get recognition, they will get similar 
opportunities (in some cases, they will get more benefits) under international law obligations. In a 
discussion earlier of this chapter, I have argued that although the country did not ratify the ILO 
Convention No. 169, Bangladesh would be bound by the ILO Convention No. 107. Furthermore, 
Bangladesh is concerned about implementing the UNDRIP at the country level, though the country 
did not ratify the Declaration yet. However, the government’s eternal promise to the UN system 
for the implementation of Indigenous peoples’ rights made a catastrophic situation for itself. If the 
government accepts the UNDRIP any time, Adibasis of Bangladesh would be entitled to the right 
to self-determination and access to political, legal, economic, and cultural rights. The government 
may have concerns about several provisions, especially on Article 30 of the Declaration. Article 
30 states:  
“1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of Indigenous peoples 
unless justified by relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by 
the indigenous peoples concerned. 
 
275  Sections 96 and 97 of The State Acquisition And Tenancy Act, 1950 (East Bengal Act No. Xxviii Of 1951), 
[16th May, 1951] Online: < http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=241>  
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2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the Indigenous peoples concerned, 
through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, 
prior to using their lands or territories for military activities.” 
 
Adibasi communities in the CHT are being suppressed through militarization and violence 
created and instigated by settlers. The Bangalee settlers are brought from various parts of 
Bangladesh to the CHT to stop Adibasis’s fight for self-determination. Since the government has 
permanent military camps in the CHT region, which is the home of eleven Adibasi communities, 
to suppress their self-determination struggle, it would not accept the UNDTRIP provision laid out 
in the Article 30. However, there is a way to make the Bangladesh government accountable for 
adopting the UNDRIP provisions in national legislation by implementing the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) commitments by the UN General Assembly in 2015. Bangladesh has 
taken the National Action Plan to fulfill its commitment.276 Moreover, there are several goals, 
targets, follow-up and reviews regarding Indigenous peoples277 the countries have to consider. 
Until now, Indigenous peoples have not been consulted and engaged in this process, although a 
meaningful engagement in national development is one of the significant components of 
UNDRIP.278 So it is imperative that Adibasis of the country be engaged in SDGs, their voices are 
heard, and their rights respected, protected and fulfilled in a spirit of UNDRIP.    
According to an Adibasi leader, “If Adibasis get recognition, there will be no ethnic 
discrimination. If they get constitutional recognition, the future generation will benefit.”279 
 
276 Chakma, supra note 249.  
277 In 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, Indigenous peoples are referred 6 times in various SDGs. Out of 
six, three times in the political declaration; two times in the targets under SDG 2 on Zero Hunger (target 2.3) and 
SDG 4 on education (target 4.5); and one time in the section to follow up and review that calls for engagement and 
empowerment of Indigenous peoples in implementing the agenda in country level. There are also two indicators that 
directly refer Indigenous peoples such as 2.3.2 and 4.5.1, and few other indicators that are relevant for Indigenous 
peoples such as 1.4.2 and 5.a.1. on land rights.   
278 Chakma, supra note 249.  
279 Interview with Ram Soren, Phulbari Bazaar, March 11, 2016. 
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Another Adibasi teacher insisted that many communities throughout the world who are 
marginalized and threatened to be abolished by losing their cultural, language, spiritual, and social 
distinctiveness be recognized and identified as Indigenous peoples. Bangladeshi ethnic 
communities are needed to be recognized by the government as Adibasi or Indigenous peoples 
because they are largely marginalized. Another Adibasi leader was telling me during the interview 
that how he and other Adibasi leaders negotiated in different occasions with government bodies 
and protested the decision of recognition of Adibasi or Indigenous peoples. He argued that if the 
trend of non-recognition continues and if Adibasis do not oppose, then there would be no Adibasi 
or Indigenous peoples in Bangladesh. Adibasis would be endangered, as Adibasi lands are being 
alienated by the majority and influential Bangalee people.280  
The government officials of Bangladesh acknowledge ‘Adibasi’ as ‘Indigenous peoples’, and 
for that reason, they are abstaining from using both ‘Indigenous’ and ‘Adibasi’ in their official 
documents. Nevertheless, the Bangladesh government is not directly using ‘Indigenous’ in their 
official documents, they use the near term ‘tribes’ in the Constitution, and other legal instruments 
are using ‘tribal peoples’, ‘aboriginals’, ‘hillman’, ‘small ethnic minority’ and ‘Adibasi’.  
 
4.5. Construction of Indigenous Identity or Indigeneity 
 
 
Indigenous identity adheres to ‘groups’ whose identity as distinct peoples necessitates a certain 
lifestyle, threatened by nation-states or by corporations to Indigenous political and economic 
structures281 where each person conforms to collectivity as a member of people, community, 
ethnicity, tribe or nation.282 The evolution of using the term ‘Indigenous peoples’ has a long history 
 
280 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016. 
281 Popova-Gosart, supra note 9 at 87. 
282 Silvia Büchi et al. Indigenous Peoples, Environment and Development, (Copenhagen: International Working 
Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1997) at 16.  
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in Europe and became popular during the process of decolonization.283 Groups who are struggling 
for their identity as ‘Indigenous peoples’ find that any recognition of their rights by a state will not 
be achieved easily.284 Through their continuous struggle, Indigenous peoples are now realizing 
that they have the power to establish their identity and rights in society.285 In this way, identities 
of Indigenous peoples are often delimited within the dominating systems of their states, although 
sometimes they constitute a majority of the population.286  
The increasing importance of the term ‘Indigenous peoples’ is connected to the role of 
transnational networks, which helps to construct, organize, and transmit resources that legitimize 
and produce Indigeneity.287 The notion of Indigeneity is used to describe Indigenous peoples as 
‘nations/peoples’ who struggle for their political autonomy. Altamirano-Jiménez’s ‘articulation of 
Indigeneity’ theory explains how meanings are produced through the historical situation and social 
practices.288 The root of the theory can be traced from Stuart Hall’s ‘the theory of articulation’ that 
states, “it enables us to think how an ideology empowers people, enabling them to begin to make 
some sense or intelligibility of their historical situation, without reducing those forms of 
intelligibility to their socio-economic or class location or social position.”289 Stuart Hall insists that 
identity bridges the gap between the personal and the public worlds; what he understands as the 
relation between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’.290 
 
283 Dean and Levi, supra note 30 at 5.  
284 Büchi et al. supra note 282 at 18.  
285 Brian Goehring, Indigenous Peoples of the World: An Introduction to Their Past, Present, and Future. Purich's 
Aboriginal Issues Series. (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 1993) at 51.  
286 Popova-Gosart, supra note 9 at 89. 
287 Altamirano-Jimenez, supra note 3 at 20. 
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289 Lawrence Grossberg, “On Postmodernism and Articulation: An Interview with Stuart Hall.” (1986) 10.2, Journal 
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According to Altamirano-Jimenez, “the concept of articulation is useful in characterizing the 
diversity of peoples making Indigeneity claims and multi-scalar production of Indigeneity 
politics.”291 One of the most important issues in the ‘articulation of Indigeneity’ is the question of 
“who is included and who is excluded”. This process of inclusion and exclusion of Indigenous 
identity have been shaped through colonial and post-colonial encounters with Indigenous 
peoples.292 Altamirano-Jiménez shows how colonial powers, networks, host-states, and 
international agencies have developed and imposed their narrow and exclusionary definitions of 
Indigenous peoples. Contemporary nation-states use this strategy of forming exclusionary 
definitions to deny the existence of Indigenous peoples in their territory.293 Consequently, the 
continuous colonial process pulls Indigenous peoples away from their self-constructed identity 
towards ‘Aboriginal’, ‘Indian’, ‘Scheduled Tribe’, ‘Scheduled Caste’, ‘Tribal’, ‘Native American’ 
or ‘Ethnic Minority’, which is an authoritative assault on Indigenous identity.294 Bob Joseph, the 
founder of Indigenous Corporate Training Inc., and member of the Gwawaenuk Nation states that 
the term ‘Native’ is considered uncivil and rarely used in respectful conversations. He added, 
“Usage of the word ‘Indian’ in Canada is decreasing due to its incorrect origin and connections to 
colonizer policies and departments such as the Indian Act, the Indian Department (precursor to 
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada), Indian Agent, Indian residential schools, etc.”295 
Although the term Aboriginal peoples was a new step, there has been resistance from many groups 
 
291 Altamirano-Jimenez, supra note 3 at 4.  
292 Ibid., at 20. 
293 Ibid. at 19. 
294 Alfred and Corntassel, supra note 15 at 599. 




as they argue that the root meaning of the word ‘ab’ is a Latin prefix that means ‘away from’ or 
‘not’. And so Aboriginal can mean ‘not original’.296  
There are places where various terms such as ‘Native Americans’ (the USA), ‘Aboriginal 
peoples’ (Australia), Maori (New Zealand), Scheduled tribes (India), Tribal (Bangladesh) are used 
officially in the country level. However, countries who accepted the UNDRIP started using the 
term ‘Indigenous peoples’. For example, the Canadian government has started using ‘Indigenous 
peoples’ term officially from 2018 in place of ‘Aboriginal peoples’ as part of their commitment 
towards implementing UNDRIP nationally.297 The UNPFII states that the term ‘Indigenous’ has 
prevailed as a generic term for many years.298 In some countries, there may be a preference for 
other terms, including Tribes, First peoples/nations, Aboriginals, Ethnic groups, Adibasi/Adivasi, 
Janajati, but they should be treated equally in international and national law.299 Occupational and 
geographical terms like hunter-gatherers, nomads, peasants, hill people, etc., also exist and for all 
practical purposes, can be used interchangeably with ‘Indigenous peoples’.300  
Furthermore, Indigenous peoples want to be recognized as ‘peoples’, not ‘people’. They find 
the ‘s’ distinction is crucial, which symbolizes the basic human rights as well as land, territorial 
and collective rights.301 Whenever we mean an Indigenous group, nation, or community, we would 
 
296 Don Marks, “What's in a name: Indian, Native, Aboriginal or Indigenous?” (Oct. 2, 2014) CBC News-Opinion. 
Online: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/what-s-in-a-name-indian-native-aboriginal-or-indigenous-
1.2784518 
297 Although Canada marks the 22nd National Indigenous Peoples Day, 21st June of 2018 is the first instance the day 
is officially called and celebrated as ‘National Indigenous Peoples Day’ as part of the commitment made in 
international forum to implement UNDRIP. Starting in 1996, it was originally called ‘National Aboriginal Day’. 
Moreover, while celebrating the ‘National Aboriginal Day’ on 21st June 2017, Prime Minister has pledged to rename 
to ‘National Indigenous Peoples Day’ starting from 2018 to be consistent with the terminology used by the 
UNDRIP. Moreover, part of NDP’s mandate to make National Indigenous Peoples Day as a statutory holiday, one 
of the party’s MPs Georgina Jolibois tabled a bill in the parliament, which was endorsed by the Ontario Public 
Service Employees Union (OPSEU). 
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use ‘people’, e.g., the Chakma people, Santal people, Inuit people, etc. However, the whole 
Indigenous community in a country should be called ‘Indigenous peoples’ of the country. Again, 
there should have only one name or term by which the world population can easily identify the 
community groups collectively. For example, the term ‘Indigenous peoples’ is being used and 
accepted in international law to understand those community groups. There should not have any 
debate about the universally accepted term. The debate between ‘Tribal’ and ‘Indigenous peoples’ 
terms should be stopped which is creating confusion to recognize and identify that marginalized 
group of people as a distinct group. As International law (both hard law and soft law) has provided 
certain rights and opportunities for fighting their vulnerabilities, they may get access to those rights 
and benefits by asserting their Indigenous identity.  
The UN has continued to use ‘Indigenous’ alone, although ILO has regularly suggested to the 
UN that it refers to both Indigenous and tribal peoples in its work, following the usage of ILO.302 
The ILO Convention No. 169 is treated as a central feature of international laws contemporary 
treatment of Indigenous peoples demands303 that include an additional criterion of ‘Tribal peoples’ 
along with an emphasis on ‘historical continuity’ in its legal definition of ‘Indigenous peoples’, 
which will be applicable in all member states.304 The ILO Convention No. 169 refers to ‘peoples’ 
and not to ‘populations’. It refers to ‘tribal peoples’ but not to ‘semi-tribal’ peoples. However, 
there are regions of the globe where the tribal population is the Indigenous population, and this 
can be established by historical evidence.305 
 
302 The ILO shows the reason of using both tribal peoples and Indigenous peoples as: The two terms ‘Indigenous 
peoples’ and ‘tribal peoples’ are used by the ILO because there are tribal peoples who are not ‘indigenous’ in the 
literal sense in the countries in which they live, but who nevertheless live in a similar situation – an example would 
be Afro-descended tribal peoples in Central America; or tribal peoples in Africa such as the San or Maasai who may 
not have lived in the region they inhabit longer than other population groups. See also: UNPFII, supra note 67.  
303 Anaya, supra note 133 at 58 
304 Kingsbury, supra note 66 at 420.  
305 Beteille, supra note 10. 
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The World Bank Operational Directive 4.20 definition used broader criteria to identify 
Indigenous peoples where both the much-debated terms ‘Tribal’ and ‘Indigenous peoples’ were 
used expressly to mean certain distinct groups.306 However, the Directive preferred to use 
‘Indigenous peoples’ to understand all groups. Paragraph 3 of a new Operational Policy 4.10 of 
the World Bank provides the identification of Indigenous peoples which states:  
“because of the varied and changing contexts in which Indigenous peoples live and because 
there is no universally accepted definition of ‘Indigenous peoples’, this policy does not 
define the term. Indigenous peoples may be referred to in different countries by such terms 
as “Indigenous ethnic minorities,” “aboriginals,” “hill tribes,” “minority nationalities,” 
“scheduled tribes,” or “tribal groups.”  
 
Therefore, OP 4.10 does not differentiate among ‘Indigenous peoples’, ‘tribal population’, and 
other terms used by states to mean distinct ethnic communities or tribal populations in various 
countries. In this regard, most of the ethnic groups who are claiming themselves as ‘Indigenous 
peoples’ but recognized by their governments as different names, can be identified as Indigenous 
peoples if we follow the World Bank’s directives and policies.  
Bob Joseph contends, “Go with what they are calling themselves”307 and as such, they can be 
called in different names in their state boundaries according to the group’s intentions: such as, 
Indigenous peoples of Bangladesh and India recognize themselves and are also known as 
‘Adibasi’, in Canada ‘First Nations’ ‘Inuit’ and ‘Metis’, in the USA ‘Native Americans’ or 
‘American Indians’, in Australia ‘Aboriginal’, in Latin America ‘Indians’ and ‘Amerindians’ etc. 
But whenever the communities are discussed in the international forum, they must be called as a 
single term Indigenous peoples. There are thousands of distinct communities that have their 
 
306 Sia Spiliopoulou Akarmarik, “The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples” in Nazila Ghanea and Alexandra 
Xanthaki (eds) Minorities, People and Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) at 95. 
307 Joseph, supra note 295. 
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community names. In Bangladesh, there are at least 45 ethnic communities who identify 
themselves as Indigenous peoples or Adibasi. In Bangladesh, the groups are using various terms 
such as Indigenous communities from plain lands use the term ‘Adibasi’ and 11 Indigenous 
communities from the CHT use both ‘Adibasi’ and ‘Jumma’, which I found confusing for their 
proper recognition. Adibasi groups have various names such as the Santal, Chakma, Marma, 
Tripura, Khasia, and Garo. They can be called by their community names, as mentioned above, 





The disregarded communities of Bangladesh have emphasized the need for official recognition 
as ‘Adibasi’ or ‘Indigenous peoples’. They have also accentuated the importance of recognition of 
their right to land and control over natural resources. The Adibasi representatives, leaders, and 
activists have expressed their concern about development issues related to using land despite the 
signing of an agreement with the government.308 However, the marginalized communities of 
Bangladesh meet the requirements of the international legal concept of ‘Indigenous peoples’. The 
claim of the distinct ethnic communities in Bangladesh to the status of Indigenous peoples cannot 
be defeated on the ground of a lacking or unclear definition or for the common excuse that the 
entire or Bangalee population of Bangladesh are Indigenous.309 Moreover, one major challenge 
persists, as Bangladeshi Adibasi or Indigenous peoples are not recognized legally, and non-
governmental development agencies are unlikely to gain government approval for their projects 
 




and development initiatives if they use the term Adibasi or Indigenous peoples in their description 
of activities.310  
In the above discussion, I have reviewed various definitions of Indigenous peoples in 
international law. According to the definitions, Indigenous peoples are those people who have 
distinct identities and form non-dominance in society with long-standing persecution and 
marginalization history. In the case of the Indigenous situation in Bangladesh, after reviewing oral 
histories, participant observation and interviews from Adibasi communities (especially Santals and 
Mundas) of the Phulbari mining area, it has been determined that Adibasi communities are the 
‘peoples’ who can be identified as Indigenous peoples under international law. In my analysis, I 
have shown that Adibasis in the mining region retains most of the characteristics which have been 
identified by scholars and international institutions that I have used for my analysis. Most of the 
respondents recognized and identified themselves as ‘Adibasi’, which they mean to understand the 
universally accepted term ‘Indigenous peoples’. Moreover, local Bangalees also identified them 
as Adibasi, and they are habituated to call them ‘Adibasi’. Many respondents claimed that their 
ancestors had settled in the area long before Bangalees had settled in the area. Moreover, the 
historical documents I have reviewed also supported that the communities existed in the area of 
time immemorial. Some even said that Adibasis migrated and settled in the mining area and other 
parts of Bangladesh from Jharkhand and Nagpur of current India (Bangladesh was also a part of 
India before 1947). However, in all instances, it is proved that Adibasi existed in the area before 
the British colonial rule.  
Adibasis are victims of colonial and post-colonial oppression and persecution. Their rights are 
violated, their territorial lands are being alienated and grabbed by dominant Bangalee people with 
 
310 Dhamai and Chakma, supra note 233.  
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the help of the government. Adibasis have tradition and customs of maintaining kinship networks, 
and they have strong ties with natural resources and their traditional knowledge. Interviewees also 
claimed that they maintain a sacred oral history of what they believe, maintain their religious and 
cultural functionality by following their tradition and customs, have distinct languages which they 
practice among their communities. Through all of this, Adibasis find themselves as completely 
distinct communities than dominant and majority Bangalees. The festivals and rituals Bangladeshi 
Adibasi communities observe are also unique in nature. Furthermore, Adibasis are struggling to 
retain their distinct identity, and sometimes they resist for self-determination. As their properties 
are being illegally grabbed, alienated and dispossessed by dominant Bangalees, their demand is to 
establish a separate land commission to deal with this matter and return their lands. They also 






PHULBARI KHONI ANDOLON: AN INDIGENOUS 




Adibasi communities in the Phulbari mining area are now carrying out a subsistence livelihood 
based on agricultural and small-scale business activities. Though they are discriminated against 
socially with unequal treatment, which I have shown in Chapter IV of this dissertation, they are 
happy with their existing economic and social settings. They feel that any changes would affect 
their livelihood negatively. They fear to become landless if any large-scale project, especially open 
cast mining, is undertaken in their area. Although most of the people of the Phulbari mining region 
are poor farmers, they have their own mechanisms to overcome the existing situation. Many 
Adibasis are working as day laborers in other peoples’ croplands. Many of them have their private 
lands where they cultivate three-crop agricultural products year around. They do not want any 
destruction or any development in their lands which, they expect through previous experiences 
elsewhere, would ultimately make them refugees. The National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, 
Mineral Resources, Power and Ports of Bangladesh (NCBD) successfully educated local people 
through their campaign, research, and analysis that any benefit to the government from exploring 
and exporting coal through the open-pit mining over 30 years would be less than the profits the 
local people would get from agricultural and small businesses activities. People understood that 
the project would not be economically worthwhile for them.  
Environmental degradation has significant implications for Indigenous peoples’ rights due to 
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their close affiliation with land and natural resources.1 James Anaya states that as part of their right 
to self-determination, Indigenous peoples have the right to decide whether they will allow a 
development project in their territory or not.2 This is also guaranteed in the UNDRIP. Hence, to 
establish their control over development projects, Indigenous peoples mobilize and resist both the 
state and transnational and multinational corporations (TNCs and MNCs).3 During the 18 months 
of educating people about the impact of the Phulbari open-pit coal project, motivating them to 
raise voices, and inspiring them to attend the protest rallies, Adibasis vowed to sacrifice their lives 
to save their livelihoods, lands, and resources of the mining region. My Adibasi respondents 
consistently shared their concerns about how the potential for mining activity threatened their 
identity as ‘Adibasi’ or ‘Indigenous peoples’ because they would lose their sacred relationship 
with the forest. Some of the mining areas include Sal forests and marshlands where Adibasis live. 
The place where they live is sacred to them, as they manage surrounding land and resources 
traditionally and customarily for generations. They knew that if the company could successfully 
develop mining in the area, they would lose their current environmental settings and ecological 
circumstances, and ultimately, they would never get back to their traditional lifestyles. The change 
triggered by the open-pit mine would be impossible to reverse.4 This consciousness inspired 
Adibasi protesters to speak in broad opposition to resource exploitation: “we do not want any 
mining in our region which would push us giving away our Indigeneity.” Some of my Adibasi and 
Bangalee respondents were also concerned about the possible destruction of the ecosystem of the 
 
1 Shawkat Alam, “Collective Indigenous Rights and the Environment” in Shawkat Alam et al. eds, Routledge 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (London: Routledge, 2012) at 588.  
2 James Anaya, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.” (2012) Human Rights 
Council (A/HRC/21/47) at 7.  
Online: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-47_en.pdf  
3 Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh, “International Recognition of Indigenous Rights, Indigenous control of Development and 
Domestic Political Mobilisation.” (2012) 47.4 Australian Journal of Political Science at 532. 
4 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016.  
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Sundarbans since the company planned to transport the extracted coal through the river of the 
forest.  
Whiteman and Mamen emphasize that the ‘cumulative social and environmental effects’ of 
mining mean that Indigenous peoples must often resist against not just one mine, but rather an 
entire mining sector because building mining infrastructure such as roads, ports, railways also 
negatively affect local livelihoods and biodiversity.5 The authors argue that conflicts throughout 
the world, especially in the global South, between Indigenous peoples and the project proponents 
have often resulted because of misrecognition of the right to land and other territorial rights, 
neglecting traditional beliefs on land and resource management, absence of access to information 
about proposed and existing mining operations, lack of involving Indigenous peoples in decision-
making process on land access and mine exploration and development plans.6 Indigenous peoples 
also resist the negative social, economic, and environmental impacts of mineral exploration, and 
seek to rectify environmental and organizational injustice through demands of greater participation 
in decisions and project development process.7 Their demands are often ignored by corporations, 
and they get involved in conflicts with state-sponsored law enforcement agents.  
Bullard and Johnson call for the environmental justice movement to identify some firm 
objectives for eliminating existing unequal enforcement of environmental regulations, policies, 
and practices. These environmental regulations and policies often prevent some individuals and 
groups from participating in decision-making.8 These problems could be eliminated if existing 
environmental, health, housing, and civil rights laws were vigorously enforced in a non-
 
5 Gail Whiteman and Katy Mamen, Meaningful Consultation and Participation in the Mining Sector?: A Review of 
the Consultation and Participation of Indigenous Peoples Within the International Mining Sector (Ottawa: North-
South Institute, 2002). 
6 Ibid. at 1. 
7 Ibid.  
8 R D Bullard & G S Johnson, “Environmentalism and public policy: Environmental justice: Grassroots activism and 
its impact on public policy decision making” (2000) 56:3 J Soc Issues, at 559.  
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discriminatory way. Urkidi and Walter study the plurality of the environmental justice movement, 
discursive framework, and the distributive dimensions of injustice where they illustrate and 
identify the emergence of three dimensions of environmental justice, namely distribution, 
recognition, and participation in the anti-mining movements.9 These three notions of justice were 
all mentioned by Schlosberg in his definition of justice, “at various times, justice is defined as 
equitable distribution, recognition, and participation.”10 Some scholars argue that the 
environmental justice movement can lead to environmental sustainability or just sustainability.   
In this chapter, my analysis of social and political processes ties together an understanding of 
equitable distribution, recognition, and participation in the decision-making process to arrive at an 
environmental justice framework.11 In other words, I examine the claims of local and Adibasi 
communities in the Phulbari Khoni Andolon against the various theoretical understandings of what 
motivates actors in the environmental justice movement. In relaying three narratives (Adibasi 
accounts, local and national activists’ accounts, and transnational advocacy groups’ accounts of 
the resistance movement) I have addressed in Chapter III, I explore the reasons why the movement 
was seen as successful. The following parts analyze if the efforts of these players fit within the 
framework of the environmental justice movement, as it manifests in the global South.  
 
5.2. Why did Adibasi Protest in Phulbari? 
I had asked my Adibasi respondents about the reason for protesting the coal extracting project, 
which is said to bring economic benefit to the country. Their answers were varied. However, most 
 
9 Leire Urkidi & Mariana Walter, “Dimensions of environmental justice in anti-gold mining movements in Latin 
America” (2011) 42:6 Geoforum at 683.  
10 David Schlosberg, “The Justice of Environmental Justice: Reconciling Equity, Recognition, and Participation in a 
Political Movement”, in Andrew Light and Avner de Shalit, (eds.), Moral and Political Reasoning in Environmental 
Practice (Cambridge, MIT Press-2003) at 78.  
11 Ibid.  
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of the respondents were concerned about losing their agricultural and household lands and fearing 
to be displaced permanently from the area. According to them, Adibasis of the Phulbari mining 
area had been facing various vulnerabilities throughout their existence. They are never recognized, 
and all decisions are imposed on them. In the case of the mining project, the government never 
asked for their contest to lease their lands to a MNC. The foreign company had not consulted 
adequately with Adibasi communities or their traditional institutions. The company had continued 
deceiving local people with various temptations by appointing Dalal. According to a local Adibasi 
leader, Adibasis of the mining area were the first communities who started raising their voices 
against the projected open-pit mining.12 Adibasis confirmed with NCBD activists during the 
campaign period in their hamlets, “we would die to stop mining.”  
Furthermore, Adibasis were so angry that they were ready to be outlawed, but the organizers 
of the movement did not let that happen.13 This part of the chapter offers an analysis based on the 
rights and interests of Indigenous peoples, or Adibasis of Phulbari reflected in EIA and what 
happened in the field. I have identified the following reasons why Adibasi communities had been 
involved in resisting the open-pit mining in their region: realizing past injustices and 
misrecognition; lack of participation (inadequate information, consents acquired by deception, and 
deficient consultation); population displacement and improper plan of resettlement; false promise 
and fear of not getting compensation and share of benefits; environmental degradation; water and 
food insecurity; foreign company; and corruption and lack of transparency. All the issues are 
analyzed in turn based on the claims of the company through the ESIA and Adibasis.     
 
5.2.1. Realizing their Experience of Vulnerability and Misrecognition  
 
 
12 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
13 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
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The conflict between economic development, environmental protection, and recognition of 
human rights exhibits in the livelihoods of Indigenous peoples.14 Moreover, the communities in 
the areas where the resources are located tend to carry a disproportionate share of the negative 
impacts of development through reduced access to resources and direct exposure to pollution and 
environmental degradation.15 The adverse effects of extractive industries on Indigenous 
communities are often enhanced by their lack of access to natural resources.  
Paragraph 1 of the IFC Performance Standard 7 and the World bank’s Operational Policy (OP) 
number 4.10(2) recognize that Indigenous peoples are among the most marginalized and 
vulnerable sections of the world population. Their economic, social, and legal status limits their 
capacity to protect their rights and interests in their surrounding environment and restricts their 
ability to receive benefits from development projects. Performance Standard 7 further expands:  
“Indigenous peoples are particularly vulnerable if their lands and resources are degraded. 
Their languages, cultures, religions, spiritual beliefs, and institutions may also come under 
threat, and consequently, Indigenous peoples may be more vulnerable to the adverse 
impacts associated with project development than non-Indigenous communities. This 
vulnerability may include loss of identity, culture, and natural resource-based livelihoods, 
as well as exposure to impoverishment and diseases.” 
 
The dignity, rights, traditional knowledge, and interests of Indigenous peoples to protect their 
cultural identities and preserve their traditional and ancestral lands and resources are receiving 
increasing recognition within the international development community. Various international 
legal instruments16 establish Indigenous peoples as international legal actors and confer rights on 
 
14 Bogumil Terminski, Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement: Social Problem and Human Rights Issue. 
Working paper. (Vancouver: Simon Fraser University, 2012). 
15 Lila Barrera-Hernandez, “Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Natural Resource Development: Chile's Mapuche 
Peoples and the Right to Water” (2005) 11 Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law at 6. 
16 Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), the ILO Convention No. 169, the World Charter for Nature, the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD), the UNDRIP, Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to 
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them. Most of the international hard laws and soft laws recognize their rights to participation, 
cultural identity, traditional lands and territories, and self-determination in natural resources 
development.17 It is also identified that the increasing recognition of social and cultural diversity 
is in the interest of society and is not an obstacle to national development or economic stability.18 
Therefore, the development process should accommodate full respect for the human rights, dignity, 
aspirations, culture, and natural resource-based livelihoods of Indigenous peoples.19  
IUCN recognizes that if all project-affected people, in most cases, Indigenous peoples, are not 
involved effectively and fully in all stages of the activity, sustainability strategies can never 
succeed. Such involvement enables them to protect their interests in any development project and 
ensure sustainable development in their territory.20  Having a long connection and environmental 
ethics, Indigenous peoples uphold their traditional cultures, values, and beliefs for managing 
natural resources. Though the trend of recognizing the role Indigenous peoples play in 
sustainability is insufficient, it is evolving. The preamble of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) (para 12) states: 
“Recognizing the close and traditional dependence of many Indigenous and local 
communities embodying traditional lifestyles on biological resources, and the desirability 
of sharing equitably benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge, innovations, 




Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, The 
1992 Convention on Biodiversity  
17 Whiteman and Mamen, supra note 7.  
18 ADB, “Bank’s Policy on Indigenous Peoples” (1998). Online: < 
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/33441/files/policy-indigenous-peoples.pdf> ADB’s 
Indigenous Peoples Policy, para 18.   
19 IFC Performance Standard 7. IFC, supra note 61.   
20 IUCN, Indigenous Peoples and Sustainability: Cases and Actions (Utrecht, The Netherlands: International Books, 
1997) at 32.  
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However, the provision identifies that environmental and economic benefits accruing from 
using Indigenous traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) should be shared with Indigenous 
peoples.21 Chapter 26(1) of Agenda 21 states that any strategy for sustainability involving 
Indigenous peoples has to respect their traditional way of managing resources such as their sacred 
oral history, traditional knowledge, and local decision-making structures.22 Ellis argues that by 
promoting the use of their traditional knowledge and its recognition in environmental or resource 
management, Indigenous peoples necessarily advocate an increased role for the holders of 
Indigenous TEK.23  
In Bangladesh, Indigenous peoples are not being recognized by the government as ‘Indigenous 
peoples’. The reason behind the exclusion is the government’s position on the recognition of 
‘Indigenous’ or Adibasi people, which I have discussed in the previous chapter. Asia Energy, the 
company responsible for implementing the open-pit coal project, claimed that they followed 
guidelines of different international financial institutions such as the World Bank, ADB, and IFC 
regarding Adibasi communities of Phulbari.24 Civil society members, environmental and 
Indigenous NGOs, and activists of the Phulbari Khoni Andolon showed their concerns on different 
occasions about fears of local and Adibasi communities regarding their displacement, which would 
violate their human and fundamental rights.  
Section 3.2 of the Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP) of the ESIA states that only 
2,200 out of 49,487 people to be displaced are Adibasis.25 However, nearly half (48.25%) of the 
total affected households identified in the draft Resettlement Plan (RP) belong to groups 
 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid. at 89.  
23 Stephen C. Ellis, “Meaningful Consideration? A Review of Traditional Knowledge in Environmental Decision 
Making.” (2005) Arctic at 68 & 69. 
24 Asia Energy PLC, “Indigenous People’s Development Plan (IPDP)”, In ESIA of Phulbari Coal Project, (NSW: 
Asia Energy Corporation (Bangladesh), 2006). 
25 Ibid.  
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recognized as being socio-economically vulnerable. According to environmentalists and Adibasi 
leaders, the number of displaced Adibasi population would be several times higher than 
estimated.26 It is perceived that one factor contributing to lower estimates of the number of Adibasi 
people to be displaced is the denial of the ‘Indigenous’ status of an unknown number of people 
affected by the project. A footnote of Section 3.2 of the IPDP reveals that this estimate excludes 
households from groups that are more appropriately classified as ‘ethnic minority’ groups rather 
than ‘Indigenous’ or ‘Adibasi’.27 Although Santal, Munda, and Mahili communities are recognized 
as ‘Indigenous peoples’ in line with international law and legal instruments by the company 
through IPDP of the ESIA regardless of the Bangladesh government’s denial situation, there are 
certain self-identified Adibasis groups such as the Karmakar, Horizon, Mahato, Rajbangshi were 
excluded. The Karmakar is one of the twenty-nine Adibasi communities that had their official 
recognition as an Adibasis negated in a highly contested government gazette published in 2010.28 
G. Karmakar, a farmer from the Karmakar community, claimed, “although the mining project 
would destroy my households and agricultural lands, the company consultants never came to talk 
to my family and me. The government never treated us an Adibasi, although we are distinct as like 
Santal and some other communities.”29 Therefore, such denials of the Adibasi identity by states 
and corporations are frequently applied to ignore Indigenous people’s rights in international 
conventions and instruments.30  
 
26 Jennifer Kalafut, “Phulbari Coal Project: A Displacement Disaster in the Name of Development”, in Phulbari 
Coal Project: Studies on Displacement, Resettlement, Environmental and Social Impact, (Dhaka: Samhati 
Publications: Dhaka, 2008) at 19.  
27 Asia Energy Plc, supra note 24 at 27 
28 Ibid. at 62.  
29 Interview with G. Karmakar, Dhontola, Birampur, March 10, 2016. 
30  Kate Hoshour, “The Indigenous Peoples Development Plan for the Phulbari Project, Bangladesh” (2012) 
International Accountability Project. 
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According to Section 4, Volume 4 of the ESIA, Adibasis from Mahili people are among those 
to be displaced;31 still, IPDP for Asia Energy’s Phulbari Coal Project does not record a single 
meeting with members of the Mahili community.32 The methodology for the IPDP included a 
Resettlement Survey (RS) designed to determine the number of Adibasi households to be displaced 
but was suspended just one month after it was initiated in February 2005. The suspension was done 
without showing any reason in the IPDP.33 The draft RP, which the IPDP produces in its final 
report, seems vague since it does not provide details of the resettlement procedure and 
rehabilitation program. Due to the lack of any information on current patterns of land use in either 
of the two proposed resettlement sites for Adibasis, it is unclear if either side has any agricultural 
land available for purchase, leasing, or sharecropping.34 Therefore, the removal of Adibsis from 
their customary lands to make way for the Phulbari open-pit coal project would be a continuation 
of historical patterns of disregard for the Indigenous land rights in Bangladesh.35  
One of the issues both my Adibasi and activist respondents raised was that the decision to 
develop coal mining in Phulbari was discriminatory. It was easy for the government policy-makers 
to decide because most of the population in Phulbari are Adibasi and Bangalee farmers. They said 
that the government considers poor farmers and Adibasi as powerless classes and violates the law; 
consequently, they never consider consulting the communities and engaging them in decision-
making processes. They pointed out that if the coal reserve was found in Dhaka, where millions 
of people live and all administrative offices, military bases, and the airport are situated, the 
government would never think of exploring for coal. The policy-makers had not considered the 
 
31 Asia Energy Plc, supra note 24.  
32 Hoshour, supra note 30. 





livelihoods of poor farmers and Adibasis, agricultural productions, sacred places, archeological 
sites, and the environment. My key respondent Cherobin Hembrom told me, which I believe 
arrived in his mind from frustration, “the government policy-makers and other rich people who 
want open-pit coal mining in our region in the name of development should interchange their 
places with us; they will move here, we will move to their places, then they would understand our 
pain.”36 I argue that this is the politics of inequality. These inequalities arise from broader political-
economic forces that exert their influences at the local level and result in many types of 
environmental health threats.37  
According to Iris Marion Young, “the lack of recognition is an injustice not only because it 
constrains people and does them harm, but also because it is the foundation for distributive 
injustice”.38 Young further argues that a lack of recognition causes damage to both oppressed 
communities and the image of those communities in the larger cultural and political sphere.39 
Nancy Fraser also insists on highlighting the lack of recognition. She argues that we have to look 
at the ‘why’ of inequity in order both to understand and remedy it.40 Both scholars identify a direct 
link between a lack of respect and recognition, and a decline in a person’s membership and 
participation in the greater community, including the political and institutional order.41 Schlosberg 
also points out that the lack of recognition is an injustice because it harms by constraining people 
from their basic rights. It is also the foundation of distributive injustice.42 Thus, if someone is not 
recognized, he or she cannot properly participate in any process. In this respect, David Schlosberg 
 
36 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
37 Harris, Ali, “The Political Economy of Environmental Inequality: The Social Distribution of Risk as an 
Environmental Injustice.” Speaking for Ourselves: Environmental Justice in Canada (2009) at 108.  
38 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference. (1990)  
39 Ibid.  
40 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking Recognition.” (2000) 3 New Left Review. 
41 David Schlosberg, “Reconceiving Environmental justice: global movements and political theories.” (2004) 13.3 
Environmental Politics, at 519.  
42 Ibid.  
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argues that justice must focus on the political process as a way to address both the inequitable 
distribution of social goods and the conditions undermining social recognition.43 In the case of the 
Phulbari project, the denial of Indigeneity of the Karmakar, Horizon, and other self-identified 
Adibasi communities means that they will effectively be excluded from any provisions made for 
Indigenous peoples because they do not hold formal title deeds.44 This would be injustice from the 
part of the government and the company involved because they do not recognize those people as 
Indigenous peoples or groups. Since they would not be recognized as Indigenous peoples, they 
could not participate in the process of decision making, through which justice can be established. 
Adibasis were important actors in the Phulbari Khoni Andolon, although NCBD’s active role 
shaded their participation in the movement. Rob Soren said, “I was in the backstage, and nowhere 
can you see me in media reports, although I played a vital role in organizing the event.”45 His 
statement exposes the normative story of the lack of Adibasi recognition in every level of society. 
He mentioned that since the inception of Bangladesh, even before 1947, Adibasis, especially 
Santals, actively took part in various democratic movements, but their contributions had never 
been recognized.46 Adibasis have been marginalized and discriminated against by colonial powers, 
state actors, and societal structures in different periods, which still exist today. Although the 
current government had promised in their election mandates to improve Adibasi lifestyles and 
economic situations, which is guaranteed by the Bangladesh Constitution as fundamental rights, 
the government eliminated the special opportunity for the “backward section of people”. The 
government disapproved of their longstanding demand for recognizing their identity in the 
 
43 Ibid.  
44 Hoshour, supra note 30. 
45 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016 
46 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
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Constitution. The government, on various occasions, instructed all government and non-
governmental bodies not to use the term “Adibasi.”47  
The environmental justice movement started in response to environmental inequities, threats 
to public health, unequal protection, differential treatment, and discrimination received by the poor 
and people of color48, which Robert Bullard terms ‘environmental racism’. According to Bullard 
and Johnson, environmental racism is one form of environmental injustice, which is fortified by 
different government bodies.49 Schlosberg makes a connection between the environmental justice 
movement and environmental racism, both concerned with low-income communities and the 
disproportionate risks they face.50 In this case, Adibasis thought that they must be displaced 
because the government was supporting the company. Adibasis know that the government is 
powerful, and they have all mechanisms to eliminate and displace them. They identified that they 
would bear disproportionate risk and exposure to environmental hazards. When they realized that 
the government and the company had been ignoring their participation as actors in the decision-
making process, they resisted as a last resort. Moreover, they have prior experience from 
Barapukuria and Modhyopara mining that if the mine is developed without proper measures, their 
life would be at stake which was not taken into consideration by the company. The company did 
not consider local people as important actors in the decision-making process. They had no choice 
but to display their demands through protests. 
Rebecca Tsosie argues that environmental justice for Indigenous peoples must be consistent 
with the promotion of their self-governance. Therefore, traditional Indigenous institutions must be 
 
47 The Daily Prothom Alo, “Govt calls for avoiding word ‘adivasi’” (August 7, 2014). Online: 
https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/news/51716/Govt-calls-for-avoiding-word-
%E2%80%98adivasi%E2%80%99  
48 Robert Bullard, “Decision Making.” in L. Westra, & B. Lawson, Faces of Environmental Racism, (Lanham: 
Rowman Littlefield, 2001).  
49 Bullard and Johnson, supra note 8 at 559. 
50 Schlosberg, supra note 41 at 78.  
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appropriately recognized for upholding their rights.51 However, a system of governance is required 
for environmental justice to ensure the participation of all stakeholders in the decision-making 
process.52 Leah Temper’s new proposal for the environmental justice framework in the settler-
colonial context also highlights the need for recognizing and engaging Indigenous self-governing 
authority besides their participation in the decision-making process.53 The right to FPIC confirms 
that traditional Indigenous institutions must be discussed when a project proponent goes to the area 
and seeks permission. Therefore, it is the company’s responsibility to make sure that Indigenous 
self-governing authorities are involved in the decision-making process. In the ESIA process of the 
Phulbari Coal Project, people attending a consultation and survey meetings are a self-selected 
group and, as such, are not representative of all affected Indigenous people. All Mandals, I had 
interviewed of the mining region, mentioned that the company organized meetings at individual 
levels. The company consultants did not involve Mandals in focus group discussion, although they 
govern Adibasis through their traditional governing system. The company never asked Mandals 
to give any input. 
 
5.2.2. Meaningless Participation/Procedural Justice 
 
The right to receive information, the right to impart information, and the right to participate in 
environmental decisions are three of the significant rights those combined environmental due 
process. The right to participate in the decision-making process is a basic human right that applies 
 
51 Rebecca A Tsosie, “Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change.” (2007) 78 
University of Colorado Law Review at 1625. 
52 Farid Ahmed, “A Bottom up Approach to Environmental Justice in the Context of Bangladesh.” In Indigenous 
Peoples and Bangladesh Environment, (Dhaka: BELA and BEN, 2008) at 49.   
53 Leah Temper, “Blocking pipelines, unsettling environmental justice: from rights of nature to responsibility to 




to all applicable areas.54 These rights are increasingly being regarded as international and national 
legal norms. Principle 23 of the World Charter for Nature exemplifies this trend:  
“All persons, in accordance with their national legislation, shall have the opportunity to 
participate, individually or with others, in the formulation of decisions of direct concern to 
their environment and shall have access to means of redress when their environment has 
suffered damage or degradation.”55 
 
Again, Principle 24 of the same Charter extends that, “Each person has a duty to act in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Charter; acting individually, in association with 
others or through participation in the political process, each person shall strive to ensure that the 
objectives and requirements of the present Charter are met.”56 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) is the body of 
independent experts that monitors implementation of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) that calls for state parties to ensure equal rights for 
Indigenous peoples concerning effective participation in the decision-making process.57 The 
Committee urges not just for consultation, but also informed consent with its interpretation of the 
rights of Indigenous peoples in applying the ICERD.58 In General Recommendation No. 23, CERD 
requires state parties to ensure that Indigenous peoples have equal rights to participate in public 
life and that no decisions relating directly to Indigenous peoples are to be taken without their 
informed consent.59 Ultimately, CERD has used the framework of protecting Indigenous peoples 
 
54 Laura. S. Ziemer, “Application in Tibet of the Principles on Human Rights and the Environment.” (2001) 14 
Harv. Hum. Rts. J. at 264.  
55 United Nations, World Charter for Nature (1982). Online: https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r007.htm 
56 Ibid.  
57 O'Faircheallaigh, supra note 3 at 532.  
58 Tara Ward, “The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples' Participation Rights within 
International Law.” (2011) 10, NW. UJ Int'l Hum. Rts. at 57. 
59 OHCHR, General Recommendation No. 23: Indigenous Peoples. (General Comments) 1997. Online: < 
file:///Users/mohammadhasan/Downloads/cerd.pdf>   
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from any form of discrimination in practicing their right to participation and right to FPIC.60 As 
Indigenous peoples articulate the injustices they face and seek solutions to the problems, there is 
a need for a meaningful participatory approach for engaging them in the subsequent development 
activities.61 If any development activity takes place in the Indigenous territory, it has to be 
formulated within a collaborative framework where all the actors will actively participate in the 
decision-making process. The participatory approach attempts to respect their traditional 
knowledge and construct a development partnership based on trust.62  
Meaningful participation in the environmental decision-making process requires that the 
concerned community is informed of actions with environmental effects, giving a basic 
understanding of environmental issues, and giving the right to express one’s opinion regarding 
environmental affairs. It also requires an effective means of redress are available to the victims of 
both ecological harm and violations of procedural rights.63 Environmental justice demands the 
right to participate as equal partners at every level of decision making, including needs of 
assessment, planning, implementation, and evaluation.64 Iris Marion Young contends that state 
agencies have the responsibility to make decisions about the distribution of risk. She also argues 
that communities should have the right to participate in the decision by having the power to 
approve or disapprove of any project.65  
The provision of participatory rights of procedural justice plays a vital role in the 
 
60 Margaret Satterthwaite and Deena Hurwitz, “The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Meaningful Consent in 
Extractive Industry Projects” (2005) 22.1 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, at 2. 
61 Andrew Grey, “Development Practice and Indigenous Peoples” in Indigenous Peoples, Environment and 
Development. (Copenhagen: International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1997) at 293.   
62 Ibid. at 290.  
63 Bogumil Terminski, “The Concept of Human Security as a Tool for Analysing the Consequences of 
Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement.” (2012) Available at SSRN 2028491. 
64 Julian Ageyman, Sustainable Communities and the Challenge of Environmental Justice. (New York: New York 
University Press, 2005) at 189. 
65 Iris Marion Young, “Justice and Hazardous Waste.” (1983) 5 The Applied Turn in Contemporary Philosophy: 
Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy at 174.  
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environmental decision-making process in EIA mechanisms. Although Asia Energy had 
mentioned that they had conducted full consultation, most of my respondents from Adibasi 
communities told me that they were ignored in their focus group discussions and individual level 
consultations. The company consultants did not ask for any consent. They said that they do not 
know about free, prior and informed consent and therefore, there is no question of FPIC happened 
towards them. There is no document available in their languages, nor the state language Bangla. 
As such, most of the community members had no chance of gaining knowledge about the project 
and its outcome and impacts. The document was not circulated to people who would be affected. 
Although there is a volume called IPDP in the ESIA, including resettlement and rehabilitation, 
potentially affected people were not adequately consulted.  
 
5.2.2.1. Inadequate Access to Information 
 
Satisfactory access to environmental information strengthens participatory mechanisms in the 
environmental management process. Successful implementation of any project depends on a 
corresponding duty of government agencies or companies to report regularly on their activities by 
confirming the right to environmental information.66 Most of my Adibasi respondents told me 
during interviews that the company neither consulted appropriately nor took proper consent from 
them. Before submitting and publishing the EIA and attaining an environmental clearance 
certificate (ECC) from DoE, the company conducted surveys and consultation processes. My 
Adibasi respondents told me that they were unaware of the project even during the survey. 
Consultants had been collecting information about their family members and household goods. 
When they asked consultants about the household survey, they had not responded to local people. 
 
66 Jona Razzaque, “Environmental human rights in South Asia: towards stronger participatory mechanisms.” (2004) 
in UNEP and Geneva Environment Network, at 33.  
232 
 
The concealed the information of mining. A Santal farmer was telling me, “some foreign 
consultants came to our hamlet for the household survey. We asked them the reason for the survey, 
but they could not answer properly. Then they developed roads and started boring on our lands in 
different places. We saw they found coals and other minerals.”67 H. Pahan, a farmer from the 
Munda community, told me that they did not know about the mining until consultants visited their 
households for surveys. Most of my respondents told me that the government had decided to 
develop the mine without consulting local people. Before that, the company started boring in 
various places in 2003. Adibasi people asked the company technicians about the reason while 
drilling on their agricultural lands, but they did not get answers from them. Adibasis did not 
understand what was going on. However, at one point, the company started rebuilding roads in the 
mining area.    
During the consultation process, the information the company consultants had provided was 
not clear to them. They just informed local people that if the mine is developed, they would be 
benefitted. Consultants did not say anything about the negative impact of open-pit mining on 
residents and local biodiversity. S. Mardi was recalling the company’s activities and saying that 
consultants had organized focus group meetings with some Adibasi communities as part of their 
consultation process where they told local people that they would be benefitted if the mine is 
developed through jobs and compensation schemes. However, they did not inform about the 
process of the mining and loss incurred due to the mining activity. Some respondents complained 
that the consultants also did not tell them that a foreign company would construct the mining.  
Giving examples of mining projects in the global North such as Germany, Australia, Canada, 
and the USA, the company consultants said the area would not be destroyed, drinking and 
 
67 Interview with P. Murmu, Boro Bukshi, Birampur, Dinajpur, March 3, 2016. 
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cultivating water would be provided through developed technology. They also said that there 
would not be water and air pollution. As Adibasis of Phulbari were not informed properly, they 
assumed that the mining would be underground like Barapukuria mining in neighboring sub-
district. Some of my respondents said that they were educated by NCBD activists during the 
campaign for the Gherao Kormosuchi occurred on 26th August 2006 that there would be open-pit 
mining, which would affect their livelihoods and local biodiversity. That was the first instance 
when Adibasis had known that there would be open-pit mining by destroying their agricultural 
lands, households, sacred places, forests, and educational institutions. Soon after hearing the 
negative consequences of the open-pit mining project, Adibasi leaders and traditional institutions 
(Manjhi Parishad) members told consultants that they do not want open-pit mining in Phulbari. 
After knowing the process of open-pit mining, people got scared that they must leave their houses 
and agricultural lands. However, they had no mechanism of fighting against decisions made by the 
government but started mobilizing to protest. 
As most of the Adibasis of Phulbari are not formally educated, they did not know about the 
ultimate loss and risks they would face for the project, and consequently, some of them consented. 
The company provided misinformation throughout the process.68 The general people in 
Bangladesh are not aware of the harm of development projects due to lack of information and lack 
of their participation in the decision-making process.69 W. Mardi told me that he collected a huge 
book (ESIA report) from the local Asia Energy office which was written in English. He only 
understood maps of the area and mining footprints. Since most of the local people do not 
understand English, according to him, the report should have published in the Bangla language; in 
 
68 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
69 Abdullah Al Faruque, Environmental Law: Global and Bangladesh Context (New Warsi Book Corp.: Dhaka, 
2017) at 349.  
234 
 
that case, local people could easily understand what the company’s plan is and how would they 
deal with the concerns of Adibasi communities.70  
S. Mardi told me that the company only reported the benefits; they did not inform about the 
expected losses. Moreover, they were not accurately informed about the compensation either. Most 
of my respondents told me the company consultants reported that the mining would benefit the 
country and the local area; people would be economically benefitted. Consequently, some of them 
gave consents which were not informed, nor attained freely. S. Mardi mentioned:   
“We had not given consent to the project, although the company had acquired consents 
from some people through deception and temptation. We also identified that the 
government should have consulted with us before deciding to develop an open-pit coal 
mining on our lands.”71    
  
5.2.2.2. Consent Acquired by Undue Influences 
 
Paragraph 3 of both the World Bank’s Operational Directive (OD) 4.20 and Operations Policy 
(OP) 4.10 state,  
“Because of the varied and changing contexts in which Indigenous peoples live and 
because there is no universally accepted definition of ‘Indigenous peoples’, this policy does 
not define the term. Indigenous peoples may be referred to in different countries by such 
names as ‘Indigenous ethnic minorities’, ‘aboriginals’, ‘hill tribes’, ‘minority 
nationalities’, ‘scheduled tribes’, or ‘tribal groups’.”  
 
From this perspective, if Adibasis are not even recognized, they cannot exercise the right to 
decide whether they want the project or not in their area. I argue that since some Adibasi 
communities of the Phulbari region are recognized as Indigenous peoples by the company, 
 
70 Interview with W. Mardi, Sonajuri, Birampur, March 16, 2016. 
71 Interview with S. Mardi, Sonajuri Hamlet, Birampur, March 06, 2016.  
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regardless of the government’s misrecognition they are enabled to exercise the right to FPIC. 
ADB’s Indigenous Policy identifies that there is dignity in all cultures, that there should be equality 
in opportunity for all segments of society, and that all sections of peoples deserve an equal chance 
of access to participation and benefits of development.72 Article 7 (1) of the ILO Convention No. 
169 clearly states: 
“The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process 
of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the 
lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over 
their own economic, social and cultural development. In addition, they shall participate in 
the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of plans and programs for national and 
regional development which may affect them directly.”73 
 
Although FPIC is an exclusive right for Indigenous peoples through which they can decide, as 
individuals or as groups, about their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development, project proponents or states should apply FPIC in every case engaging not only 
Indigenous peoples but also all project-affected communities unless it is clearly exhibited that the 
impact of the proposed project would be minimal and the project is in the public interest.74 The 
consent they express must be free from any pressure, and in possession of all relevant information 
regarding the proposed activity and its potential impact.75 FPIC allows all project-affected 
Indigenous peoples to be well informed about all aspects of the project and give consent to a project 
 
72 ADB, supra note 18.  
73 ILO, Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO C169) (1989). 
Online: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169  
74 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Free, Prior and Informed Consent: An Indigenous Peoples’ Right and 
a Good Practice for Local Communities, Manual for Project Practitioners (Paris, 2015) at 17. Online: 
<http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6190e.pdf  
75 Anaya, supra note 2.  
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or their territories.76 Once they have given their consent, they can withdraw it at any stage by 
exercising their right to self-determination.  
Article 10 of UNDRIP states that Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their 
lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of 
the Indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where 
possible, with the option of return. James Anaya states:  
“…..companies should conduct due diligence before proceeding or committing themselves 
to proceed, with extractive operations without the prior consent of the Indigenous peoples 
concerned and conduct their own independent assessment of whether or not the operations, 
in the absence of Indigenous consent, would be in compliance with international standards, 
and under what conditions. If they would not be in compliance, the extractive operations 
should not be implemented, regardless of any authorization by the state to do so.”77 
 
The decision-making process should reflect the concern for all citizens and contribute to 
improve the situation of the majority of people and to minimize the number of displaced people. 
Decisions to resettle thousands of displaced people in remote regions of a country should be 
completed through consultation.78 My Adibasi respondents pointed out that the company 
consultants accomplished consents with deception. They lied. They bribed to local journalists and 
influential political leaders to force Adibasis to give consent to the project. The company also gave 
false promises to local Adibasi people during the consultation process. They tempted poor 
Adibasis with money, jobs, and model towns, which they believed would not get. Some people 
were tempted by the company’s undue strategy and consented, but most of the people ultimately 
were with this movement and actively participated.  
 
76 FAO, supra note 74 at 18.  
77 Ibid. 
78 Terminski, supra note 63.  
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P. Murmu recalled that the company consultants organized a meeting where they gave money 
and food to people who attended and asked them after briefing about only the benefits the mining 
would bring to the local area “if you would be happy to see the development of your area?” Some 
of them consented without knowing the consequences for their future. The company completely 
ignored taking permission from local Adibasi people whether they want mining or not. They 
directly informed local people that the government would evict them using force.79 The key 
respondent of my research Cherobin Hembrom rightly pointed out that any development that 
harms local communities cannot be treated as development. He questioned, “development for 
whom? If it is for the country and its citizens, the population should be considered first. If people 
are not satisfied with any project, the government should not go forward with that project.”80 Since 
development occurs for people, if people say ‘no’, nobody should step forward. People will decide 
whether they want development or not.81 
 
5.2.2.3. The Company Failed to Consult and Engage Adibasi Communities 
 
O’Faircheallaigh argues that the powerless in society are, in fact, the least likely to participate 
in the decision-making process, both because they lack the resources to do so, and they often find 
the processes involved mysterious and intimidating.82 Consultation with Indigenous peoples and 
their representatives in the project development process will ensure better decision-making. Prior 
consultation between government, corporations, and Indigenous peoples is recognized as an 
essential mechanism in extractive resource development processes, as the dialogue often results in 
 
79 Interview with P. Murmu, Boro Bukshi, Birampur, Dinajpur, March 3, 2016. 
80 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016.  
81 Interview with S.J., Dhaka, April 12, 2016.  
82 Allan P Dale & Marcus B Lane, Strategic Perspectives Analysis: A Procedure for Participatory and Political 
Social Impact Assessment (1994).  
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either community acceptance or rejection of a project. Involving local and Indigenous peoples in 
the early phase of the decision-making process reduces the possibility of further conflicts among 
residents and the policymakers including creating greater trust in the process.83 Article 6(1) of the 
ILO Convention No. 169 instructs states to consult with Indigenous communities through genuine 
representatives maintaining proper procedures in any project development in their territory. 
Moreover, the same provision requires that Indigenous peoples can freely participate at all levels 
of the decision-making process within the nation-state. Article 6(2) of the same Convention affirms 
that consultations have to be in good faith with the object of reaching an agreement with the 
affected Indigenous peoples.  
Although Asia Energy responds in their documents stating that they are concerned about the 
importance of meaningful participation of Adibasis in the Phulbari project as it has significant 
adverse effects, actual consultation with affected Adibasi communities has been grossly 
inadequate.84 The Public Consultation and Disclosure Plan (PCDP) for the Phulbari Coal Project 
also states that focus group discussions have been held with various categories of people within 
the project, with emphasis on vulnerable and special interest groups, including Indigenous 
groups.85 However, my respondents told me that they were not adequately informed about the 
mining decision, the process of mining and the impact of mining. Their right to FPIC, participation, 
and self-determination in Phulbari were not upheld properly. This is a clear showcase of injustice 
towards Adibasi communities of Phulbari. 
In this current case, Section 1 of Volume 4 of the ESIA for the Phulbari Coal Project’ states, 
“Consultation with stakeholders is an ongoing process, and will continue to be conducted 
 
83 Razzaque, supra note 66.  
84 Hoshour, supra note 30.  
85 Asia Energy Plc., “Public Consultation and Disclosure Plan (PCDP)” in ESIA for Phulbari Coal Project, (NSW: 
Asia Energy Corporation, 2006).  
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throughout the project development, forming a key component of design, development, 
implementation, and operation of the project.”86 The company has failed to consult with local 
stakeholders for more than five years, but the company is continuing its efforts to force the project 
forward. Adibasis of Phulbari would be displaced from at least five administrative unions of the 
Phulbari, Birampur, and Nawabgonj sub-districts, but consultation has been limited to one union 
of Phulbari only.87 In addition to that, the documentation of these consultations with Adibasi 
communities is also inadequate.88  
It is widely acknowledged that the knowledge of local communities and the participation of 
Indigenous peoples in decision-making for sustainable development are crucial for the protection 
of local ecosystems. Mushkat contends that the full involvement of the major stakeholders in 
environmental decision-making and implementation must be transparent involving varying 
relations of civil society and the private sector.89 I talked to some local and national Adibasi NGOs 
whose names are included in the list of NGOs the company consulted, but they denied and told me 
that they were never consulted. The chief executive of a leading national environmental NGO told 
me that the company did not communicate with her. She does not have any idea of how the 
company used her name and her NGO as ‘consulted’. She said, “I was never formally invited. I 
never gave my formal consent to discuss with the company. That’s a total lie that they mentioned 
in the EIA document.”90 A local Adibasi NGO spokesperson told me that the company had 
contacted the NGO to get information and statistics about Adibasi households, but they never 
 
86 Ibid. at 22.  
87 Hoshour, supra note 30. 
88 Ibid.  
89 Roda Mushkat, “Public Participation in Environmental Law Making: A Comment on the International Legal 
Framework and the Asia-Pacific Perspective” (2002) 1 Chinese J Int’l L 185.  
90 Interview with S.R.H., Dhaka, April 17, 2016.  
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invited them to participate in any consultation or meeting.91 Asia Energy did not contact 
Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon (BAPA) formally. But they recruited some BAPA members as their 
consultants and had ‘golden handshakes’. The company wanted to purchase other BAPA 
members.92 
IPDP of the ESIA states, “Despite the question and concerns that have been raised during the 
consultation process, Indigenous peoples have appeared supportive of the project, participating in 
the consultation process through attendance at meetings and responding to the various surveys.”93 
IPDP further states that just over seventy percent of respondents from Indigenous households 
agreed with the statement, “the coal project is necessary for the development of the country”.94 I 
identify that these are very questionable and vague claims. The actual scenario is different now 
because the consultants did not inform those people about the project.95 Attendance at meetings 
and responding to surveys cannot be equated with support for the project, particularly in light of 
the very detailed and grave concerns about the project expressed by Adibasi communities. Survey 
respondents may use the survey to express their opposition and concerns rather than support for 
the project.96  
When I was talking to Adibasi communities as part of my research activities, they claimed that 
they were not properly consulted, and the company achieved some consents through undue 
processes. As a Mandal of his hamlet, R. Mardi presided over many meetings with other members 
of the council involving Adibasi men and women. He identified that the company failed to consult 
with Adibasis properly. Some of my respondents whose households and lands are included in the 
 
91 Interview with K. Kisku., Phulbari, March 07, 2016. 
92 Interview with S.J., Dhaka, April 12, 2016.   
93 Asia Energy Plc, supra note 24 at 45 
94 Ibid. at 47. 
95 Hoshour, supra note 30. 
96 Ibid.  
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mining footprint told me that the company consultants never consulted with them. The government 
did not consult with the community, not even with community leaders, about the decision to 
develop the project in their locality. They were not involved in any decision-making process. There 
was not a single hearing held involving local and Adibasi communities regarding the project. Many 
Adibasis claimed that they were deceived because they were not properly consulted. I find the 
perception the Adibasi communities perceive is clear, “if you want to explore natural resources on 
our lands, take permission from us with proper consultation.”  
 
5.2.3. Population Displacement and Resettlement 
 
Many resource extracting projects have similar negative outcomes regarding environmental 
impacts, displacement, and resettlement of local and Indigenous peoples. It is observed that most 
of the mining projects worldwide are in Indigenous territories and involve negative environmental 
impacts, displacement, and resettlement of Indigenous peoples and violation of human rights.97 As 
stated, various MNCs, TNCs, and multilateral financial institutions are involved in developing 
large-scale resource extraction projects, dams, military bases, and toxic waste sites in Indigenous 
areas, which would inevitably affect the conditions of living of Indigenous peoples.  
Omar Faruque studies company-community conflict in local settings, drawing on corporate 
practices of mining companies and shows that companies adopt various strategies to minimize 
conflict. The author, through qualitative research, finds that instead of addressing the complex 
issues such as displacement and eviction of local people, the transnational company in Phulbari 
tried to convince them with economic gain.98  
 
97 UNDESA, State of the World's Indigenous Peoples. Vol. 9. (United Nations Publications, 2009) at 6. Online: < 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/SOWIP/en/SOWIP_web.pdf>  
98 M. Omar Faruque, “The Politics of Extractive Industry Corporate Practices: An Anatomy of a Company-
Community Conflict in Bangladesh.” (2017) The Extractive Industries and Society. 
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Terminski argues that Indigenous peoples are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of 
displacement and resettlement because they cannot adapt to a new situation due to inadequate 
mechanisms.99 Indigenous peoples have their traditional way of managing resources around them, 
but most of the traditional resources would be missing in new places. The author argues that the 
displacement of people leads to a violation of many individuals and collective human rights.100 
Adibasi communities in the Phulbari region were very much concerned about losing their 
Indigeneity. If the project is implemented and if they are displaced from their existing households 
and social settings, they would not be able to practice their cultural and social festivals and rituals 
on which their identity exists. There are hundreds of religious and archeological sites in the mine 
footprint. One of my respondents mentioned, “the mine would kill our identity as ‘Adibasi or 
Indigenous’ because we must be displaced from our homes and resettled in a new place where we 
cannot practice our religious, cultural and sacred rites, rituals and festivals as we are practicing 
now.”101 He mentioned those cultural practices are their base of human integrity. W. Mardi, a 
Santal farmer, said:  
“There was no problem of developing a mine in the region if that would improve our 
lifestyle and would benefit the country. We vastly depend on working and cultivating in 
agricultural fields. Hundreds of thousands of Bangalees and Adibasis of the Phulbari 
mining region would have been displaced if the mining had been developed. We would not 
get a similar life in our new place. Sine the open-pit mining project would affect our 
livelihoods, we strongly protested.”102  
 
An Adibasi leader reported discriminatory treatments by the government agencies towards 
Adibasis. He said that Adibasis in Bangladesh had experienced various hurdles: a riot situation in 
 
99 Terminski, supra note 63 at 4-5 
100 Ibid.  
101 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016 
102 Interview with W. Mardi, Sonajuri, Birampur, March 16, 2016. 
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1947 during the India-Pakistan partition,  India-Pakistan war in 1965, and Bangladesh’s war of 
independence in 1971.103 They also know the Adibasi displacement and marginalization 
experience in the CHT due to the development of a hydropower dam on the Kaptai Lake, which 
was built in 1962 and at least 100,000 Adibasi Chakma, Marma, Tripura, and eight other Adibasi 
communities were displaced and permanently lost their lands. The government later brought 
Bangalees from various parts of the country and settled them in the traditional lands of ‘Adibasi’104. 
Adibasis of the CHT never got back to their original and traditional lands, and they are still fighting 
for their survival and self-determination. The state’s policy-making and implementing machinery 
are depriving them of repression. Through these experiences, they knew once they allow the 
foreign company to develop open-pit mining, they would be displaced and could never return to 
their ancestral homes.   
The fear of displacement from livelihoods, fertile croplands and limited opportunity of the 
social sector played a vital role in the motivation of the protesters to join the Phulbari Khoni 
Andolon. Adibasis were motivated to protest because they knew from their previous and ancestral 
history of deprivation that open-pit mining in the area would make them vulnerable to state 
repression, and it would be impossible for them to deal with the new situation. They were self-
educated to recognize that if they were displaced from their lands, they would never return to their 
agricultural lands, households and sacred places.105 If the company would have developed mining 
in that area, at least fifty thousand Adibasis would be permanently displaced. An Adibasi Santal 
elderly woman told me that they went to the Gherao and aftermath protests because they did not 
want to be dislocated. She said, “the government can extract coal when they have money and have 
 
103 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
104 Adibasi of CHT are collectively known as Jumma.  
105 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
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their own technology, but by consulting local people, not through the foreign company and not 
with open-pit mining.”106  
An Adibasi respondent was motivated to protest the company when he heard from a consultant 
that they would provide a single room for a whole family as part of their resettlement plan. I find 
his question, “how can we manage to live with family and domestic animals in a single room?” 
was valid, as most Adibasi households have domestic animals such as cattle, goats, ducks, and 
hens on which their livelihoods also depend; thus, they need larger spaces for taking care of 
them.107 The company’s resettlement plans have not provided clear indications of ‘how much 
household property they would get.’  
ICESCR and ICCPR (Article 1), Agenda 21 (Paras. 7.6 and 7.9 (b)), Para 2(h) of the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (Article 27), Habitat II and III have kept various 
provisions of right to adequate housing and settlement for people and the obligation of states to 
refrain from illegal eviction and displacement. However, displacement or forced eviction would 
violate the right to protection and housing as well as the rights to freedom of movement. Moreover, 
problems affecting the displaced people as a result of establishing such projects are very difficult 
to envisage in the category of violation of the law. The Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights concluded that forced evictions or involuntary displacement are prima facie 
incompatible with the requirement of the ICESCR, and all persons should possess a degree of 
security that guarantees legal protection against displacement.108  
 
106 Interview with D. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 09, 2016.  
107 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
108 Para 8(a) of General Comment No. 4.  
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Adibasis could not believe the company’s promise about the resettlement plan of building a 
larger community in the name of an ‘ideal village’, which they think is not feasible. Since Adibasis 
understood that if the mine is implemented, they could not stay in their homes, they would lose 
their agricultural properties: ‘there is no point of living’ and ‘begging would be their ultimate 
destination’ despite having their lands on which they depend,109 so they resisted.  P. Murmu said 
that he would never transfer his lands to anyone, even to the government. He had recalled Adibasis’ 
struggle to survive in the area. He pointed out that once Adibasis leave the area, they cannot return 
to their original place. He said that living in his house and attaining his land is his right to live. He 
was ready to die for protecting his lands and consequently, he joined the movement 
wholeheartedly.110   
 
5.2.4. False Promise and Fear of Unfair Treatment regarding Compensation  
 
One of the seventeen environmental justice principles confirms that environmental justice 
protects the right of all victims of environmental injustice to receive full compensation and 
reparations for damage as well as quality health care.111 The United Nations Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on Development based Evictions and Displacement states that “Cash compensation 
should under no circumstances replace real compensation in the form of land and common 
property resources. Where land has been taken, the evicted should be compensated with land 
commensurate in quality, size, and value or better.”112 The Bangladesh Constitution guarantees 
that ‘no citizen should be deprived of their right to life and property’.113 If the government, 
 
109 Interview with W.Mardi, Buchki Hamlet, Birampur, March 05, 2016.  
110 Interview with P. Murmu, Boro Bukshi, Birampur, Dinajpur, March 3, 2016. 
111 Ageyman, supra note 64 at 189. 
112 UN Human Rights Council, Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development Based Evictions and Displacement 
(2007) at 68. Online: https://undocs.org/A/HRC/4/18   
113 Article 32 and 42 of the Bangladesh Constitution.  
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following the law, wants to take those rights away for implementing a development project, 
compensation must be paid.114 Laws that regulate environmental programs in a particular sector 
usually allow objections to be raised and provide for compensation for all rights and interests 
affected by relevant projects. Therefore, all people who are adversely affected have the right to 
ask for compensation.115 Although compensation may do justice to the victim for a time being, the 
injury that would happen can be irreparable or may require a long time to recover.  
The project’s draft RP also states that most displaced households will become landless because 
there is no provision in the plan that Adibasis would receive land for land as compensation.116 The 
lack of land-for-land compensation in the Phulbari Coal Project violates both national and 
international regulations.117 Adibasis claimed that they do not want money; they want similar types 
of agricultural lands. The government and the company, in this case, are responsible for 
compensating and relocating those displaced people in their reclaimed lands or properties in a safe 
environment. If the government or the company does not comply accordingly, it will be a violation 
of international law.118 
The company consultants told Adibasi people that if the mine is implemented in their area, 
they would not have to work, they would easily be able to lead their entire life with the 
compensation the company would provide. They would have small businesses, and many would 
get jobs in the mining industry. Many Adibasis agreed to transfer their lands, as the company 
promised to provide several times higher price than the actual market price of lands. My key 
informant Cherobin Hembrom said:   
 
114 Mohiuddin Farooque, Selected Writings of Mohiuddin Farooque: Environmental Order, the Security of Survival, 
(Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA): Dhaka, 2004) at 152.  
115 Ibid. 
116 Asia Energy Plc., “Draft Resettlement Plan” in ESIA of Phulbari Coal Project, (NSW: Asia Energy Corporation 
(Bangladesh), 2006). 
117 Kalafut, supra note 26.  
118 Ageyman, supra note 64 at 181. 
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“The company and the government agencies tempted us with undue benefits, but we 
somehow understood that we would not be benefitted in any way. Local people did not 
understand how they are going to be benefitted. They primarily believed the company’s 
temptation, but when they understood the reality, they started mobilizing themselves and 
protested.”119   
 
The company consultants later told Adibasis that the government had sold their lands to Asia 
Energy for mining which is a complete lie. Adibasi people were told that the government would 
acquire their lands without giving compensation. However, they would pay well if they give 
consent to them. They surveyed about their households, listed the price of everything they belong 
to, which they used to write with pencils. They were anxious and scared that the company would 
erase the price they promised during the survey and would write the new price.120  
Everyone in Phulbari knows that neither they nor the country would benefit from the project. 
According to them, the company would not provide proper compensation, which they learned from 
two neighboring mine development processes. Referring to the Barapukuria Underground Mining 
and Madhyapara Hardrock Mining, which are situated only a few kilometers from Phulbari mining 
area, one of my respondents said:  
“People whose properties were acquired for mining, they have not received proper 
compensation as companies promised. They had not received land for land compensation 
either. Now we found that the promises were false. I know a person who was once a 
landowner of an acre, now he is working as a day laborer. The money he received has been 
spent in a few years. Most of the people who lost their properties and got compensation are 
now destitute in a similar way.”121  
 
 
119 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
120 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
121 Interview with S. Baske. Ratanpur Village, Birampur, March 06, 2016. 
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Adibasis understood that the mining project would destroy their households and displace them 
from their ancestors’ lands, they would not get actual prices of the alienated lands, and they would 
not get proper compensation, and subsequently, they would be destitute, marginalized, and 
powerless.122 Even in circumstances where agricultural lands and households fell within the 
compensation scheme, Adibasis believe that compensation could not be valued properly. Some 
Adibasi respondents also told me that the borderline households and agricultural lands of the mine 
footprints would also be affected, but those affected lands or households would not be covered 
under the compensation scheme. This matter was not discussed or was not taken into consideration, 
and consequently, the owners of those lands were not consulted.  An Adibasi leader stated:   
“I can be an example of this situation. I have seen the map of the projected plan and found 
that some of my agricultural lands are included in the planned map, but my house is not 
included in the map. According to the map, I would not be displaced but I have to face all 
the negative impacts of open-pit mining. I would get ashes and burning heat. It is not only 
people of the mining region but also the surrounding communities would be directly 
affected.”123 
 
The concern that “people who would be affected invisibly, would not be compensated” was 
firmly constituted among Adibasis, and influenced them to attend the protest rally and assemblies. 
Although people whose agricultural lands and households fall under a planned map would be 
compensated as ‘damages for land loss,’ this compensation would never be valued properly. 
Adibasis could easily understand that most of the affected people would never benefit from the 
Phulbari Coal Project. During the survey period, landowners who do not cultivate their lands did 
not receive compensation for boring or damaging their lands. However, sharecroppers received 
compensation for losing their crops. W. Mardi was telling me that there were six pillars (for each 
 
122 Interview with K. Kisku., Phulbari, March 07, 2016. 
123 Interview with Ram Soren, Phulbari Bazaar, March 11, 2016. 
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pillar he got 33 BDT or 0.5 CAD) on his lands and as he was cultivating the lands, he received 
compensation. Some respondents said if they would have known that the government has leased a 
company to extract coal by destroying their lands, they would never give consent to bore in their 
lands.  
When Adibasis heard that they would be more affected and would lose all agricultural lands 
with less compensation, Adibasi community leaders, their traditional institutions, and some 
Adibasi NGOs of the Phulbari mining region started opposing the project strongly.124 Mobilization 
around the value of fostering agricultural production, small businesses and household craft rather 
than coal mining motivated people to join the movement.125 Changing the voices of Adibasi 
protesters from low to high inspired them to continue and get more involved in the protest. When 
they heard a committee was formed in Phulbari town to protest, they went forward and showed 
their interest to protest. The project is going to represent a clear breach of multiple rights. The right 
not to be deprived of one’s own resources, the right not to be deprived of one’s livelihood, and the 
right to both life and family life will not be respected. Therefore, the lives of displaced people will 
be disrupted for unwanted hazardous activity. In the case of the Phulbari Coal Project, the 
government must take responsibility to protect the rights of local and Adibasi peoples. Also, the 
government must engage the company to ensure environmental justice for all.  
 
5.2.5. Claiming a “Fair Share” of Benefits Accruing from the Project  
 
 
The Phulbari open-pit mining project would destroy houses, educational institutions, religious 
institutions, and agricultural lands permanently. While it would make powerful people more 
 
124 Interview with N. Pahan, Belpukur Hamlet, Birampur, March 11, 2016.  
125 Interview with T. Murmu, Dhakundah Hamlet, Birampur, March 06, 2016; Anu Muhammad, Phulbari Koyla 
Khoni: Kar Lav, Kar Kkhoti. 
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prosperous, it was not done for the community and the country as a whole.126 An Adibasi leader 
told me with frustration:  
“Some advantaged people of the country would be benefitted from this project. Those are 
nobody but policy and decision-makers. They make plans, lease out natural resources to 
foreign corporations, displace and relocate poor people. Some of them already made huge 
money for their double-standard actions. This project would never benefit people who live 
in Phulbari, Briampur, and Nawabgonj. The majority of people have to lose everything.”127  
 
Critics of the neoliberal policy argue that through these sorts of development projects, the 
government only sees the benefits of corporations and the government instead of seeing the 
benefits of citizens or the country as a whole. The government does not see the benefits of local 
people; instead, TNCs are being benefitted through the government’s policies. Some Adibasis 
bargained with the company consultants at an individual level. One of my Adibasi respondents 
told a consultant, “if any mineral resource is found under our lands, that belongs to us, we are the 
owner of that resource.” The consultants reminded him that the government would forcefully evict 
them anyway; in that case, they would lose their compensation. Like him, some other respondents 
said that they should have shared in the mineral resource found on their lands. However, Cherobin 
does not think that way. He said:   
“Although I have not seen anyone who claimed the share, I don’t see any problem of 
claiming the shares from the company or the government. We are the people who would 
lose everything, which can never be valued. Although we would get price compensation 




126 Interview with Ram Soren, Phulbari Bazaar, March 11, 2016. 
127 Interview with Ram Soren, Phulbari Bazaar, March 11, 2016.  
128 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
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Cherobin told me that when he understood that they could not stop mining in their region, the 
government might evict them, and for that reason, he asked for several times more price of their 
lands and household goods. Their argument was if the government provide them the same number 
of agricultural lands in another location, they will leave the place for the better interest of the 
country. Moreover, Adibasi communities had decided after discussion in Manjhi Parishad 
meetings that since they must leave their lands permanently, the government must provide the 
same quality and quantity of agricultural lands for them in another place. The government must 
settle the prices of houses, household goods, and cattle, trees, etc. reasonably. Adibasis also 
decided and told consultants and policy-makers that people who want coal mine should move to 
Phulbari, and people of Phulbari go to their places. Cherobin Hembrom told that people who did 
not go through the refugee situation would not understand their pain. Other people may want 
development projects in Adibasi areas, but they would never leave their place for mining. He said, 
“now, we can demand a mine development in Dhaka and evacuate the whole city, they would 
never leave their place.”129  
 
5.2.6. Environmental Degradation Risk and Health Insecurity  
 
The Phulbari Coal Project would lead to severe pollution of air, water, and soil that has plagued 
communities living with coal extraction and coal-fired power plants, with grave health impacts on 
the local people. Environmental degradation and negative impacts on local biodiversity, drinking 
and irrigation water scarcity, climate change, and public health were other concerns for local 
Adibasis.130 They learned about the destructive impacts of open-pit mining through NCBD 
 
129 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016. 
130 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016 
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campaigners, who showed documentary films on open-pit mining projects in different places 
and educated the villagers effectively. They understood that if the project would have been 
developed, people could not lead their normal life in the region.131 An open-pit mining method 
needs water of the whole area to be drained and the topsoil to be removed. This could cause 
deforestation and loss of productivity of agricultural lands.  
My Adibasi respondents told me that their livelihood largely depends on forest and wetlands. 
They collect flowers for their cultural festivals, which they observe for centuries. They use dry 
leaves and bunches of forest trees for cooking. They hunt fishes from nearby wetlands. Adibasis 
manage their surrounding natural resources sacredly using their traditional knowledge, which 
learned from their thousand years of ancestral traditions. They identify nature as ‘God’.132 They 
knew that if the project had been implemented, everything would be destroyed. They are also 
concerned about the Sundarbans forest. An Adibasi leader told me that this sea-lying largest 
mangrove forest has been saving the country from huge destruction of cyclones.133     
Local people would face various health problems too. Extracted coal would create dust and 
pollute air and soil, which in various ways that would affect the human health of the local 
communities. An NGO worker told me that one of the major concerns of Adibasis and other 
protesters to attend the Phulbari Khoni Andolon was environmental degradation, which ultimately 
would affect their health. He said, “although my village is five kilometers far from the minefield, 
villagers would be affected due to mining activities.”134 He learned about the impact of mining 
from the Barapakuria coalfield. He said, “I was observing the environmental change of the local 
area as part of my work in my organization and found that the Barapukuria mine contributes 
 
131 Interview with C. Mardi., Lakshipur Hamlet, Phulbari, March 07, 2016.   
132 Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016.  
133 Interview with Rob Soren, Dhaka, April 11, 2016 
134 Interview with K. Kisku, Phulbari, March 07, 2016.  
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various ecological problems. For example, the production of coconuts and other fruits has 
drastically decreased.”135  
 
5.2.7. Water and Food Insecurity 
 
Water scarcity throughout the country is visible. Water is not seen in small rivers, which are 
affecting irrigation throughout the country. Bangladesh has a network of hundreds of small rivers, 
meaning that water pollution in one area can spread over a large area. The Phulbari Coal Project 
would divert the Little Jamuna River and suck an aquifer dry for more than 30 years.136 The river 
is crossing the mining footprint. I have seen during my field activities that the water level of the 
river already went down. To implement the mining project in Phulbari, a huge area needs to be cut 
to reach coal that lies 150m to 250m below the surface. To prevent the mine from flooding and to 
keep the mine pit dry, huge pumps would run 24 hours a day for the whole mining period. Thus, 
the mining operation would need to pump up to 800 million liters of water a day out of the mine. 
The discharged water often contains large quantities of toxic shock syndrome (TSS), total 
dissolved solids (TDS), and hard and heavy metals, which contaminate the surface and 
groundwater. This water is sometimes acidic and pollutes the water system.137 The acid mine 
drainage may render water sources undrinkable and contaminate groundwater needed for 
agriculture for centuries to come. Water will also be polluted from washing of coal, risking 
pollution of surrounding water bodies.138 My Adibasi respondents told me that water quality in the 
close vicinity of underground mining in Barapukuria became toxic. One of my respondents told 
 
135 Interview with K. Kisku, Phulbari, March 07, 2016.    
136 H. Withanage, Bangladesh: Phulbari Coal Mine -“Losses beyond Compensation”. Bankwatch. (Quezon City, 
Philipines: NGO Forum on ADB, 2008)  
137 R. K. Tiwary, “Environmental Impact on Coal Mining on Water Regime and its Management.” (2001) Water, 
Air, and Soil Pollution, at 186. 
138 Ibid.  
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me that people of Barapukuria are not getting enough water from underground tube-wells, which 
are largely affecting the production of agriculture. Moreover, the taste of drinking water which 
they collect through tube-wells turned bad. My Adibasi and Bangalee respondents informed me 
that the water in the area changed sometime after the company started functioning.  
Due to mining drain out, the groundwater in an area covering about 500 square kilometers 
would be lowered.139 In this case, wells would no longer provide enough water for farmers. 
Underground water is the most significant source of water for drinking, cooking, washing, bathing, 
and other domestic purposes in the area. The pond-water and river-water are not used for drinking 
or cooking by the Adibasis but is used for irrigation purpose. The dry season is the toughest time 
for getting water through deep tube wells for every purpose since the water level of the 
groundwater-surface goes down. Since farmers of the mining area produce rice twice a year, they 
need water frequently for irrigation. Most of my respondents pointed out that although they are 
getting enough water for drinking and irrigation now, the vast use of water in the mine operation 
would largely affect their agricultural production. Once the mining is finished, Asia Energy plans 
to create a huge lake, providing freshwater, fisheries, and recreation; according to the company. 
But after more than 30 years of digging, water will be toxic.140 Since their livelihoods are 
dependent on agriculture and the water scarcity is obvious due to the mine operation, they 
resisted.141 
Adibasis are most concerned about losing their agricultural lands on which they depend most. 
Adibasis consume rice three times a day for a living and claimed that they would be affected most 
due to a shortage of food. Most of the areas of the mining footprint cover agricultural lands, which 
 
139 Withanage, supra note 136 at 27. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Interview with J. Baske, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, March 05, 2016.  
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would have been destroyed completely. Moreover, the production of crops would be largely 
affected by contaminated air, soil, and water.  
 
5.2.8. Foreign Company and Lack of Transparency  
 
Some of the Adibasi respondents told me that if it were a domestic company, the resistance 
would not have been so strong. They were concerned that foreign investors, in the name of 
investing and helping the country through extracting natural resources, are stealing national 
resources by destroying local ecology and livelihoods. But some disagreed and contended that they 
were scared because transnational corporations have a direct connection with the government, and 
the government always wants to protect them, which was seen throughout organizing the 
movement. Asia Energy, with the help of the government’s law enforcement and security agencies, 
repressed the protesters and solidarity groups, which I have shown in the previous chapter. 
Consequently, many people could not attend the protest because they were scared and hopeless.  
An Adibasi farmer from the Munda community expressed that the experience of corruption in 
the Barapukuria coal and power plant project and Modhyapara hard rock mining142 also worked to 
motivate people to join the Phulbari Khoni Andolon since landslides are happening more often.143 
Adibasi and other protesters have still firmly believed that the company will start developing open-
pit coal mining in the Phulabri region by creating pressure on the government. Indicating 
corruption at Barapakuria Coal Mining, W. Mardi told me that Dalal of the company made huge 
money out of doing nothing, but villagers who lost their lands are landless now and becoming 
refugees as unexpected impacts of the mining. Local people who would have been evicted from 
 
142 Both the mining projects are situated within the vicinity of the Phulbari mining footprint.  
143 Interview with N. Pahan, Belpukur Hamlet, Birampur, March 11, 2016. 
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their lands did not get proper compensation. People learned from the observation and did not agree 
with the open-pit mining process. 
Although the Prime Minister has said that the government will not develop a mass destructive 
project in Phulbari, which will cause damage to the country’s natural resources and local farmers 
and Adibasi people, protesters cannot solely rely on her statement. They want to break ties between 
the government and the company so that the company cannot continue their share businesses in 
London’s AIM. Furthermore, people have known through transnational networks and advocacy 
groups—later published by Wikileaks—that the US government has been continuously planning 
to implement the project, as 60% of the company’s shares are owned by USA companies.144 A 
prominent environmental lawyer told me that it is common everywhere in the world. This is the 
double standard of the donor agencies in the global South where they bring MNCs from the global 
North into the scenario. Donor countries do not do this practice in their own countries. But they 
go to the global South and corrupt their officials through bribes and undue gifts. When local people 
were informed by NCBD and other solidarity groups about the company’s corruption and power, 
they found a new spirit to resist the company. As Ram Soren told me, “Asia Energy lost all 
credibility, and we will not allow the company in Bangladesh.”145  
 
5.3. Tactics of the Environmental Justice Movements in Phulbari 
 
      The environmental justice movement involves various tactics such as road or long marches, 
petitions, rallies, coalition, and community empowerment through litigation, violent and 
 
144 Huffington Post, “Big Coal WikiLeaks Emergency in Bangladesh: Does Obama Support Removal of 100,000 
Villagers?” (May 24, 2011). Online: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeff-biggers/big-coal-wikileaks-
emerge_b_840037.html  
The guardian, “WikiLeaks cables: US pushed for reopening of Bangladesh coal mine” (December 21, 2010). 
Online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/21/wikileaks-cables-us-bangladesh-coal-mine  
145 Interview with Ram Soren, Phulbari Bazaar, March 11, 2016. 
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nonviolent direct action. In fact, a central debate in environmental justice scholarship is over the 
relative efficacy of legal strategies versus ‘direct action’. In the following few paragraphs, I 
compare various tactics of the environmental justice movement as observed in Phulbari.  
 
5.2.2. Representative Suit and PIEL 
 
Since the right to life and property is a fundamental right under the Bangladesh Constitution, 
the right should be enforceable as a prerogative by the High Court Division (HCD) of the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh (SCB) through exercising extra-ordinary jurisdiction.146 The court may issue 
an interim order for upholding someone’s right to life and property. However, the HCD cannot 
exercise the jurisdiction if the order affects the implementation of any development project. 
Therefore, the order can only be given if it is not liable to prejudice the program or if the order 
prejudices a development project in any manner, no ad interim injunction can be issued.147 
Mohiuddin Farooque, the pioneer of public interest environmental litigation (PIEL) and 
environmental justice movement in Bangladesh, argues that if the case is allowed to proceed 
against a development project without the power of the court to issue an ad-interim injunction, 
there is no jurisdiction to allow the case.148 He states that ad interim injunctions/orders are made 
to protect the ends of justice. If the court cannot exercise that extra-ordinary jurisdiction, affected 
communities would be deprived of their rights because the due process of civil litigations takes a 
long time. If a plaintiff gets a decree in favor of him after 15 years through civil litigation, the 
proper justice would not be served. Because in the meantime, the project may be implemented. 
Although such a decree can only help the plaintiff to get compensation, local people must face the 
 
146 Article 102 of the Bangladesh Constitution  
147 Article 102(4). See also, Farooque, supra note 114 at 153.  
148 Ibid.   
258 
 
disproportionately negative impact of the project.149 The Bangladesh Code of Civil Procedure of 
1908 has a provision of the representative suit where a representative on behalf of affected 
communities can file a petition to the court of justice to protect their rights (only to seek 
compensation as a remedy).  
PIEL is considered as an effective strategy to ensure environmental justice in South Asian 
countries, especially in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. It can provide innovative and accessible 
remedies to the people affected by environmental degradation or development projects. PIEL is a 
vehicle through which people can be aware of their right to environment, making environmental 
justice accessible to the common people and enhancing their participation in the environmental 
decision-making process.150 In India, a PIEL can be filed only against the state government, central 
government, municipal authorities or any other authority that comes within the purview of a ‘state’ 
under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution. The litigation can be brought in the Supreme Court of 
India under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, in the High Court under Article 226 of the 
Constitution, and in the Court of Magistrate under Section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code.151 
But in Bangladesh, a PIEL is only filed in the HCD of the SCB through a writ petition to challenge 
the action of the public bodies or individuals violating environmental law and regulations. It 
prohibits the alleged industry or body from violating environmental law and regulations by 
obtaining pre-emptory order to perform a specific duty in public law.152 PIEL also enables the 
accountability of the government for its failure to protect the environment and human lives. 
Moreover, it extended the meaning of the fundamental rights under the Constitution of Bangladesh 
 
149 Ibid.  
150 Faruque, supra note 69 at 354. 
151 Ibid.  
152 Ibid. at 349.  
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to ensure everyone is entitled to live in a healthy environment.153 According to Abdullah Al 
Faruqe, many conflicts can be avoided and resolved if civil society and NGOs are engaged in the 
decision-making process.154 PIEL is considered as ‘participation’ because the suit engages 
complainants and respondents in the court’s court process.  
The availability of PIEL in Bangladesh is a result of relentless efforts by environmental lawyers 
and NGOs. In that process, many human rights and environmental NGOs have set their priority 
issues for PIEL, and by instituting PIEL before the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, NGOs have 
been making governmental agencies accountable to perform their duties by enforcing 
environmental regulations.155 However, the practice of PIEL instituted by NGOs through a writ 
petition to the SCB to protect the environment and human dignity was not achieved easily in 
Bangladesh. BELA is a pioneer in introducing PIEL in Bangladesh and has filed many PIEL for 
the protection of the environment and human life. There was a question among judges whether an 
NGO or an individual, who is not affected by any action of a public body or any development 
project, has locus standi (standing right) as there was no clear direction, understanding, and 
manifestation in the Constitution or any statute. Article 102 of the Constitution allows ‘any person 
aggrieved’ to file a suit in these cases. In Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque vs. Bangladesh, Ccivil Appeal 
No. 24 of 1995, the apex court resolved the issue of locus standi in PIEL and extended the phrase 
‘any person aggrieved’ to ‘any person with sufficient interest’. The petitioner was the Secretary-
General of BELA and he achieved locus standi.156 There are some other cases through which 
environmental NGOs and individuals have instituted PIEL on ‘sufficient interest’ grounds. 157  
 
153 Farooque, supra note 114 at 152.  
154 Ibid. 
155 Faruque, supra note 69 at 348-349. 
156 Farooque, supra note 114 at 7.  
157 Md. Idrisur Rahman v. Shahiduffin Ahmed and others 51 (1999) DLR, AD, 162. Syeda Rizwana Hasan vs. 
Bangladesh & Ors 9 ADC (2012) 816 
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Moreover, the judgment also recognized the right to a healthy environment by analyzing the 
constitutional guarantee.158 Therefore, the court can initiate legal reforms by filling the gaps 
between law, policies and institutional frameworks through PIEL. The judges in Bangladesh 
through suo moto rule have redressed injustices committed by government agencies in 
contravention to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.159 
I asked a BELA spokesperson if the organization could file a PIEL against Asia Energy or the 
government. She said that since a PIEL cannot be filed against the company and therefore, the 
court would not hear about the issue of the case. In this regard, BELA or anybody who has locus 
standi could file a writ against the government, but the writ would not stand against the 
government, because the court may reason that there is no valid agreement between the company 
and the government, and the project did not harm anybody yet, and their rights were not violated. 
Any affected person or any NGO could file a suit before the environmental court about the validity 
of the EIA, but since DoE accepted the company’s EIA which they published later and granted an 
environmental clearance certificate, the court, in practice, might not hear the case.  
 
5.3.1. Violence, Repression and ‘Occupying Streets’ 
5.3.1.1. Phulbari Khoni Andolon  
 
Most of the respondents of my research stated that ‘occupying the street,’ is an effective way 
to achieve justice for people in the Bangladeshi perspective. During interviews, my respondents 
shared multiple examples of cases of harassment of Adibasis and non-Adibasis in the mining 
footprint. Many protesters were beaten by both by Dalal and security forces before, during, and 
after the movement. When protesters heard that ‘three or more people were killed’, they occupied 
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159 Faruque, supra note 69 at 354.  
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the street as their weapon to show their strength. During the four-day protest in Phulbari in 2006, 
thousands of local people occupied major streets. Adibasi men and women who could not attend 
the rally on 26th August 2006, they cooked, and feed protesters sang, and danced with traditional 
dresses on Dhaka-Dinajpur Highway by blocking all communication with the capital city which 
inspired hundreds of protesters. They were unmoved until the six-point demands were signed by 
the government and NCBD, although security forces tortured unarmed protesters. There were 
multiple clashes between protesters and security forces reported during this period.   
The government assured the company that they could implement the project despite having 
huge local resistance. During the campaign stage of the movement, the government deployed law 
enforcement agencies to suppress the protesters from the very beginning of the mobilization. The 
company personnel only contacted influential local people, whom they thought, could influence 
poor farmers. They manipulated those people with bribes and other undue amenities without 
making any connection with the mass of people. According to one of my respondents, company 
consultants bribed local administrative authorities. Dalal was empowered with huge money and 
power. The company provided money, and the local administration sheltered them. Dalal and other 
company agents on different occasions tried to break the ties which were built among protesters. 
They used different tactics to stop the movement.  
James Anaya, in his “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” 
of UN General Assembly, states:  
“Many cases have come to the attention of the Special Rapporteur in which Indigenous 
individuals or communities have suffered repression for their opposition to extractive 
projects. In several of the cases, Indigenous individuals and groups opposing extractive 
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projects have been met with acts of intimidation or violence, including violence resulting 
in death.”160  
 
Anaya demands that states must adopt necessary measures to secure the rights of Indigenous 
peoples so that they can express their disagreement with mining development in their territories. 
The states and companies must provide training to their security forces to protect Indigenous 
communities from any act of intimidation and violence.161 Anaya also recommends that companies 
who are developing resource extractive projects should take reasonable measures to protect 
Indigenous cultural and social patterns by adopting sensible policies and practices following 
relevant human rights standards.162 Justifying the demands of various environmental justice 
leaders, Bullard and Johnson argue that no community or nation, in any race or color, should be 
allowed to become a victim of environmental degradation. In connection with the arguments of 
Anaya, the authors claim that companies and governments have often exploited local Indigenous 
communities through their unsound and risky operations.163 The communities are also 
economically deprived due to unequal political power arrangements in society. 
In the case of the Phulbari Coal Project, concerned international organizations including the 
UN urged the Bangladesh government to stop the project. James Anaya, including six other Special 
Rapporteurs164 of the UN, issued a joint press release on 28th February 2012, calling for an 
immediate halt to the project and conveyed their concerns about violations of fundamental human 
rights of hundreds of thousands of people, including Indigenous peoples.165 They stated, 
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Sepúlveda, Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights. 




“Displacement on this scale, particularly of Indigenous peoples, is unacceptable without their free, 
prior and informed consent, and poses an immediate threat to safety and standards of living.”166 
The experts warned the government of Bangladesh that the “Phulbari coal mine should not be 
allowed to proceed because of the massive disruptions it is expected to cause.”167 In the wake of 
the protest, a Bangladesh Supreme Court Committee recommended the project be stopped as they 
found it to hurt the environment and Indigenous peoples. The court later asked the company to 
come up with proposals for an environmental rehabilitation project and compensation to meet the 
demands of protesters.168  
I identify that the Asia Energy Office Gherao Kormosuchi against the company was successful 
because the outcome of the movement reflected the demand of all people. Throughout the period, 
the protesters had been repressed by security forces, local powerful political leaders, and their 
goons. Many people could not protest publicly due to political pressures and criminal charges 
brought against them. Their anger was great, which was reflected in the Phulbari Khoni Andolon. 
In the following two sections, I incorporate examples of Bangladeshi direct action campaigns as 
part of environmental justice movements. The first one occurred between 2005 and 2007 
(concurrently with the Phulbari resistance movement), where Adibasi communities occupied 
streets and became successful without forming a coalition with national and transnational 
organizations. I am illustrating two other environmental movements where protesters are still 
fighting to be successful.  
 
 
166 United Nations, “Open-pit coal mine project in Bangladesh threatens human rights – UN experts” (28 February, 
2012), UN News. Online: https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/02/404922-open-pit-coal-mine-project-bangladesh-
threatens-human-rights-un-experts#.UXIIsbU3vzx  
167 Ibid.  
168 Sadid A. Nuremowla, Resistance, rootedness and mining protest in Phulbari, DPhil Thesis. 
University of Sussex, (2012) at 11.  
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5.3.1.2. Garo Movement to Protect Madhupur Forest 
 
As part of the Forest Department of Bangladesh’s strategy to construct eco-parks aiming to 
protect the remaining forest resources and to create employment for local people, an eco-park 
project called the Madhupur National Park Development, popularly known as the Madhupur Eco-
park, was planned to be constructed in the Madhupur forest in 1999. The Department would 
construct a boundary wall occupying 3000 acres out of the 21,000 acres of the total forest land. 
The World Bank and ADB supported and financed this eco-park project by giving loans to the 
Department.169 The proposed project would create picnic spots, lakes, ponds, and guesthouses to 
provide recreational facilities for promoting eco-tourism. Moreover, a road would be built along 
the boundary wall so that visitors could walk around the forest.170 The government’s concern was 
that national forests were being destroyed by local people, although Adibasi Garo171 and Koch172 
communities, who have been living in this forest for several hundred years, rejected the 
allegation.173 Their livelihoods largely depend on forest resources, which they manage 
traditionally. They also cultivate bananas and pineapples. They believe that ‘forest is the Mother’ 
because their survival depends on the forest, and there is no point in ‘killing their Mother’. 
Moreover, many cluster villages are surrounded by this core area of the forest, where many 
Bangalees migrated lately. They cleared some portions of forestlands and grabbed Adibasi 
 
169 Sadia Drong, “Problems and Issues of Garo and Koch Community in so-called Eco-Park Project of B’desh” (4 
December, 2008) in Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP). Online: https://aippnet.org/problems-and-issues-of-garo-
and-koch-community-in-so-called-eco-park-project-of-bdesh/   
170 The Forest Department Project Proposal, 2000.  
171 The Garo, also known as Mandi, is one of the Adibasi communities live in north-central and north-eastern parts 
of Bangladesh. This is the only community in Bangladesh who maintains matriarchy. They are mostly converted 
into Christianity now but have distinct cultural and social identity from other communities.  
172 The Koch is an ethnic community living in the North-Central and Northern regions in Bangladesh. Koch belongs 
to the Tibetan-Burman branch of Mongolions. They are very small number now in Bangladesh. There are a large 
number of Koch live in India in different states like Koch Bihar, Jalpaiguri and Meghalaya. 
173 Farid Ahmed and Nicholas P. Low, “Environmental Justice Dialogues and the Struggle for Human Dignity in the 
Deciduous Forest of Bangladesh.” In Environmental Justice in the Anthropocene, (Colorado State University, 2017). 
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people’s agricultural and traditional lands. They claimed that the government also alienated their 
lands in the name of various projects.174 The Department started a rubber plantation project in the 
forest by wiping off 8,000 acres of Sal forest with the loan from ADB and the World Bank. 
According to Adibasi communities, banana and pineapple plantations are largely being affected 
due to the commercial rubber plantation.175  
In this case, Adibasi Garo claimed that they heard the news from media reports and later from 
the local administration. The government never asked the surrounding communities whether they 
want the eco-park or not. They were never consulted, and therefore, they were not involved in the 
decision-making process. Hearing the news of the eco-park, local Garo started resisting the 
government’s decision, believing that the eco-park project will, directly and indirectly, affect their 
livelihood. The project would obstruct their freedom of movement, which is guaranteed by the 
Bangladesh Constitution.176 They formed small groups in each village to discuss the issue, formed 
a coalition with some NGOs, and contacted media. They also formed a committee named the 
Committee for Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights and Environmental Preservation (CIPLREP) to 
protect their interests.177 The Committee negotiated with Department officials, local 
administration, and respected ministers to halt the project and submitted a ten-point demand to the 
government. However, in most cases, the meetings failed to reach a firm solution. They organized 
several protest rallies, focus group discussions, human chains, roadblocks, assemblies and street 
events against the project.  
During the protests that started in 2000, many Adibasi Garos were arrested, tortured, and 
repressed in ways such as filing false criminal cases against protest leaders. A Garo activist named 
 
174 Ibid.  
175 Sadia, supra note 169.  
176 Article 36 of the Bangladesh Constitution.  
177 Ahmed and Low, supra note 173.  
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Piren was killed, and several were injured on January 3, 2004, when security forces and the forest 
department’s guards opened fire on a rally organized by the Committee. The project was 
suspended, and the Department was silent until January 2007 when a military-backed new 
government came into power. But the death of an Adibasi leader named Choles Ritchil by RAB 
force geared the movement up at a new pace.178 Protesters occupied the street until the government 
declared the project was suspended. Both the incidents attracted the attention of political parties, 
educated professionals and the media, as the Madhupur killings received widespread coverage in 
the national dailies. The killing of Piren and Richil boosted the spirit of determination in the Garo 
community. They were now ready to sacrifice everything for their cause. Adibasi Garo protesters 
did not stop resisting the powerful sectors, although they still have been facing various repressive 
actions of the administration. Up to 2007, nothing went wrong against their interests. The 
protesters, through negotiation, could create pressure on the Forest Department and could make 
the government understand that the forest is their only place for their livelihoods, and they had 
been depending on it for centuries.179 Moreover, through their protests, Adibasi Garos pointed out 
that they must be recognized as Adibasi and, as such, they have the right to participate in the 
decision-making process. Maybe the conflict could be avoided if they were allowed to explain 
through public participation that how the project will impact them. In that case, decision-makers 
could have designed the project accordingly. The current government appointed a Garo member 
of the parliament to the cabinet in the last two consecutive terms. Like Phulbari mining protesters, 
Garo protesters also see ‘occupy the street until their demands are fulfilled’ as the solution to 
resolve problems in Bangladesh.  
 
 
178 Ibid.  
179 Ibid.  
267 
 
5.3.2.3. Banshkhali and Rampal Movements  
 
In both Phulbari and Madhupur Adibasi protests, there have been violence, killings, arrests, 
deception, and lack of transparency that coincides with protesters’ accounts of the tactic of 
‘occupying the street.’ But the statement is not always true, even in the Bangladesh perspective. 
While I was researching and conducting my field activities in the Phulbari mining area and Dhaka, 
Bangladesh, I observed some other events of protest movements stopping at least two coal-fired 
power plants (Banshkhali and Rampal) which the protesters thought would be harmful and 
disastrous for residents and the environment. In both cases, local protesters gathered together and 
protested strongly but failed to stop the operations. The Environmental Justice Atlas (EJATLAS) 
labeled both movements as failed environmental justice movements; whereas, Phulbari was 
labeled as successful on their website. I have been trying to understand why the same group 
(NCBD), who was successful in Phulbari, failed in other environmental justice campaigns in 
Bangladesh.  
In Banshkhali of Chattogram district, at least five local people were killed by the police force 
in four subsequent protest movements to halt an imported coal-based power plant before April 4, 
2016.180 The controversial joint venture two 660MW coal plants are being built by a joint venture 
company (JVC) comprising two private companies, one from Bangladesh and another from China, 
on a forcefully-acquired coastal 600 acres of coastal land even before conducting an EIA.181 
Although the company failed to get an environmental clearance certificate from DoE as of May 6, 
2016,182 and the company suspended the work after the killing incidents, local protesters are 
 
180 IC Magazine, Justice for the Banshkhali People (July 7, 2016). Online: https://intercontinentalcry.org/justice-
banshkhali-people/  
181 The Independent, Deal signed for $2.5 billion project (17 February 2016). Online: 
http://www.theindependentbd.com/post/34279  




worried about their future.183 The Committee to Protect Households and Graveyards organized a 
protest rally where thousands of local people joined together to protest and ask the company to 
stop developing the project in Gondamara, Banhskhali. Police and local goons attacked and killed 
four people and left hundreds injured.184 However, police filed criminal cases against more than 
3000 protesters, who left their villages to avoid arrests. The local protesters claimed that the raids 
were being conducted to foil their movement against a coal-fired power plant there.185 The locals 
alleged that JVC’s local agents forced them to sell their lands to the company. Some of them were 
deceived as well.186 They think that since the company is allegedly a close ally of the current ruling 
party, they would easily take over the place for building coal-fired power plants disregarding the 
local outcries.187  
Due to my field activity in Phulbari, I could not attend a five-day long march from Dhaka to 
Rampal organized by NCBD in April 2016 as part of the ongoing protest, a joint venture coal-
based power plant in Rampal of Bagherhat District. The protest began several years ago 
among residents threatened with displacement by a JVC project in the event of a deal between 
Bangladesh’s Power Development Board (PDB) and India’s National Thermal Power Corporation 
(NTPC). The JVC decided to set up a 1350MW coal-based power plant at Rampal, a few 
kilometers away from the Sundarbans forest, at the cost of $1.5 billion.188 The Bangladesh 
government acquired 1,834 acres of farmlands without the consent of the people by using the 
 
183 New Bangladesh, “Banshkhali power plant construction suspended.” (8 April 2016). Online: 
http://www.newsbangladesh.com/english/details/13309  
184 New Age, “3,000 villagers prosecuted for Banshkhali killing” (April 6, 2016). Online: 
http://archive.newagebd.net/218214/banshkhali-killing/ 
185 Ibid.  
186 IC Magazine, supra note 180.   
187 Ibid.  
188 EJAtlas website: https://ejatlas.org/conflict/rampal-thermal-power-plant-rampal-bangladesh  
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police force and local goons even before the EIA was completed.189 The residents are poor farmers 
and fishermen whose livelihood depends on agriculture and shrimp cultivation. People of 
Bangladesh started protesting when they came to know that the plant would devastate the 
Sundarbans and farmlands, displace local people, and disrupt their livelihoods. NCBD organized 
another long march to stop this project in 2013 when twenty thousand participants demanded an 
immediate halt to the project.190 In May 2015, more than forty environmental groups signed a 
declaration in a conference in Dhaka denouncing the Rampal coal-fired power plant for its 
potential “to cause significant damage to the unique ecosystem of the forest.”191 The activists 
pointed out that the contract for the power plant is non-transparent and unequal. Many alleged that 
the Indian government would be more beneficial than the Bangladesh government. The protestors 
requested the government to explore an alternative site and means to generate energy without 
destroying the Sundarbans. Multiple protests and mobilizations against the project have also 
happened in India.192  
NCBD has been assisting both Banshkhali and Rampal protesters by providing information 
and strategies. None of the demonstrations that local people organized were able to attract national 
or international media and solidarity groups’ attention as the Phulbari Khoni Andolon did. 
Moreover, they are not as directly involved in this protest as they were involved in the Phulbari 
Khoni Andolon. On the other hand, the government and companies learned from the Phulbari 
experience. Since protests were not organized strongly like Phulbari and the media was silent on 
the government’s repression, the project proponents in both cases created terror situations so that 
 
189 Banktrack, “Equitor Principles of the Rampal Coal Fired Power Plant Project, Bangladesh”, (June 2015). Online: 
https://www.banktrack.org/download/rampal_equator_principles_full_analysis_pdf/rampal_equator_principles_full_
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protesters could not mobilize large numbers. Additionally, national solidarity and other groups are 
under surveillance. As a result, those groups cannot support them even after local protesters 
contacted them. Protesters were barred from meetings, assemblies, and rallies. Moreover, local 
protesters are being harassed at different times.  
 
5.4. Does the Phulbari Khoni Andolon Constitute an “Environmental 




Toffolon-Weiss and Timmons Roberts argue that direct actions and violent protest tactics are 
not always successful. According to the authors, groups with unified, centralized, and 
bureaucratized structures were more successful than groups with more decentralized 
organizational structures. But, the use of a legal strategy combined with other strategies, such as 
demonstrations and lobbying, by protesters can lead to a successful outcome.193 In my analysis, 
the Phulbari Khoni Andolon was successful because local, national and transnational 
environmental activists are tied together. An impression built in Bangladesh that ‘occupying the 
street’ can bring success, but only ‘occupying the street’ alone cannot be fruitful unless the whole 
movement is unified and centralized. The Phulbari Khoni Andolon was well planned and moved 
forward with the local-national-transnational alliance. I have mapped out and analyzed the 
Phulbari Khoni Andolon, which, I believe, is part of the global environmental justice movement, 
with some elements distinct to the global South 
I describe how this environmental justice movement requires two types of actors such as 
grassroots groups (Phulbari Rokkha Committee (PRC), Jatiyo Adibasi Parishad (JAP), NCBD and 
 
193 Melissa Toffolon-Weiss  and Timmons Roberts, “Who wins, who loses? Understanding outcomes of 




Adibasi leaders) and network groups (BAPA, Bangladesh environment network (BEN), and 
transnational environmental justice organizations (TEJOs)). Grassroots groups engage actively in 
physical participation in the field, and network groups maintain coalitions with grassroots groups 
by providing support and encouragement and by pressuring the project’s proponents and state 
actors. Local grassroots groups are multi-political groupings, civil society members, and NGOs 
who desire to protect their homelands, natural resources, and the environment from destruction. 
These groups including civil society demand for economic reform, transparent, accountable, and 
participatory governance, and action against corruption and human rights abuses.194  
Organizing the Phulbari Khoni Andolon was not limited to local considerations of the impact 
of the open-pit mining on local and Adibasi communities of the Phulbari mining area. Some local 
activists, NGOs, and national campaign groups collaborated in the process of forming the concepts 
of resistance, which is inspired by the discourse of environmentalism, nationalism, and anti-
colonialism that ultimately resulted in the 26th August Phulbari movement. In this case, local 
communities and activists were facilitated by the national groups to raise their voices against the 
open-pit mining involving the interaction of national and local understandings. Their conception 
was to protect the national interest and the rights of the affected people.  
Most of the network groups are NGOs and advocacy groups who have technical expertise and 
professionalism. They can emerge from both host-states and home-states and from other countries 
who work with solidarity. They help the local grassroots with academic and policy research and 
provide information related to projects in their territory, which ultimately assists in building a 
successful resistance movement. TEJOs are inspired by the global discourses of environmentalism 
 
194 Kishan Khoday and Usha Natarajan, "Fairness and International Environmental Law from Below: Social 
Movements and Legal Transformation in India." (2012) 25.2 Leiden Journal of International Law at 418. 
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in the global South.195 They create pressure on the company and both host-state and home-state 


















Red arrows: Pressure created by different actors on the company and the governments 
Black arrows: Connections and coalitions made (mutual, and one-sided communications) 
 
 

















Chart 1: Coalition Mapping of the Phulbari Movement: Pressure, Power, and Knowledge 
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Local and national protesters, and TEJOs may not share common interests, but they collaborate 
with others in aiding the communities against the transnational corporation, in this case, Asia 
Energy, and form a coalition to resist injustice.196 It is that kind of campaign that establishes 
environmental justice. However, there is another Adibasi environmental justice movement had 
been happening simultaneously in Bangladesh, where only local protesters succeeded in fighting 
an eco-park project of the government’s forest department that was believed to harm the 
livelihoods and subsistence of Adibasi communities. 
From the Phulbari Khoni Andolon experience, local and national settings of the movement 
may not completely stop the operation of the open-pit mining, as the company has a great influence 
over the government. The company has both IFIs and the host government who want the open-
cast project to go forward for economic development, although research says the project would 
harm local livelihoods and would not be beneficial for the country. Again, the company’s allies 
(shareholders) are powerful Western governments and a group of companies who have all sorts of 
power to implement a project and can apply their influence on host governments.197 However, they 
do not take the risk in every case. If they find the opposition or protest is weak, they use their 
power.  
In this case, the coalition between national and transnational network groups has made the 
Phulbari Khoni Andolon strong, which created pressure on the government, the company, and IFIs 
to keep them away from developing the project. Core movement actors from NCBD have built a 
coalition with the Adibasi and their traditional governance institutions through which protesters 
understood their future roadmap for resisting the company. They have educated themselves, 
motivated themselves, and resisted with the spirit of ‘we would rather die.’ The movement actors 
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197 Huffington Post, supra note 144.  
274 
 
have built a coalition with different local and national environmental and Adibasi NGOs and civil 
society members who have supported them with various resources. When NCBD leaders found 
that local and national coalition alone may not stop the company from building the project after 
experiencing the repressive activities in Phulbari, they created coalitions with TEJOs. TEJOs put 
pressure on the company through its networks, advocacies, and activism. They pressured the host 
government by publishing reports and organizing protests. IFIs were also driven by their actions; 
consequently, ADB pulled themselves away from funding the company.  
Suzana Sawyer investigates how neoliberal interventions of MNCs victimize local and 
Indigenous peoples and bind them to protest.198 She argues:  
“A shared concern with neoliberal economic policies of privatization and multinational 
investment implemented across the country in the resource sector helped formulate unity 
on a national level. Local people are not just the victims of all-powerful globalizing forces; 
rather their movement strategies invoke the similar transnational processes ‘that enable the 
hyper-exploitation under globalization.’”199 
 
Sawyer’s observations emphasize that the success of social movements is defined by a 
successful alliance with outside supporters, such as economic groups and environmental groups, 
in protesting against state policies that affect local people.200 Sawyer further argues that the protests 
against TNCs and their impacts on the land and the rainforests evoke desired conditions of social 
justice and accountability.201 In this current case, the protesters and economic and environmental 
observers viewed the protest as a successful social movement.  
Anu Muhammad, a Professor of Economics and the Secretary of NCBD said in an interview:  
 
198 Suzana Sawyer, Crude chronicles: indigenous politics, international oil, and neoliberalism in Equador. 
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“The 2006 Phulbari coal mine movement was a huge experience for us. It has shown how 
people from different ethnic groups, women, and men, joined the resistance movement 
even though many from among their leaders were in cahoots with the company. The 
movement is unprecedented, both regarding the scale of the uprising and the consciousness 
it has ignited and is still successfully resisting this imperialist grabbing project.”202  
 
 
Muhammad identifies that these counter-hegemonic efforts have mobilized public opinion 
against anti-people corrupt deals, and in favor of utilizing natural resources for the country’s own 
people and economy.203 According to David Pellow, “critical components of all successful social 
movements include organizing and mobilizing resources, framing grievances and goals, and 
engaging the political opportunity structures that constrain or enable social change.”204 Pellow 
argues that social movements result when the movement actors are excluded from routine decision-
making processes. Muhammad points out that in the various cases in Bangladesh, policy and 
decisionmakers have never considered the outcries for saving natural resources and the 
environment as well as protecting the rights of poor farmers and Adibasis.205  
In the case of the Phulbari Khoni Andolon, Asia Energy was confident about implementing the 
project because they knew that the project was backed by the World Bank, IFC, and ADB, and 
consequently, the government would help them. Whenever local people were asking them about 
displacement, resettlement plans, and compensation issues, the company could barely inform 
them. Most of my respondents claimed that the decision of the project development was taken 
without consulting with them. However, people of the Phulbari mining area were happy to hear 
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that a significant coal reserve was found in their area, and they accepted the decision of mining 
initially. They thought the project would be underground mining, like the neighboring Barapukuria 
Coal Project,206 which, they know, has a lesser impact on environment and livelihoods. When they 
heard that a foreign company would extract coal through open-cast mining, which would not only 
displace people but also destroy the ecology, sacred sites, heritage and biodiversity of the whole 
area, they had no option but to protest. Scheidel et al. argue that environmental justice movements 
address the impacts of unsustainable and sustainability policies. The actors of movement are, 
therefore, the most auspicious social forces for promoting sustainability in society to achieve 
change.207 Their struggles against unsustainable extraction, which cause harm to human dignity 
and environment, can qualify for both the environmental justice movement and environmental 




I argue that the demand for public participation in the decision-making process involving 
Indigenous and local communities is central to the environmental justice movement and those 
communities must be recognized properly. In other words, if Indigenous communities’ 
participation is not complete, and their rights and cultural aspects are not recognized properly, this 
constitutes an environmental injustice. Throughout the discussion of this chapter, I identify that 
 
206 Barapukuria coal mine is an underground coal mine at Barapuluria in the Dinajpur District in Bangladesh. The 
mine is operated by Barapukuria Coal Mining Co. Ltd. (BTMCL), the coal mining subsidiary of a government 
owned oil, gas and mining company named PetroBangla. The International Accountability Project reports that 
mining operations at Barapukuria have destroyed roughly 300 acres of land, impacting about 2,500 people in seven 
villages, as land subsidence of over one meter in depth has destroyed crops and lands and damaged homes. People in 
15 villages have also reportedly lost their access to water, as huge quantities of water pumped out for the 
Barapukuria mine caused a rapid drop in water levels. Source: 
https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Barapukuria_coal_mine   
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the rights and interests of Indigenous peoples (Adibasis) of the Phulbari mining region were not 
properly recognized, and their participation in the process of decisions was not considered. 
Although the company has published an EIA by following guidelines of Bangladesh and IFIs 
where they detailed out every possible outcome for local people and claimed that Adibasi rights 
were reflected, the findings of this research indicate differently. Adibasis of the Phulbari area think 
that they were not regarded as important actors due to their identity and vulnerability, and as such, 
their participation in the process was ignored. Some self-identified Adibasis communities of 
Phulbari are recognized while some are not recognized as ‘Indigenous peoples’ by the company, 
although some Adibasi leaders of the area claimed that the company would not have recognized if 
the current situation would exist that time.   
I identify that since Adibasis were not engaged properly, their traditional way of life, land 
rights and traditional knowledge have not been recognized. I argue that communities, especially 
Indigenous and other marginalized communities including their self-governing authorities, should 
have the right to participate in the decision-making process by having the power to approve or 
disapprove any project. Although Adibasis are enabled to apply their right to FPIC in this regard, 
the company consultants acquired their consents through undue practices. My Adibasi respondents 
claimed that the company deceived them by providing wrong and limited information about 
compensation, displacement, resettlement and false promises during consultations and surveys. 
However, most Adibasi respondents claimed that they were unaware of the consultation processes 
as they were not invited. Their concerns were ignored both by the company and the government. 
Although Adibasis and other low-income communities articulate that they would face more 
risks than other sections of citizens of the country, they have not asked for special benefits. Very 
few Adibasis raised questions about economic value sharing. Consequently, some Adibasi leaders 
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were very angry and mentioned that policy and decision-makers who live in the capital should 
exchange their houses and lands. Since they know about the mishandling of compensation through 
two neighboring mining projects, they feared of agreeing ‘money’ as ‘compensation’. They 
claimed a similar kind of agricultural and household property as compensation instead of money. 
However, their claims for land-for-land compensation were ignored. The company consultants 
nowhere in ESIA mentioned about Adibasi claims of land-for-land compensation. Adibasi and 
non-Adibasi communities of Phulbari resisted because they thought that they might not be 
compensated properly due to longstanding lack of recognition of their rights. They argue that the 
government has the responsibility to make decisions based on the fair distribution of risks and 
benefits among different actors in the case of mineral resource extraction. But the governments 
argue that the decision would bring the greatest benefit to the greatest number. 
The company’s recent non-transparent activities, ties with powerful actors, and repression 
experiences made them believe that allowing Asia Energy to develop the project in Phulbari would 
be disastrous, and their fate would be becoming environmental refugees. My Adibasi and Bangalee 
respondents frequently mentioned that the company tried to manipulate their straightforwardness 
through undue practices such as temptation, gifts, threat, intimidation, deception, lies, and 
repression through security forces and Dalal. Moreover, the company consultants misrecognized 
the rights and traditional lifestyles of Adibasi communities, and consequently, their movements 
against the company became successful and gained national and international focus. The company 
failed because local people already were prepared to sacrifice their lives, which I have shown in 
Chapter III by incorporating their conversations and accounts. They argue that there is a real threat 
to their social, economic and cultural security, to their health security, to the local environment, 
and to their right to participate in the decision-making process. All these threats establish a risk to 
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the recognition of their humanity. Through their movement, Adibasi communities claim that 
destruction of their livelihoods in the name of development can never bring real development for 
them. According to them, a problem cannot be solved without addressing the sustainability of the 
solution which, however, may create new environmental conflicts through a redistribution of 
environmental benefits and burdens. I argue that all actors, local, national and transnational, who 
are involved in fighting to stop unsustainability, can be termed as environmental activists. 
Environmental activists can address this issue of justice through their protests, campaigns, 
advocacy and solidarity against unsustainable policies.    
I have identified two forms that environmental justice movements take in Bangladesh. The first 
one is through the court process, and the other is through protest or occupying the street to achieve 
environmental justice for affected communities. The emergence of the environmental justice 
movement in Bangladesh started with winning a public interest environmental litigation where an 
NGO achieved standing right in filing a case in the Supreme Court of Bangladesh on behalf of 
affected communities against a government authority who carried out a development project. 
Before that, there was no clear direction in the statutes that ‘who has the right to fight’ against the 
government or public bodies that harm surrounding people and environment. Again, ‘occupying 
the street’ for protecting the rights and interests of affected communities is seen as another form 
of environmental justice movement in Bangladesh where some are successful, and some are not. 
By analyzing some protest movements in Bangladesh, I argue that the success of any 
environmental justice movement depends on how the protesters are unified and how their claims 
are presented.  
The Phulbari resistance was not only limited to locals, but some national economic and 
environmental campaign groups also were involved in the protest movement. I have mapped out 
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the building of a coalition among local protesters, national and transnational environmental justice 
organizations groups through which everyone is connected to protest the company’s illegal 
activities and the government’s repression. Local and national groups collaborated in the 
resistance, which was inspired by discourses of environmentalism, nationalism, and anti-
colonialism. Local communities were encouraged by NCBD in this case to raise their voices 
against the open-pit mining involving the interaction of national and local considerations. Such 
communities aimed to protect the national interest and the interest of affected people in the mining 
region. Other groups, such as international campaign and solidarity groups, also joined with local 
and national groups. However, local and national public interest groups and protesters, and 
transnational environmentalist organizations come together to give a general meaning and further 






The dissertation has examined the claims of Adibasi communities in a coalmine development 
process in Bangladesh by a London-based multinational corporation that ultimately culminated in 
violent protests in 2006. The projected mining footprint is densely populated by different ethnic 
communities, including Adibasis and Bangalees, whose livelihoods depend on agriculture and 
small businesses. This research identified that some traditional groups of the mining region call 
themselves ‘Adibasi’, which, to them and the Bangladesh government, is synonymous to the global 
term Indigenous peoples. Moreover, non-Adibasis or local Bangalees also refer to the distinct 
groups as Adibasi, and they are comfortable with this term. The dissertation started by synthesizing 
theoretical and conceptual literature on Indigenous rights, detailed the groups’ struggles against 
powerful actors, outlined the dominant environmental justice framework, and situated the groups’ 
resistance in the transnational or global environmental justice movement. By incorporating various 
theoretical understandings, the research examined the claims of Adibasi communities and other 
actors and what motivated them to join in the Phulbari resistance movement in Bangladesh. The 
research focused on the accounts of Adibasi communities and local and national activists in 
organizing the movement and their ultimate goals. In doing so, the dissertation investigated 
whether the protesters’ claims fit within the dominant understandings of the environmental justice 
movement by analyzing environmental justice frameworks such as recognition, distribution, and 
participation. However, throughout the dissertation, the recognition element played a vital role, 
and the specific elements of environmental justice movements as they play out in the global South 
became critical.  
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The journey of my research started in 2010 when I heard from an Adibasi person during his 
sharing the movement experience in Dhaka, Bangladesh. My central questions surfaced: How is it 
possible? Why are they still bearing their spirit of resisting? Why did not they forget their 
movement experience? Why are they still resisting whenever they hear about the development of 
open-pit mining in their region? Why do they not want the coal mine though it is said to bring 
economic gain for the country and the local people?  In the aftermath of the movement, many 
researchers have examined the struggle from multiple angles, but few have considered the 
Indigenous peoples’ own perception of their resistance. I was asked several times during the 
dissemination of this research in different conferences and informal meetings about whether 
communities who are demanding their recognition as Indigenous peoples are Indigenous peoples 
or not. I argue that recognition of the rights and identity of these communities as Indigenous 
peoples is the most important element in their struggle for justice. Adibasi communities of 
Bangladesh have consistently demanded official recognition as ‘Adibasi’ or ‘Indigenous peoples’. 
They have also accentuated the importance of recognition of their rights to land and control over 
natural resources. Since Adibasi communities of the mining region are not recognized by the 
Bangladesh state as ‘Indigenous peoples’, and there are restrictions from the government in using 
both ‘Indigenous peoples’ and ‘Adibasi’ to describe them, national and transnational 
developmental agencies tend not to recognize them in their description of activities as it goes 
against the government’s interest. In this current case, the company identified only three Adibasi 
communities as ‘Indigenous peoples’ in their official documents, which were prepared before the 
government’s current recognition politics. However, the company disregarded some other 
communities who claim themselves as Indigenous peoples.  
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After reviewing various definitions and interpretations of Indigenous peoples adopted by 
scholars that are widely accepted in international law, Chapter IV of the dissertation argues that 
those self-identified Adibasi groups should be qualified as Indigenous peoples. The research 
identified some firm features or characteristics for ‘being Indigenous’ and tested them through the 
conversations and accounts collected in the project areas. The findings of this research showed 
that Adibasi communities have most of the characteristics of Indigenous peoples set by 
international legal instruments to identify their ‘Indigeneity’. I argue that a national government 
does not have the authority to define any people; self-definition and self-identification of any 
community are enough for identifying or recognizing their status of identity. The claims of Adibasi 
communities in Bangladesh towards their recognition as ‘Indigenous peoples’ will not be defeated 
regardless of the non or misrecognition by the Bangladeshi government, and the rights embodied 
in international will be applied to those people.  
In Chapter II, I focus on the description of the Phulbari Coal Project and conclude that it would 
be destructive for local people, their livelihood, natural environment, and local biodiversity. The 
Bangladesh government’s neoliberal policy that encouraged MNCs to invest in economic 
development projects never worked, which the research showed by examining three MNCs’ 
intervention cases in resource extractive projects. The dissertation demonstrates that the 
governments, in different regimes after the introduction of neoliberal policy, have been dealing 
with destructive incidents in mineral resources that occurred by MNCs and identified that MNCs 
are more powerful than many states in the global South regarding benefit sharing. Besides, MNCs 
often cannot be held responsible for their destructive actions due to their ties with powerful states, 
financial institutions, and other actors.  
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Returning to the issue of the Phulbari open-pit coal project, Asia Energy has been selling shares 
in the London Stock Exchange (Alternative Investment Market) in the name of the ‘Phulbari Coal 
Project’, which TEJOs and advocacy groups have been protesting arguing that the company is 
doing illegal business. According to those solidarity, campaign and advocacy groups, the project 
does not exist, and there is no valid agreement between the government of Bangladesh and Asia 
Energy. The Bangladesh government recently conceded to activists’ claims about the validity of 
the contract and has been planning to a lawsuit against the company for continuing to sell shares 
in the name of the project. International organizations such as UNDP, UNICEF, and UN 
Rapporteurs have frequently requested the company to scrap the project in Phulbari. ADB, who 
had assured the company to finance the project, has confirmed that it would stop aiding the project. 
The second chapter also focused on the importance of EIA in resource extractive industries, which 
emerged during the neoliberal policy intervention in Bangladesh. The chapter identified that it is 
important that the rights and interests of Indigenous peoples that they acquired from international 
legal instruments should be reflected in every process of EIA.  
Chapter V answered the central question of the research by articulating the claims of Adibasi 
communities who thought that they were not adequately recognized as parties of an open-pit coal 
project. I argue that if Indigenous peoples, their rights and interests, and cultural aspects were 
appropriately reflected in the decision-making process of a project in their territory, they would 
receive proper justice. In other words, if these aspects are not recognized, their participation would 
not be regarded as complete, which is an injustice. The dissertation demonstrates that the demand 
for ‘complete’ participation involving the affected communities is central to environmental justice. 
Indigenous communities, including their self-governing authorities, should be enabled to 
participate in every process of decision-making by applying their recognized rights under the 
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UNDRIP and by having the power to approve or reject any development project in their territories 
which will affect their livelihoods.  
Through analysis of the field data and other primary research, the dissertation identified that 
the rights and interests of Adibasis of the Phulbari mining region were not properly recognized, 
and their participation in the process of decisions was not considered. Adibasi respondents of this 
research claimed that the project would not only have been a real threat to their social, economic, 
cultural, and health security, it would negate the close ties with forest and natural environment on 
which their livelihoods depend. All these threats establish a risk to the recognition of their 
humanity. Since Adibasis were not appropriately engaged, their traditional way of life, land rights 
and traditional knowledge have not been recognized. Findings also showed that the marginalized 
communities were deceived in the process of acquiring their consents, providing information about 
compensation, displacement, and resettlement and tempted with dreamy benefits and money 
during the engagement process. Both the government and the company ignored Adibasi concerns 
and dignity in the process. According to Adibasi respondents, their rights, interests, claims, and 
demands were not reflected in the EIA because Adibasi communities were not regarded or 
recognized as ‘people’ or ‘parties’ or ‘actors’ in the decision-making process. The findings show 
that Adibasi protesters were concerned about their non or misrecognition as important actors and 
understood that if they were not recognized adequately, they would be ignored in every process of 
the decision. Their demands for recognition as ‘actors’ or ‘parties’ in the decision-making process 
and recognition of their rights were justified and strong for establishing environmental justice for 
themselves. 
Additionally, Adibasi protesters were inclined to join the movement because they recognized 
that they would face more risks than other communities of people in the region for their long 
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history of marginalization and discrimination, which is explored in Chapter IV. However, the 
resistance movement did not ask for special favor or benefit for the uneven risks they would face. 
Adibasi protesters were very careful about the compensation the company and the government 
offered as their neighbors had been going through discrimination. They were scared that the same 
thing would happen to them if they allowed the company to develop the project in their locality 
and found their way to protest the project. Adibasis contended that the government has the 
responsibility to make decisions based on a fair distribution of risks and benefits among different 
actors in the case of mineral resource extraction, although the government argued that the decision 
would bring the greatest benefit to the greatest number.  
It is common throughout not only the global South but also in the global North that in the 
process of determining the approvals for resource extracting projects the voices of Indigenous 
peoples are rarely heard. Consequently, they find themselves in conflicting situations opposing 
development projects and project proponents. Because the governments in the global South are 
not defending the interests of their citizens, foreign companies are waived of their accountability 
for destructive actions. However, states should prioritize the interests of their citizens. This 
research identifies some imperative questions accrued from the accounts of Adibasi respondents, 
such as ‘development for whom’? Is it primarily for the benefit of an MNC, or is it for the benefit 
of the country and its citizens? Adibasi and non-Adibasi protesters answered these questions and 
claimed that the open-pit project would destroy their livelihoods in the name of development, 
which would never bring real benefits for them. In this current case, the action of the Bangladesh 
government could not ensure that the interests of local farming communities would be established, 
nor that Adibasis could exercise their rights. Consequently, the protesters challenged the 
government’s decision on the open-pit coal project and successfully founded a conception among 
287 
 
all citizens that they have been resisting not only because of their own interest but also for the 
significant interest of the country. Their resistance showed that the country would not benefit to 
the extent that the foreign company would from developing the project, which can be a lesson for 
the Bangladesh government.  
The misrecognition of Indigenous rights, their distinctiveness, traditional lifestyle and 
knowledge, and lack of engagement of local people in decision-making from the project proponent 
had generated inspiration among protesters to join the movements in Phulbari which ultimately 
became successful and attracted national and international focus. Chapter III incorporated accounts 
of Adibasi protesters, farming communities, and other Bagalee activists. Through their accounts 
and conversations, the chapter identified some successful dimensions of their organizing and 
building of social movements in Phulbari. The popular Phulbari movement started with local 
initiatives to protect the lives and nature of the area. The local initiatives built a coalition with a 
national campaign group named NCBD, who successfully motivated all walks of people of the 
mining region about the negative impact of the open-pit coal project and fought back against the 
multi-dimensional powerful forces (the government, the company, and financial institutions) 
through a bloody resistance movement in 2006. Surrounding Adibasi communities, regional and 
national environmental justice activists aimed to protect the national interests through their 
demonstrations. They found that fighting against powerful allies such as MNCs, TNCs, IFIs, and 
the host government will be almost impossible for them; in turn, they built coalitions with different 
transnational advocacy, solidarity, and environmental justice organizations (TEJOs).  
I conclude that the success of any environmental justice movement depends on how those 
resisting are unified and how their claims are presented. The current case is an example of a 
successful environmental justice movement where all actors of the Phulbari movement (local, 
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national, and transnational advocacy groups) tied together to give a general meaning to the 
resistance movement, which can be included under the banner of the global environmental justice 
movement. The dissertation also analyzed accounts of key organizers who believe that the Phulbari 
resistance movement was successful because movement actors and Adibasi people of Phulbari 
were able to overcome divide-and-conquer tactics attempted by Asia Energy. The findings of this 
research showed that Adibasi and non-Adibasi farming communities were influenced by the 
company’s unfair practices such as temptation, gifts, threat, intimidation, deception, lies, and 
repression. The MNC managed to use the state’s security forces against protesters. The dissertation 
examined that the company’s recent non-transparent activities, ties with powerful actors and 
repression experiences, made local and national protesters believe that allowing Asia Energy to 
develop the project in Phulbari would be disastrous and their fate would be becoming 
environmental refugees. The research identified two types of environmental justice movements in 
Bangladesh: public interest environmental litigation and occupying the streets. The first category 
empowers NGOs to file a writ petition before the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in favor of 
aggrieved or affected communities against government agencies for establishing their rights. 
Occupying the street is another completely different kind of environmental justice tactic seen in 
Bangladesh, where affected communities organize themselves and protest against project 
proponents to achieve justice. This current case analyzed that the efforts of these players fit within 
the framework of the environmental justice movement, as it manifests in the global South. I believe 
the resistance actors should be identified as environmental justice activists.  
While this research can inform analysis of mining conflict in Indigenous territories and has 
demonstrated that these protests form a part of the environmental justice movement in the global 
South, there are some shortcomings evident. The company representatives were not found after 
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repetitive efforts, which could ensure the reliability of data from a neutral perspective. The 
dissertation relied on accounts of Adibasi communities and activists, which critics and scholars 
can find as inconsistencies of information. However, a large number of data was gathered from 
ESIA and other documents prepared by the company. Another shortcoming of the dissertation is 
the data collected from only local Adibasi and some national Adibasi leaders for identifying or 
recognizing the ‘Indigeneity’ of Adibasi communities. Since the dissertation could not employ 
accounts of other ethnic communities who live in other parts of Bangladesh, policymakers and 
government representatives can question that Adibasi communities of the mining footprint can be 
identified as Indigenous peoples while others not. However, one of the purposes of this dissertation 
is to examine whether Adibasi or ethnic communities who are claiming to be Indigenous peoples 
can establish the status of Indigenous peoples or not under international law. I understand, studying 
on several self-identified and self-defined Adibasi communities by their accounts and 
conversations, and historical evidence cannot justifiably refer to other ethnic communities of a 
country.  
In researching the recognition of Adibasi communities and their claims for environmental 
justice, there are some questions raised which this research could not accommodate. Due to time 
and financial constraints, the research could not gather data from transnational environmental 
justice groups through interviews or participant observation. But the dissertation used their online 
reports, news, blogs, and other resources of their activities in London and other cities for fighting 
against neoliberal and unlawful practices of Asia Energy. The research even could not use email 
conversation with two transnational advocacy activists due to the limitations of York University's 
research ethics protocol, which was expired. Another limitation of the research is that it could not 
accommodate the analysis and discussion of host-state and home-state responsibilities to regulate 
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MNCs and TNCs in their respective boundaries. The research acknowledges that there is a 
limitation under international law in regulating corporations in both home-states and host-states. 
However, future research should focus on regulating TNCs and MNCs concerning their mining or 
other development activities on Indigenous territories. Therefore, it is ideal that international 
communities should consider linking home-state and host-state responsibilities, including 
accountabilities. Although the research offered analysis on the environmental justice movement 
through the court process, it could not comprehensively analyze judicial activism, which is seen 
in South Asian countries. While I suspect that those judges can make a huge impact in this regard, 
I was not able to establish that in this research.  
I anticipate that this empirical research will attract other ethnographic research on the 
environment, Indigenous peoples, resource extractive industries, and sustainable economic 
development in the global South. I expect my study will inform the analysis of the contemporary 
social, political, and economic policy of Bangladesh as well as other states in the global South. 
My study will also contribute to a better assessment and understanding of the content and processes 
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